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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2004, twenty-nine-year-old Pakistani citizen Abdullah Mesud
was released from Guantanamo Bay.2 Despite being captured while fighting
for the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, American military authorities
determined that Mesud's artificial leg made him a low-risk security threat.3
After his release, Mesud made his way to Waziristan, a lawless region in
Pakistan known as a terrorist haven.4 There Mesud planned and orchestrated
the kidnapping of two engineers working on a dam site, one of whom was
killed in the ensuing rescue attempt.5 Before fleeing the area, Mesud told
journalists, "We will fight America and its allies until the end. ' '6  Mesud
later chose to kill himself with a grenade rather than surrender to Pakistani
authorities. 7 He is just one of the many detainees that have resumed waging
terror against innocents following release from Guantanamo.'
2. Tim McGirk, Out of Captivity, TIME, Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,725179,00.html.
3. Id.
4. See James Rupert, Where the Taliban Still Rule: Movement Controls Areas Out of Pakistani
Government's Reach, NEWSDAY, Feb. 9, 2006, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/
nationworld/world/ny-wotaliO54618726feb09,0,4795733.story.
5. See McGirk, supra note 2.
6. Id.; see also Robert Bums, Joint Chiefs Chairman: Close Guantanamo, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 14, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/
14/AR2008011400210.html ("After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration
considered Guantanamo Bay a suitable place to hold men suspected of links to the Taliban and al-
Qaida, contending that U.S. laws do not apply there because Guantanamo is not part of the United
States. Lawyers for the detainees have challenged that interpretation ever since."). It is noteworthy
that several of the detainees that have been released from Guantanamo have rejoined the fight, and
this problem has caused many people to wonder whether a speedy detention and processing system
is warranted in light of this reality. As Joint Task Force Guantanamo has said, "At least 29 of those
detainees released or transferred from Guantanamo have been confirmed or are suspected of
returning to the battlefield." See Joint Task Force Guantanamo, http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.
mil/about.html#gtmo (last visited Sept. 16, 2008); see also Jack Spencer, Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Jim
Phillips & Alane Kochems, No Good Reason to Close Gitmo, Heritage Foundation, June 14, 2005,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm763.cfm#_ftn3 ("Mullah Shahzada, a
former Taliban field commander who apparently convinced officials at Guantanamo that he had
sworn off violence, was freed in 2003, and immediately rejoined the Taliban. He was subsequently
killed in battle in the summer of 2004 in Afghanistan. Maulvi Ghafar, a Taliban commander
captured in 2001, was released in February 2004. He was subsequently killed in a shootout with
Afghan government forces in September 2004.").
7. See Gitmo and Al Qaeda, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 1 18541055463578360.html?mod=googlenews wsj.
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Mike Mount, Pentagon: Ex-detainees
Returning to Fight, CNN.COM, May 7, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/07/
gitmo.bomber/index.html?er ("A Kuwaiti man released from U.S. custody at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base in 2005 blew himself up in a suicide attack in Iraq last month, Pentagon officials said
Wednesday. Abdullah Saleh al-Ajmi was one of two Kuwaitis who took part in a suicide attack in
Mosul on April 26, the officials said. Records show that an attack in Mosul that day targeted an
Iraqi police patrol and left six people dead, including two police officers. An announcement on a
jihadist Web site earlier this month declared that al-Ajmi was one of the 'heroes' who carried out the
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The United States is now in the seventh year of Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, 9 and the fifth year of Operation Iraqi Freedom.'l
Together these operations are known as the Global War on Terrorism (war
on terror)." The war on terror began following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and is currently being waged by the United States and
its allies 2 against the Al Qaeda network and its worldwide affiliates. 13
Mosul operation. A second man from Kuwait also took part in the suicide attack, the Web site said.
Pentagon officials who had been keeping track of al-Ajmi said they were aware he had left Kuwait
for Syria, a launching ground for terrorists into Iraq. A video posted on various jihadist Web sites
shows a number of images of al-Ajmi, followed by text reading, 'May God have mercy on you
Abdullah al-Ajmi. I send you a warm greeting 0 you martyr, 0 you hero, 0 you, a man in a time
where only few men are left."').
9. See infra note 134 and accompanying text; see also United States Central Command,
History, http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-history/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) ("The
terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001 led President George W. Bush to declare a
war against international terrorism. USCENTCOM soon launched Operation Enduring Freedom to
expel the Taliban government in Afghanistan, who were harboring Al Qaida terrorists and repressing
the Afghan population.").
10. See infra note 135 and accompanying text; see also Multinational Force Iraq, Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Background, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=
16&Itemid=5 (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) ("Continued Iraqi noncompliance with the Security
Council resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and
the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. Coalition forces remained in Iraq, helping to establish the
secure rule of law and restore the country's degraded infrastructure.").
11. See Donna Miles, Petraeus Explains Stance on Iraq's Link to U.S. Security, Responds to
Criticism, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 12, 2007, available at http://defenselink.mil/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47418 ("' I was trying very hard yesterday to avoid becoming more than
the MNFI commander,' he said. 'And so when I was asked about the global war on terrorism, I
thought that that perhaps is a question for those who are carrying out the global war on terrorism.
I'm carrying out one piece of that, which is the part that is prosecuted inside Iraq.').
12. See United States Department of Defense, International Contributions to the War on
Terrorism, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008) ("The United States began building the military coalition on September 12, 2001,
and there are currently 68 nations supporting the global war on terrorism. To date, 20 nations have
deployed more than 16,000 troops to the U.S. Central Command's region of responsibility. This
coalition of the willing is working hard every day to defeat terrorism, wherever it may exist. In
Afghanistan alone, our coalition partners are contributing more than 7,000 troops to Operation
Enduring Freedom and to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul-making up more
than half of the 14,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan. The war against terrorism is a broad-
based effort that will take time. Every nation has different circumstances and will participate in
different ways. This mission and future missions will require a series of coalitions ready to take on
the challenges and assume the risks associated with such an operation."); see also International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Mission, http://www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2008) ("On 5 October 2006, in another landmark step for NATO, NATO-ISAF took
command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from the US-led Coalition.
Now, some 52,700 troops (including National Support Elements) are providing support to the
Afghan authorities throughout the country, with the aim of boosting efforts to provide reconstruction
and development.").
13. The Al Qaeda terrorist network has claimed responsibility for bombings in Indonesia,
Shortly after the war on terror began, the military established the United
States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as the holding place for Al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in the war. 14  Since then, many
prisoners (detainees) have attempted to challenge their detentions in federal
courts by arguing that habeas corpus rights entitle them to a meaningful
review process to contest their detentions. '" These suits have posed unique
legal challenges that reflect the novel nature of the war.' 6 Contrary to past
state-based wars such as World War I and World War II, the current war is
in large part being waged against a stateless network of terrorists whose
practice of dressing as and targeting civilians makes it difficult to distinguish
between lawful and unlawful combatants. 17 As a result, the laws designed to
accommodate conflicts between belligerent nations do not provide easily
applicable processes to resolve the legal status of stateless, unlawful
combatants.18
England, Spain, Jordan, Africa, and Turkey. See GLOBAL SECURITY, Al Qaeda General Overview,
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2008).
14. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
15. See generally 151 Cong. Rec. S12731 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham)
("A Canadian detainee who threw a grenade that killed an American Army medic in a firefight and
who comes from a family of longstanding Al Qaida ties, moves for preliminary injunction
forbidding interrogation of him or engaging in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of him.").
This is an example of a habeas petition filed on behalf of Guantanamo Bay detainees, introduced by
South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham during the Congressional debate on the passage
of the Military Commissions Act, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?
dbname=2005_record&page=S 12731 &position=all (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
16. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President's War Power
Necessarily Remains "The Power to Wage War Successfully," 53 DRAKE L. REV. 851, 860 (2005).
17. Id. at 862; see also Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban
Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed
Conflict, 55 A.F.L. REV. 1, 15 (2004) ("The unconventional operations and attacks of al-Qaeda and
the Taliban in armed conflict are much more dangerous and lethal to protected noncombatant
civilians than has been seen historically with saboteurs, spies, guerillas, and other typical unlawful
combatants who mask themselves perfidiously as protected civilians. In contrast to merely hiding
among protected civilian noncombatants illegally, al-Qaeda has squarely targeted them and has
attempted to maximize civilian casualties with the apparent approval of the Taliban. Nonetheless,
al-Qaeda and Taliban behavior of exploiting civilian disguise in armed conflict unlawfully is related
closely to the conduct of the types of civilian-attired unlawful combatants referenced above. Neither
group is entitled to POW status upon capture.").
18. See Bialke, supra note 17, at 15 ("Admittedly, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and other
international laws of armed conflict, do not specifically envisage an armed conflict resembling the
armed conflict against al-Qaeda continuing in Afghanistan and elsewhere across the globe. An
asymmetric international armed conflict where one party (the Taliban, a defacto state) sponsors and
partially incorporates members of a global stateless organization (the al-Qaeda) that directs relatively
independent factions to engage in massive and worldwide suicidal terrorism against protected
civilian populations, is a fairly new paradigm. Regardless of these atypical attributes of defacto-
state sponsored international terrorism, determining the legal status of captured combatant Taliban
and al-Qaeda members in accordance with existing LOAC remains a matter of relatively simple
analogy.").
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The United States government has attempted to fashion a response to
these challenges that is legally and militarily feasible. Congress enacted and
President Bush signed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),1 9 attempting to clarify the
habeas rights to which these noncitizen detainees are entitled.20  The
Supreme Court has issued four detainee-related rulings since 2004, and a
decision in Boumediene v. Bush was issued on June 12, 2008.21 Yet despite
the Court's rulings and Congressional legislation, many constitutional
questions persist. 22 A common theme underlying these questions is whether
the Constitution applies to detainees, and if so, how.23  Furthermore, the
flurry of Legislative and Executive branch activity has led many to question
whether the separate co-equal branches of government are observing their
proper boundaries as they work to resolve the legal issues arising from
detainee detentions.24
This Comment addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the
debate over detainee rights: whether the DTA/MCA review process is a
proper exercise of congressional authority to determine the habeas rights of
detainees in light of the habeas statute, the Constitution, and the Geneva
Convention.25  This Comment will argue that the statutory review process
19. See infra note 20.
20. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 110 Star. 2680,
2742-44; Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
21. See Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195 (June 12, 2008). This decision is discussed in the
Postscript. See infra Part IX.
22. A comprehensive discussion delineating the applicability of each constitutional provision to
the detainees is beyond the scope of this article, but in light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
questions have been raised regarding the possible reach of constitutional protections such as Fourth
Amendment search and seizure and Fifth Amendment due process to detainees, not only in
Guantanamo, but in battlefields across the globe. Such extraterritoriality is far beyond the scope of
the Constitution's traditional limits, especially for alien enemies detained abroad. See infra notes
103-16 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 348-55 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 413 and accompanying text. Foreign affairs have traditionally been the realm
in which the Executive branch enjoys its greatest freedom from the checks and balances inherent in
domestic governance. However, the Bush Administration's robust interpretation of the President's
Article II commander-in-chief authority did not go unaddressed by the Supreme Court, especially
when the Court viewed the President asserting broad executive authority at a moment of perceived
political weakness. Id.; see also infra note 414 and accompanying text.
25. Whether those statutes are constitutional exercises of congressional authority hinges on two
factors. The first factor is the rights to which the Court determines detainees are entitled. If the
Court finds, as is argued here, that detainees have no statutory or constitutional right to habeas, then
Congress's enactment of the DTA and MCA were proper exercises of Congress's constitutional
authority. Conversely, if the Court finds the detainees have a constitutional or statutory right to
habeas, then the DTA and MCA would be unconstitutional abridgments of those rights. A short
was a proper exercise of congressional authority and will address the
relevant issues as follows.
Part II will provide a general background of the writ and examine its
historical origins, its incorporation into the Constitution, the operation of the
writ in federal court, and the Court's habeas jurisprudence prior to the war
on terror.2 6 Part III will detail the system of executive detention against
which the writ has been asserted, focusing on the Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. 7 Part IV will analyze judicial and congressional responses to
legal challenges brought by citizen and noncitizen detainees against that
system of executive detention.28 Part V will discuss the unresolved
questions regarding the nature and breadth of detainee legal challenges.29
Part VI will evaluate the review process provided under the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and Military Commissions of 2006 in light of habeas
obligations under domestic and international law.3 ° Part VII will consider
the implications of the legal debate on the larger war effort.3' Part VIII will
conclude the Comment, and Part IX discusses the Boumediene decision.32
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the relevance of habeas corpus to detainees
imprisoned in the war on terror, it is beneficial to develop a basic knowledge
of the writ's historical development and practical function. The writ as
originally construed in medieval England bears little resemblance to its
contemporary understanding as a check on unlawful executive detention.33
Yet the contemporary understanding was incorporated into the
Constitution,34 and since then the Supreme Court has wrestled with defining
discussion of the implications of the Boumediene decision is presented infra in the Postscript. See
infra Part IX. Second, the scope of review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is dictated by what
Congress intended in the DTAIMCA, and a broad appellate review that infringes on the President's
wartime authority would be seen as an improper exercise of congressional authority. Recent
detainee litigation has focused on what habeas rights the detainees do or do not possess, and
therefore the Comment couches the discussion accordingly. A short analysis of the second factor
and why a robust appellate review does not violate the President's wartime prerogatives is included
infra in Part VI.D.5.
26. See infra notes 33-131 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 132-51 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 152-279 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 280-309 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 310-403 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 404-26 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 427 and accompanying text. This article was written prior to the Court's
decision in Boumediene. Hence, the Postscript discussing Boumediene follows the Conclusion. See
infra Part IX.
33. See infra notes 36-54.
34. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the scope of the writ's application to citizens and aliens.35 The discussion
that follows describes the evolution of the writ, both in terms of its meaning
and its application, and the ways in which the Court has applied it to those
seeking to assert it against executive detention.
A. Origin and Evolution of the Writ in England
Known as the "Great Writ," the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
3 6
originated in medieval England.37 Its origins are believed to date back to the
Magna Carta3 8 and perhaps even to William the Conqueror.39  Originally
conceived as a legal means of ensuring an individual's in-court appearance
before the King's judgment was issued against him,40 the writ gradually
developed into a tool for the King's courts to establish jurisdiction over
independent local courts.41  This was accomplished by requiring "widely
dispersed and fiercely independent local courts to subjugate their judgments
concerning a prisoner to those of the Crown's courts. 42  Further legal
evolution occurred43 as the writ was used to compel various state actors to
35. See infra notes 91-131 and accompanying text.
36. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction. Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2036-37 (2007).
37. See William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to
Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983,992 (1978).
38. See Muhammad Usman Faridi, Streamlining Habeas Corpus While Undermining Judicial
Review: How 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) Violates the Constitution, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 361, 366
(2006). The author notes that "[h]abeas corpus has its roots in the thirteenth century English charter
Magna Carta, which provides that a person cannot be imprisoned 'save by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land."' Id.
39. See Duker, supra note 37, at 987-88. As Duker notes:
When the Normans arrived in England in 1066, they found no central court system. Even
the "national system of local courts" was largely overshadowed by small private
franchise units. The absence of a central administration was discordant with the Norman
notion that justice flowed from the king. To implement this notion, William the
Conqueror introduced the Curia Regis (king's council) and the royal missi (itinerant
justices), but left the local courts standing .... For William's centralization of the court
system to be effective, uniform procedures, including a standard form of precept to
compel a defendant's appearance, were necessary.
Id.
40. Id. at 992.
41. John A. Sholar, Jr., Habeas Corpus and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 661, 667
(2007).
42. Id. at 667.
43. See Duker, supra note 37, at 1004.
By the middle of the fourteenth century, the use of habeas corpus in response to petitions
on behalf of prisoners so that they might be presented before the court was sufficiently
common to take on the status of a distinct form of habeas corpus: habeas corpus cum
present alleged defendants for trial before common law courts.44  This
transformation continued until the mid-seventeenth century when the writ,
given greater force through judicial and legislative pronouncements,45
appeared in its modem role as a judicial check against unlawful executive
detention.46  What began as a means of consolidating the Crown's
jurisdictional control quickly became the principal legal remedy for
contesting unjust executive detention; the Monarchy was now required to
justify its detentions in common law courts.47
English political developments of the mid-seventeenth century solidified
the legal development of the writ. The political upheavals of the
Interregnum period-beginning with the beheading of King Charles and
culminating in the reign of Oliver Cromwel148---occasioned the end of the
monarchy's secret convictions outside of common law courts.4 9
Parliament's 1641 vote to eradicate the Court of the Star Chamber °
demonstrated its intent to end the Crown's private show trials and bring all
judgments resulting in government detention within the purview of the
common law courts.5 ' Some have argued that such legal and political
transformation served to institutionalize the new understanding of the writ as
a fundamental check on executive detention.5 2  This argument is likely
correct. If the writ was so understood, then the Framers, as heirs and
causa, or simply, corpus cum causa.
Id.
44. See Sholar, supra note 41, at 667-68 ("The Writ continued to evolve throughout the years,
and by the sixteenth century, the first (unsuccessful) interaction between the Admiralty and the
courts over Habeas was documented in Dolphyn v. Shutford. Eventually, in Thomilson's Case and
Hawkridge's Case, the Writ was put successfully to the Admiralty, forcing it to deliver prisoners to
the common law courts. By forcing the Admiralty to obey the Writ, the courts were able to show
their primacy over the actions of an agent of the Monarch.").
45. See id. at 668. Two pivotal events occasioned this transformation. In 1620, a court case
known as Chamber's Case was the first instance where a court "used Habeas Corpus to free a
prisoner who had been unlawfully jailed by the Monarch's Privy Council, rather than using it as a
means of protecting jurisdiction." Id. at 668. Also, in 1641 Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus
Act, which did away with the much-maligned Court of the Star Chamber. Id. at 669. Habeas corpus
now stood as an effective means with which to seek judicial redress for unlawful executive
detention. See also Duker, supra note 37, at 1035. Duker verifies this development, noting that
"Chamber's Case confirmed that the writ of habeas corpus had assumed a new role. No longer was
it primarily an instrument employed by the common-law courts to protect their jurisdiction. The
questioning of the validity of commitments, previously an incidental effect of the writ, now became
the major object." Id.
46. See Sholar, supra note 41, at 668.
47. See Duker, supra note 37, at 1036.
48. See History of the Monarchy, The Stuarts, Charles I, http://www.royal.gov.uk/output/
page76.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
49. See Sholar, supra note 41, at 669.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Duker, supra note 37, at 1037.
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students of the common law, would have ensured its inclusion in America's
founding documents.53 Indeed, the Framers' appreciation of the writ is
demonstrated by the fact that it is specifically provided for in the
Constitution.54
B. Constitutional Incorporation of the English Common Law Writ
Despite the federalism concerns raised by some delegates,55 the writ was
recognized by the Founders and was, as noted above, of sufficient
importance to warrant inclusion in the constitutional text.56  Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that the "privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
53. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-74 (2004) ("Habeas corpus is, however, 'a writ
antecedent to statute ...throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.' The writ
appeared in English law several centuries ago, became 'an integral part of our common-law heritage'
by the time the Colonies achieved independence ... and received explicit recognition in the
Constitution, which forbids suspension of '[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."') (internal citations
omitted).
54. See infra note 57.
55. See Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
451, 456-57 (1996). Maryland delegate Luther Martin voted with the minority on the Suspension
Clause motion, saying:
As the State governments have a power of suspending the habeas corpus act [in cases of
rebellion or invasion], it was said there could be no good reason for giving such a power
to the general government, since whenever the State which is invaded or in which an
insurrection takes place, finds its safety requires it, it will make use of that power-And it
was urged, that if we gave this power to the general government, it would be an engine of
oppression in its hands, since whenever a State should oppose its views, however
arbitrary and unconstitutional, and refuse submission to them, the general government
may declare it to be an act of rebellion, and suspending the habeas corpus act, may seize
upon the persons of those advocates of freedom, who have had virtue and resolution
enough to excite the opposition, and may imprison them during its pleasure in the
remotest part of the union, so that a citizen of Georgia might be bastiled in the furthest
part of New-Hampshire--or a citizen of New-Hampshire in the furthest extreme to the
south, cut off from their family, their friends, and their every connection-These
considerations induced me, Sir, to give my negative also to this clause.
Id. (emphasis in original).
56. See Sholar, supra note 41, at 672. Sholar notes that:
At the Convention, Charles Pinkney of South Carolina moved that "[t]he privileges and
benefit of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature except
upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding
months."
Id.
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." 57  Following
ratification, Congress followed suit and enacted section 14 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.58 The Act provides that "courts of the United States, shall have
power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not
specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of
law."
, 59
So vital was the writ that following the Constitutional Convention there
was fierce debate over the effectiveness of the Suspension Clause.6° Some
questioned whether it would safeguard a robust interpretation of the writ as a
prohibition against unjust government detainment, particularly of those
expressing minority or unpopular views.61 Furthermore, with respect to the
ratification debate, "four states specifically asked for a clause in the new
Constitution guaranteeing the right to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus without
any means of suspension., 62 Subsequent American history, including recent
cases discussed infra,63 reveal that the writ was in fact employed
successfully in instances where citizens and aliens alleged unlawful
government detention.64 In sum, it is clear that the Founders worked to
assure the states that the Constitution provided a way to challenge any unjust
executive detention that might impinge on their citizens' liberty. 65  Having
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
58. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14.
59. Id.
60. See Freedman, supra note 55, at 456. Freedman provides an excerpt of James Madison's
notes that record the debate at the Convention on Charles Pinkney's habeas motion:
Mr. Pinkney, urging the propriety of securing the benefits of the Habeas corpus in the
most ample manner, moved "that it should not be suspended but on the most urgent
occasions, & then only for a limited time not exceeding twelve months"
Mr. Rutlidge was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable-He did not conceive that a
suspension could ever be necessary at the same time through all the States-
Mr. Govr. Morris moved that "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the public safety may require
it".
Mr. Wilson doubted whether in any case a suspension could be necessary, as the
discretion now exists with Judges, in most important cases to keep in Gaol or admit to
Bail.
The first part of Mr. Govr. Morris's motion, to the word 'unless' was agreed to nem: con:
-- on the remaining part; N.H....
Id.
61. Id.
62. Sholar, supra note 41, at 673.
63. See infra Parts IV.A.1-3 and accompanying text.
64. See id.
65. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 121 (2005) ("Another
section 9 clause, sounding in both federalism and separation of powers, guaranteed that 'the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.' In the absence of any such extreme circumstance, courts
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explored its value during the founding period, it is now appropriate to
consider how the writ is in fact asserted against unlawful executive
detention.
C. The Operation of the Writ in Federal Court
The writ of habeas corpus is:
[T]he procedural mechanism through which courts have insisted
that neither the King, the President, nor any other Executive official
may impose detention except as authorized by law. Where the writ
runs, courts have the power and responsibility to enforce the most
basic requirements of the rule of law, even in wartime.
66
But where the writ runs,67 the authority on which it runs,68 the manner in
which its availability can be restricted,69 and its application to aliens are
important issues the Supreme Court has dealt with as it has applied the writ
in different circumstances.70  These general issues can be consolidated into
three specific issues for purposes of habeas jurisprudence: jurisdiction,
merits challenges, and procedural challenges. 71
would remain open to hear all challenges to the lawfulness of executive detentions.").
66. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2032; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474-75
(2004) ("But '[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
the legality of executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.'
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring in result) ('The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by
executive authorities without judicial trial'). As Justice Jackson wrote in an opinion respecting the
availability of habeas corpus to aliens held in U.S. custody: 'Executive imprisonment has been
considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be
imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land. The judges of England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to preserve these
immunities from executive restraint.' Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
218-219 (1953) (dissenting opinion). Consistent with the historic purpose of the writ, this Court has
recognized the federal courts' power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of
cases involving executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace. The Court has, for
example, entertained the habeas petitions of an American citizen who plotted an attack on military
installations during the Civil War, Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866), and of admitted enemy aliens
convicted of war crimes during a declared war and held in the United States, Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942), and its insular possessions, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).").
67. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2032.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2037-40.
The initial inquiry is whether the court has proper jurisdiction to hear
the matter.72 As noted above, section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 grants
federal courts the statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals to executive
detention.73 Although it seems simple enough, jurisdiction remains a
debatable issue. Whether the statute allows federal courts to grant the writ
to state prisoners in the absence of a statute granting such authority has been
disputed since John Marshall served on the Court.7 4 This issue is important
because subsequent amendments to the federal habeas statute, 75 now
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2241,76 have raised new questions about whether the
habeas right is a legislative one.77 Moreover, some also question whether
legislative enactments can legally restrict habeas rights without violating the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution.78
Another key feature of habeas jurisdiction is the fact that "a grant of
habeas jurisdiction not only authorizes courts to hear cases, but also confers
on those who can invoke the jurisdiction a right to the remedy of release
unless the custodian can show that detention is lawful. 79  Indeed, the
defining feature of the writ is that, if successful, it grants release from
72. Id. at 2037-38.
73. See Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 58.
74. See Faridi, supra note 38, at 367. Faridi notes that:
Justice Marshall interpreted Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to mean that the Act
does not grant federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners,
and that federal courts lack the power to issue writs of habeas corpus unless affirmatively
granted by a statute.
Id.
75. See id. at 368. The federal habeas statute was subsequently amended in 1833 "to empower
federal courts to hear claims where states detained federal officers for acts authorized by federal law,
and later in 1867 to enforce newly created federal rights during the Reconstruction era." Id. The
1867 Act was itself amended in 1885. Id. The most relevant amendment for this discussion is that
which occurred under the auspices of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which added two new
subsections, each labeled (e), which preclude federal court jurisdiction to hear detainee habeas
appeals. See Comell University Law School Legal Information Institute, available at http://www.
law.comell.edu/uscode/28/2241 .html (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005).
77. If claimants must base their habeas petitions solely on the grant of jurisdiction contained in
the habeas statute, and not on an inherent right to habeas under the Constitution, this implies that the
statute is the principal source of the right, despite the fact that the right to habeas corpus is explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution. See Faridi, supra note 38, at 367. Under this analysis, Congress
would determine the extent to which individuals have the right to challenge executive detention.
This is doubtless a controversial proposition given the wartime context and the recent history of
single party control of the Legislative and Executive branches.
78. See id.; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2038. The authors note that "[a]lthough
the existence of habeas jurisdiction is initially a statutory question, limits on statutory jurisdiction
sometimes present constitutional questions." Id. These constitutional questions, they argue, might
lend credence to the argument that "implicit in the Constitution's structure" is a grant of "substantive
rights to judicial relief from executive detention," a position they attribute to Professor Henry Hart.
Id. at 2039.
79. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2038.
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executive detention. Yet, release is predicated upon the detained individual
demonstrating why his detention is an unlawful one. To do that, he must
marshal evidence to contest the merits of his detention.
Substantive challenges to the merits of executive detention represent the
second key issue in federal habeas challenges.8 0 Habeas petitioners typically
seek to challenge the merits of their detentions in three ways. First, in line
with Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, s l the initial argument
rests upon separation of powers and considers whether the Executive branch
has legal support, vis-A-vis Congress, in conducting the detainment.8 2
Second, the petitioner alleges his constitutional right to be free from
unlawful detention.8 3  Third, habeas petitioners can point to extra-
constitutional rights, such as those enshrined in the Geneva Conventions,
which might restrict executive detention in specific instances.8 4 Each of
80. See id. at 2039.
81. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, Justice
Jackson laid out a three-part framework for evaluating the constitutional authority of executive
action. He reasoned that:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said
(for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government, as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President
pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Id. at 636-38.
82. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2039.
83. See id. A good example is an individual detained for protesting the war in violation of his
First Amendment rights. Id.
84. Id.
these arguments is relevant because detainees at Guantanamo Bay have
presented similar arguments in contesting their detentions.85 Finally, having
challenged both the jurisdictional and merits aspects of their detention,
habeas petitioners also attempt to show that the detention process itself is
violative of their procedural rights.86
Judicial review of the Executive's detainment procedures or processes
represents the third component of federal habeas actions." As it pertains to
enemy aliens asserting the writ against government detention, this review
analyzes the military detention procedures, the evidence collection
procedures, and the appeals process if one is available.88 Procedural
questions are integral as much of the detainee litigation occurring in the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court concerns the sufficiency of
the process available to detainees seeking to challenge the merits of their
detentions.89 However, before addressing the recent detainee cases, it is
necessary to consider how the Court has dealt with habeas challenges
brought by petitioners residing outside the jurisdiction in which the petition
is asserted. These decisions highlight the Court's evolving habeas
jurisprudence, and it is against the backdrop of these decisions that the
Court's war on terror decisions must be understood.90
D. Habeas Jurisprudence Prior to the War on Terror
In many respects, the development of the Court's habeas jurisprudence
mirrors its development in other areas of substantive constitutional law. Just
as the Court has utilized substantive due process to expand the range of
protected liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment in the post-Lochner
period,91 the Court has also been willing to apply the writ more expansively
85. See infra Parts IV.A-B.
86. See id.
87. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2039.
88. See infra Part V.
89. See id.
90. See infra Part II.D.
91. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1469 (2005) ("One hundred years after the Supreme Court invalidated a law regulating bakers'
working hours as a violation of liberty of contract in Lochner v. New York, the case and its legacy
are at the forefront of debate over the Constitution. Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in Lawrence
v. Texas, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment no more protects the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy than it protects the right to work 'more than 60 hours per week in a bakery.' Conservative
scholar Robert George, attacking the majority opinion in Lawrence and the Massachusetts Supreme
Court opinion recognizing a right to same-sex marriage, asserts that 'it is important to make clear
that what is going on in the state and federal courts is Lochnerizing on a massive scale."'); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Practising Law Institute Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation Symposium,
Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REv. 1501, 1502-05 (1999) ("Substantive due process was
used, as you know, in the first third of this century to aggressively protect economic liberties from
government interference. Lochner v. New York is the quintessential case from that era.").
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in the twentieth century than in the previous two centuries.92 A notable
exception to this trend was the Court's general unwillingness to let
petitioners located outside the jurisdictional boundaries of federal courts
assert the writ in those courts, particularly if those petitioners were enemy
aliens detained outside the United States.93 The Court hewed closely to a
strict jurisdictional interpretation of the habeas statute until subsequent
decisions overruled that principle as it applied to domestic cases. 94 It was
later overruled as it applied to international habeas cases brought during the
current war on terror.
9 5
The Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Ahrens v. Clark illustrated the
Court's traditional reluctance to let petitioners in one federal jurisdiction
assert habeas claims in another federal jurisdiction.96 The issue in Ahrens
was "whether the presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the District
Court of the person detained is prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus."97 Even though they were detained at Ellis Island, New
York, 120 Germans being held for deportation brought their claims in
federal court in Washington, D.C.9 8 The Court construed the words "within
their respective jurisdictions"99 of the habeas statute to mean that a federal
court could not entertain writs filed by petitioners outside its territorial
jurisdiction. 0  This interpretation of the habeas statute was important
because it led the District Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager to conclude that it
lacked jurisdiction over the claims brought by German detainees seeking to
utilize the writ.' 0' The Eisentrager holding appeared to affirm this
interpretation and confirm that a strict interpretation of the habeas statute's
92. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474 ("As it has evolved over the past two centuries, the habeas statute
clearly has expanded habeas corpus 'beyond the limits that obtained during the 17th and 18th
centuries.' Swain v. Presley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 ... (1977).").
93. See infra notes 103-14.
94. See infra notes 117-27.
95. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479.
96. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
97. Id. at 189.
98. Id.
99. For the literal language of the then-current habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 452, see Rasul, 542
U.S. at 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 189. The Court rejected the petitioners' claims and held that "apart
from specific exceptions created by Congress the jurisdiction of the district courts is territorial. It is
not sufficient in our view that the jailer or custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction." Id. at 190
(citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court expressly reserved the question "of what process, if any,
a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert
federal rights." Id. at 192 n.4.
101. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950).
jurisdictional requirements was appropriate for both domestic and
international habeas cases.
0 2
In Eisentrager, twenty-one German nationals imprisoned at Landsberg
Prison in Germany petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. 10 3  They were convicted by a United States
Military commission for engaging in hostilities against the United States in
China.0 4  The Court dismissed the petitions, finding that neither the
Constitution nor any statute supported holding the writ of habeas corpus to
be available to alien enemies captured outside the United States. 10 5
Furthermore, the Court noted that in those instances where habeas rights
were afforded to aliens, it was because those aliens were located within the
United States.'0 6 As petitioners were captured in China and imprisoned in
Germany, they had no physical connection to the United States that
warranted application of federal law or the constitutional protections of
habeas corpus. 107 Thus, the Court found "no basis for invoking federal
judicial power in any district ...."10'
This decision was important on several levels. First, it clearly rejected
the notion that the German petitioners had a right under the habeas statute to
bring a habeas claim in a federal court where the petitioners' capture and
detention occurred beyond the reach of federal court jurisdiction.'0 9 Second,
it rejected the notion that the Constitution itself conferred the habeas right to
such aliens located outside the United States."0 Third, it made explicit that
the extension of habeas rights to aliens was premised upon those aliens
having a physical presence in the country."' Addressing this point, the
Court noted that:
102. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 778.
107. Id. The Court went to great lengths to reject the petitioners' contention that aliens outside the
United States were entitled to American courts via habeas corpus and noted that:
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether
friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied
protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time
were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any court of the United States.
Id. at 777-78.
108. Id. at 790.
109. Id. at 768.
110. Id. at 785 ("We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
govemment at war with the United States.").
111. Id. at 777-78.
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We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other
country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien
enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has
been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the
Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.
Absence of support from legislative or juridical sources is implicit
in the statement of the court below that "The answers stem directly
from fundamentals. They cannot be found by casual reference to
statutes or cases."''
12
Thus, two years after Ahrens, the Court affirmed the principle set forth
in Ahrens by holding that federal habeas statute jurisdiction does not extend
to those held outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.1 3 Applying that
rule to alien enemies during wartime, the Court closed the courthouse door
on enemy aliens detained overseas." 4 This decision stood undisturbed until
2004, when the Supreme Court held that a 1973 decision overruling Ahrens
also overruled Eisentrager."5  That 1973 decision was Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky."6
In Braden, an Alabama prisoner filed a habeas petition in Kentucky,
alleging that a three-year-old Kentucky indictment violated his constitutional
right to a speedy trial. 17 The Court considered whether the habeas statute,
which provided that "'[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by the...
district courts ...within their respective jurisdictions' . . . precluded the
District Court from entertaining petitioner's application."'" 8  It held the
district court was not precluded from considering the writ" 9 because
"developments since Ahrens have had a profound impact on the continuing
vitality of that decision."' 2 0 The Court cited several such legislative' 2' and
112. Id. at 768.
113. Id. at 791.
114. Id.
115. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
116. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
117. Id. at 485.
118. Id. at 485-86 (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 486.
120. Id. at 497.
121. Congressional amendments to the habeas statute regarding collateral attack rules, the
prisoner's ability to bring a habeas challenge in multiple venues, and the requirement that the
petitioner be present before the court adjudicating his habeas claim demonstrated that "Congress
explicitly recognized the substantial advantages of having these cases resolved in the court which
originally imposed the confinement or in the court located nearest the site of the underlying
controversy." Id.
judicial"' developments that indicated a desire on the part of Congress and
the Supreme Court to reduce the inconvenience associated with contesting
charges in multiple jurisdictions. 23  In light of these considerations, the
Court rejected the notion that Ahrens mandated an "inflexible jurisdictional
rule" requiring appearance in an "inconvenient forum."' 114  The Court
ultimately held that "[u]nder these circumstances it would serve no useful
purpose to apply the Ahrens rule and require that the action be brought in
Alabama."'
25
With respect to the reach of statutory habeas jurisdiction, there was little
doubt 26 that Braden overruled Ahrens to the extent that prisoners subject to
court jurisdiction in one state could now bring habeas claims to contest
charges in other states. 127  Yet, it did not mention Eisentrager or how its
ruling might affect the rights of enemy aliens detained abroad.
12
122. Id. at 498-99 ("A further, critical development since our decision in Ahrens is the emergence
of new classes of prisoners who are able to petition for habeas corpus because of the adoption of a
more expansive definition of the "custody" requirement of the habeas statute. See Peyton v. Rowe,
391 U.S. 54 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236
(1963). The overruling of McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131 (1934), made it possible for prisoners in
custody under one sentence to attack a sentence which they had not yet begun to serve. And it also
enabled a petitioner held in one State to attack a detainer lodged against him by another State. In
such a case, the State holding the prisoner in immediate confinement acts as agent for the demanding
State, and the custodian State is presumably indifferent to the resolution of prisoner's attack on the
detainer.").
123. Id. at 497-500.
124. Id. at 500.
125. Id. at 499 ("Here, for example, the petitioner is confined in Alabama, but his dispute is with
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not the State of Alabama. Under these circumstances it would
serve no useful purpose to apply the Ahrens rule and require that the action be brought in Alabama.
In fact, a slavish application of the rule would jar with the very purpose underlying the addition of
the phrase, 'within their respective jurisdictions."').
126. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 494 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But in fact Braden did
not overrule Ahrens; it distinguished Ahrens.").
127. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 502 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court overrules Ahrens
v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), which construed the legislative intent of Congress in enacting the
lineal predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Although considerations of 'convenience' may support the
result reached in this case, those considerations are, in this context, appropriate for Congress, not this
Court, to make. Congress has not legislatively overruled Ahrens, and subsequent 'developments' are
simply irrelevant to the judicial task of ascertaining the legislative intent of Congress in providing, in
1867, that federal district courts may issue writs of habeas corpus 'within their respective
jurisdictions' for prisoners in the custody of state authorities.").
128. Id. at 484-511. Indeed, the crucial fact in Braden was the fact that the petitioner, a United
States citizen, was already subject to the jurisdiction of one state before he filed the writ in a second
state, and the Court's rationale is replete with forum convenience analysis as to why a citizen should
not be barred from bringing a habeas claim under the circumstances. Id. at 493-94 (majority
opinion) ("In terms of traditional venue considerations, the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky is almost surely the most desirable forum for the adjudication of the claim. It is in
Kentucky, where all of the material events took place, that the records and witnesses pertinent to
petitioner's claim are likely to be found. And that forum is presumably no less convenient for the
respondent and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, than for the petitioner. The expense and risk of
transporting the petitioner to the Western District of Kentucky, should his presence at a hearing
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Additionally, subsequent Supreme Court decisions did not provide occasion
for the Court to articulate a clear rationale for distinguishing between the
habeas rights of citizens and aliens in the wartime context; nor did they
articulate a precise definition of the sovereign territory of the United States
to be applied should such a case arise. 2 9 Such questions were arguably
thought to be settled before the Supreme Court took up the issue in Rasul.13
0
The road from Ahrens to Rasul was an interesting one, but the journey from
the battlefields of Afghanistan to the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.,
required an unlikely detour through Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 3'
III. EXECUTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Following the September 11 th attacks, Congress passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which granted the
President the authority to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to wage
war against those responsible for the attacks. 132 Acting under this directive
and his Article II commander-in-chief authority, 133 the President commenced
prove necessary, would in all likelihood be outweighed by the difficulties of transporting records and
witnesses from Kentucky to the district where petitioner is confined. Indeed, respondent makes clear
that 'on balance, it would appear simpler and less expensive for the State of Kentucky to litigate
such questions [as those involved in this case] in one of its own Federal judicial districts."').
129. This definition is integral to applying habeas rights under the federal statute because the
statute extends federal court jurisdiction only to those areas within the sovereign territory of the
United States. See U.S.C. § 2241 (2005).
130. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 496-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. See infra Part Ill.
132. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
("This joint resolution may be cited as the 'Authorization for Use of Military Force'. SEC. 2.
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES. (a) IN GENERAL-That
the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements--(l) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION-
Consistent with section 8(a)(I) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section
is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the
War Powers Resolution. (2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS-Nothing in this resolution
supercedes [sic] any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.").
133. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each
of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and
he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.").
hostilities against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the government
of Saddam Hussein in 2003.' Operations in both theaters of the war
resulted in the capture of hundreds of enemy fighters.
136
In 2002, the United States military designated the United States naval
base located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as the principal location for the
detainment and prosecution of enemy fighters captured during the war.'37
The Bush Administration determined that the detainees' disregard of
traditional laws of warfare did not entitle them to POW (prisoner of war)
status under international law. 138 It then declared its intention to detain them
indefinitely until they were determined to be enemy combatants and
established military commissions to try those prisoners determined to be
enemy combatants.' 39 The Supreme Court subsequently invalidated these
134. See Presidential Address to the Nation, Oct. 7, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html ("THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. On my orders, the United
States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the
use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the
Taliban regime.").
135. See President Bush Addresses the Nation, March 19, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html ("THE PRESIDENT: My fellow citizens, at this hour, American
and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people,
and to defend the world from grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking
selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These
are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are
giving crucial support-from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to
the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share
the honor of serving in our common defense.").
136. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004) ("Since early 2002, the U.S. military has held
them-along with, according to the Government's estimate, approximately 640 other non-Americans
captured abroad-at the naval base at Guantanamo Bay."); see also Joint Task Force Guantanamo,
supra note 6, "Mission," available at http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/mission.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2008) ("The United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against al-Qaida,
the Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters. During the course of the Global War on Terror, U.S.
and allied forces have captured thousands of individuals fighting as part of the al-Qaida and Taliban
effort.").
137. See Joint Task Force Guantanamo, supra note 6, "Joint Task Force History," http://www.
jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/about.html#gtmo (last visited Sept. 16, 2008).
138. See Bialke, supra note 17, at 2 ("The U.S. has applied well-established existing international
law in holding that the al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees are presumptively unlawful combatants not
entitled to POW status. Taliban and al-Qaeda enemy combatants captured without military uniforms
in armed conflict are not presumptively entitled to, nor automatically granted, POW status. POW
status is a privileged status given by a capturing party as an international obligation to a captured
enemy combatant, if and when the enemy's previous lawful actions in armed conflict demonstrate
that POW status is merited. In the case of captured al-Qaeda and Taliban combatants, their
combined unlawful actions in armed conflict, and al-Qaeda's failure to adequately align with a state
show POW status is not warranted.").
139. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. IV
2004). The pertinent sections of the order are quoted below.
Section 1. Findings .... (e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the
effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary
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provisions 140 and new procedures were established in conjunction with
Congress to conform to the mandates of the Court's decisions.
1 41
Yet even before the Supreme Court weighed in on the due process rights
of detainees, the military had established procedures to frequently reassess
the evidence supporting detentions. 42  Since 2002, annual review boards
have reviewed the classified and non-classified evidence pertaining to each
detainee to ensure that continued detention is warranted.1 43  The boards'
assessment is forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who makes the
final decision regarding whether the evidence warrants release, transfer or
continued detention.'" As of November 2008, "approximately 255"
detainees were being held at Guantanamo, while over five hundred detainees
had been transferred.
145
The detentions at Guantanamo Bay have not been without
controversy,146 and that controversy-in some instances fueled by inaccurate
for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when
tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals....
Sec. 3. Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense. Any individual subject to this
order shall be--(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of
Defense outside or within the United States;...
Sec. 4. Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Trials of Individuals Subject to
this Order. (a) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military
commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual
is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties
provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or death.
Id. §§ l(e), 3(a), 4(a) (emphasis in original).
140. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The "Enemy Combatant" Cases in Historical Context: The
Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1005 (2007); see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). These cases are discussed in Part IV, infra.
141. See infra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
143. See Joint Task Force Guantanamo, JTF Guantanamo Marks 500'h Detainee Transfer,
available at http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/storyarchive/2008/January/010408-1-500transfer.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
144. Id.
145. See U.S. Department of Defense, Detainee Transfer Announced, Nov. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid = 12332 ("Since 2002, approximately 520
detainees have departed Guantanamo for other countries including Albania, Algeria, Afghanistan,
Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden,
Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and Yemen. There are approximately 255
detainees currently at Guantanamo.").
146. See Charles Babington, Critics of Guantanamo Urge Hill to Intervene, WASH. POST, June 16,
2005 at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontentlarticle/2005lO 6 /15/AR2
media reports 47-has served to heighten judicial and congressional scrutiny
of the facility. Some in Congress have called for the detention center at
Guantanamo to be closed, and for its prisoners to be transferred to prison
facilities within the United States. 148 There are no indications, however, that
this will occur in the near future. Furthermore, while President Bush 149 and
Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen 50 have expressed their desire
to see Guantanamo closed, there are no current indications that the
Guantanamo detention facility will be closed any time soon.'5 ' It is against
005061500823_pf.html ("Pressure has mounted on Congress in recent weeks to address allegations
of detainee abuse at the prison, opened in January 2002 at a Navy base on a U.S.-leased slice of
Cuba. Amnesty International issued a report last month and its secretary general called the camp
'the gulag of our time,' a reference to Soviet labor camps. Former president Jimmy Carter is among
those who have called for the United States to close the facility.").
147. Howard Kurtz, Newsweek Apologizes: Inaccurate Report on Koran Led to Riots, WASH.
POST, May 16, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/05/15/AR2005051500605.html ("Newsweek apologized yesterday for an inaccurate report on
the treatment of detainees that triggered several days of rioting in Afghanistan and other countries in
which at least 15 people died.").
148. See Democrats Mull Plan to Close Guantanamo: Key House Democrats Suggest Speedy
Trial Or Release Of Most Prisoners, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 8, 2007, available at http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/08/terror/main2452243.shtm ("Key House Democrats said Thursday
they are considering a plan to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the end of 2008, with
the exception of several dozen detainees in the war on terror who would be kept at the facility and
tried there. Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., said he hopes to include the provision in legislation this spring
that Democrats also intend to use to try to prevent further increases in troop strength in the war in
Iraq. Without public notice, Murtha dispatched Rep. Jim Moran, D-Va., to the detention center at
the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay on a one-day trip late last month to recommend ways for
closing it. Both men said the prison has become counterproductive as the United States tries to win
converts overseas in the war on terror.").
149. See Babington, supra note 146 ("President Bush has left open that possibility [closing
Guantanamo], but he and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld also have defended treatment of
Guantanamo Bay captives and said the government must have a facility where it can hold terrorism
suspects.").
150. See ABCNEWS.com, Joint Chiefs Chairman: Close Guantanamo, http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/wireStory?id=4131424 (last visited Sept. 16, 2008) ("The chief of the U.S. military said he
favors closing the prison here as soon as possible because he believes negative publicity worldwide
about treatment of terrorist suspects has been 'pretty damaging' to the image of the United States.
'I'd like to see it shut down,' Adm. Mike Mullen said Sunday in an interview with three reporters
who toured the detention center with him on his first visit since becoming chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff last October.").
151. See White House Press Briefing by Dana Perino, June 22, 2007, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070622-4.html ("Q Can we go on to Guantanamo? Was
there a meeting scheduled for today to discuss Guantanamo? MS. PERINO: There's meetings
scheduled regularly to talk about Guantanamo, they happen frequently, they happen often, because
people are charged with the responsibilities that the President has given them to try to close down
that facility. Yes, there was going to be a meeting today, but there was a determination that it wasn't
needed. Q Was it because of the AP story? MS. PERINO: I think that the decision to make-to not
have the meeting happened late in the day after that story came out. Q So it was because of that?
MS. PERINO: What I can tell you is that meeting was not a decisional meeting, there was nothing
imminent coming out of that meeting, and that there are people who are charged with-tasked with
working on this issue every day, not only here at the White House, but at the Defense Department,
State Department and other agencies, to make sure that we are figuring out a way to repatriate these
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the backdrop of the controversy surrounding Guantanamo that we now turn
to evaluate the detainee challenges to the Guantanamo detention system and
the response those challenges elicited from Congress and President Bush.
IV. THE ENEMY COMBATANT CASES AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided three detainee cases,' and
Congress and the President responded with a statute to overturn the third and
most controversial decision.'5 3 In 2006, the Court decided a fourth detainee
case, 54 and Congress and the President again responded in an attempt to
correct what they perceived as an errant ruling.'55 Habeas petitions from two
more detainees reached the Court during its October 2007 Term, and a
decision was reached in the summer of 2008. 56 Additionally, there is recent
detainee litigation in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that is likely to reach
the Court in the near future.'
5 7
These developments demonstrate the tension between the Court and the
political branches regarding the legality of the detention system established
above. A recurring issue is the Court's concern that detainees have the
ability to challenge the merits of their detentions through habeas or an
acceptable substitute.'58 Whether the legislation enacted in response to the
individuals, so they can go back to their countries in a way that we can make sure that they're going
to be held, and not a threat to anybody else, as well as be treated humanely. Q Are you nearing a
decision? Was there anything different about this meeting? Are the meetings and the attendees-
and the Secretary of State? Was there something different? Was this going to be a focus? MS.
PERINO: Well, the meeting was going to be focusing on doing what the President has asked them to
do for the past few years, which is work to get the facility closed. I think that-I think that report
was overblown. There was not an imminent decision made. There's no deadline. There was just a
regular meeting."); see also David Stout, Bush Advisors Weigh Closing Guantanamo Prison Sooner,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/washington/22cnd-
gitmo.html.
152. See infra Parts IV.A.1-3.
153. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
154. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
155. See infra notes 272-75.
156. See supra note 21; see also infra note 291 and Part IX.
157. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
158. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004) ("Petitioners' allegations-that, although
they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have
been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term,
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being
charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.' 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Cf. United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-278, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990) (KENNEDY, J.,
concurring), and cases cited therein.").
Court's decisions enables such challenges is a matter of debate and is
discussed infra.5 9 Those decisions and the resulting legislative responses
are discussed in the following section.
A. Round One: Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul, CSRTs and the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld-The Due Process Rights of Citizen Detainees
Yaser Esam Hamdi was born in Louisiana in 1980, moved with his
family to Saudi Arabia, and by 2001 was living in Afghanistan. 6 ° That
year, following the initiation of military hostilities against the Taliban,
Hamdi was captured by the Northern Alliance-an Afghani militia group
allied with the United States. 161 He was then delivered to the United States
military. 62  The government alleged that after Hamdi arrived in
Afghanistan, he joined the Taliban and participated in weapons training.163
Therefore, the government determined he was an enemy combatant subject
to indefinite detention.' 64  In January 2002, Hamdi was transferred to
Guantanamo, but after learning that he was an American citizen, military
authorities transferred him to a military prison in Virginia and then to South
Carolina.' 65 Hamdi's father filed a writ of habeas corpus on Hamdi's behalf,
claiming that Hamdi went to Afghanistan to do relief work, and that his
detention was illegal and in violation of Hamdi's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Rights. 1
66
Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, articulated two propositions
that were central to the holding. First, the Court held that as a valid and
necessary means of preventing combatants from returning to the battlefield,
"[t]he capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention,
and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are
'important incident[s] of war."",167  Second, the Court held that the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force gave the President the authority
to conduct such detentions. 
168
159. See infra notes 310-403 and accompanying text.
160. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 512-13.
164. Id. at 513.
165. Id. at 510.
166. Id. at 511.
167. Id. at 518 (citation omitted).
168. Id. The Court also held that Hamdi's citizenship did not preclude his detention as an
unlawful combatant. Id. at 519 ("There is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as
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Second, the Court applied the Mathews due process balancing test 169 to
determine what sort of process Hamdi was due. 7 ° Weighing the interests
led the Court to conclude that "[s]triking the proper constitutional balance"
required that "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."''
Three more features of the plurality opinion warrant mention. First, the
Court held that the due process requirements they outlined "could be met by
an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal."'7 2
Second, in the absence of such a tribunal, the Court asserted that "a court
that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy
combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process
are achieved."' 173 And third, the Court found "Congress' grant of authority
for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict," provided "that the individual
"'174is... an enemy combatant ....
These three issues are important because they affirm, to a certain extent,
the Court's traditional practice of giving reasonable deference to Executive
an enemy combatant. In Quirin, one of the detainees, Haupt, alleged that he was a naturalized
United States citizen ... We held that '[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of
the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile
acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of... the law of war.' ... While Haupt was tried for
violations of the law of war, nothing in Quirin suggests that his citizenship would have precluded his
mere detention for the duration of the relevant hostilities.") (internal citations omitted).
169. Id. at 528-29 ("The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing
interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not
'deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,' is the test that we articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge.... Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined
by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the official action' against the
Government's asserted interest, 'including the function involved' and the burdens the Government
would face in providing greater process. The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious
balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation' of the
private interest if the process were reduced and the 'probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards."') (internal citations omitted).
170. Id. at 530. On the one hand, the Court found that Hamdi's principal interest was "a citizen's
right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law."
Id. at 529. On the other hand, the government was interested "in ensuring that those who have in
fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States" and
"unnecessarily and dangerously" distracting its officers "by litigation half a world away." Id. at
531-32.
171. Id. at 530-33.
172. Id. at 538.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 521,523.
wartime decision-making regarding the due process rights of enemy
combatants.' 75 Furthermore, if the detention and review procedures outlined
in the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act'7 6 are
therefore subject to similar deference, a plausible argument can be made that
the procedures established therein might fulfill the "minimum requirements
of due process" mentioned in Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion.
177
The Hamdi dissenters, Justices Scalia, Souter (concurring in the
judgment, but dissenting in part and concurring in part), Ginsburg, Thomas,
and Stevens, rejected the plurality's opinion for several reasons.17 8  First,
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the Non-Detention
Act prevented government detainment of Hamdi. 179  Second, Justice
Scalia, 8° joined by Justice Stevens, argued that when the government
accuses a citizen of being an enemy combatant, the traditional practice is
either to charge him with treason or invoke the Suspension Clause if such
procedures are not possible during wartime.'' Finally, Justice Thomas,
175. See Kmiec, supra note 16, at 871-72 ("The commonsense accommodation of interests in
Hamdi was a vindication for the President and the Congress, and for war conducted largely by
nonjudicial-but still constitutional-means. In an age of concern over the pervasiveness of judicial
presence, it is important to reflect even momentarily on how all that is constitutional is not
necessarily judicial. Acting constitutionally is not synonymous with acting judicially. The Supreme
Court in Hamdi demonstrated considerable, but not total, deference to its coequal branches, and that
is much to its credit. The depth of that respect is revealed by the Court's comment that the due
process standards outlined could be met by military tribunal. In this regard, Justice O'Connor makes
reference to a tribunal mechanism far less exacting than that envisioned by President Bush's military
order and Pentagon regulation for the trial of al Qaeda or those who harbor or assist them.
Specifically, the Justices highlight existing military regulations that tribunals be made available to
determine the status of enemy detainees who assert POW status under the Geneva Convention. If
the military chooses not to supply the review itself, the Court concedes that habeas is available to a
citizen-detainee within the jurisdiction of the United States, but admonishes district courts to proceed
with caution and to 'engag[e] in a factfinding process that is both prudent and incremental."').
176. See infra notes 241, 273 and accompanying text.
177. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 538 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also infra note 333
and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 539-99.
179. Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) ("No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained except pursuant to an Act of Congress."). Justice Souter, who was joined by Justice
Ginsburg, concurred in part, dissented in part, and concurred in the judgment, asked whether:
[t]he severity of the Act be relieved when the Government's stated factual justification
for incommunicado detention is a war on terrorism, so that the Government may be said
to act "pursuant" to congressional terms that fall short of explicit authority to imprison
individuals? With one possible though important qualification ... the answer has to be
no. For a number of reasons, the prohibition within § 4001(a) has to be read broadly to
accord the statute a long reach and to impose a burden of justification on the
Government.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
180. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
181. Id. at 554 ("Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime.
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raising a separation of powers argument, asserted that the Court's inquiry
should begin and end with the question of whether the President has the
necessary authority to wage war and hold enemy combatants as an incident
of war. 182  The group of dissenting Justices is significant because it
demonstrates an unusual coalition of Court members coming together to
reject, for various reasons, the military's detention of a United States citizen
in alleged violation of his due process rights. 183  Furthermore, is it
noteworthy how dissimilarly organized the dissents were in the following
two cases concerning, respectively, the rights of a detained United States
citizen 184 and the rights of Kuwaiti and Australian citizens.1
85
2. Rumsfeld v. Padilla--Citizens and the Immediate Custodian Rule
In conjunction with a grand jury investigation into the September 11 th
attacks, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued a material witness warrant for Jose Padilla.186 On May 8, 2002,
after arriving at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport on a flight from
Pakistan, Padilla was arrested by federal agents executing the warrant and
subsequently incarcerated in New York.'87 While in prison, Padilla filed a
motion to vacate the warrant.' 88 While the motion was pending, President
Bush designated Padilla an enemy combatant and directed the Secretary of
Defense to detain Padilla in a military facility.'89 Padilla was then
incarcerated in the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South
Where the exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution's Suspension Clause allows Congress to
relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the Executive's assertion of
military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without charge. No one
contends that the congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the Government
relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension Clause. Accordingly, I
would reverse the judgment below.") (internal citations omitted).
182. Id. at 579-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that Article II and the AUMF
gave the President the legal authority he needed to detain enemy fighters and determine their legal
status as combatants, and therefore all other questions-such as whether Hamdi actually was an
enemy combatant, and more broadly, whether enemy combatant determinations are a proper incident
of executive war making-are properly left to the government branches responsible for prosecuting
the war effort. Id.
183. For instance, Justice Stevens joined a dissent authored by Justice Scalia, whereas in Rasul
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion while Justice Scalia wrote a lengthy dissent.
184. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
185. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
186. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430-31.
187. Id. at431.
188. Id.
189. Id.
Carolina.' 90 His counsel subsequently filed a habeas petition in the Southern
District of New York, and named as respondents President Bush, former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Brig Commander Melanie
A. Marr.' 9'
The Court was faced with two issues. First, whether the Southern
District of New York had jurisdiction over Padilla's appeal. 92  Second,
whether the President had the authority to detain Padilla as an enemy
combatant.' 93 A divided Court held 5-4 that under the rule articulated in
Wales v. Whitney, 194 Padilla should have brought his habeas petition in the
District of South Carolina, not in the Southern District of New York.,
95
Finding the habeas petition improperly filed, 196 the Court did not reach the
190. Id. at 432.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 433-34. Padilla was imprisoned in South Carolina, yet was bringing his claim in New
York, and he was asserting the writ against three respondents. As the Court noted, "[tihe consistent
use of the definite article in reference to the custodian indicates that there is generally only one
proper respondent to a given prisoner's habeas petition. This custodian, moreover, is 'the person'
with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court." Id. at 434-35.
193. The district court agreed with the Government's position that the President had the authority
to detain citizens as enemy combatants when they are captured on United States soil during wartime.
Id. at 433. But the Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion. Id. ("Reaching the merits, the
court of appeals held that the President lacks authority to detain Padilla militarily. The court
concluded that neither the President's Commander in Chief power nor the AUMF authorizes military
detentions of American citizens captured on American soil. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals
found in both our case law and in the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), a strong presumption
against domestic military detention of citizens absent explicit congressional authorization.
Accordingly, the court granted the writ of habeas corpus and directed the Secretary to release Padilla
from military custody within 30 days.") (internal citations omitted).
194. In Wales, the Court held that the habeas statute "provisions contemplate a proceeding against
some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the
body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown
to the contrary." Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885).
195. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 451.
196. The Court addresses and then rejects the dissent's misplaced reliance on Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973) and Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 (1972) by
arguing that precedent does not "support a deviation from the immediate custodian rule here."
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 437. ("In Braden and Strait, the immediate custodian rule did not apply because
there was no immediate physical custodian with respect to the 'custody' being challenged. That is
not the case here: Commander Marr exercises day-to-day control over Padilla's physical custody.
We have never intimated that a habeas petitioner could name someone other than his immediate
physical custodian as respondent simply because the challenged physical custody does not arise out
of a criminal conviction. Nor can we do so here just because Padilla's physical confinement stems
from a military order by the President. It follows that neither Braden nor Strait supports the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that Secretary Rumsfeld is the proper respondent because he exercises the
'legal reality of control' over Padilla. As we have explained, identification of the party exercising
legal control only comes into play when there is no immediate physical custodian with respect to the
challenged 'custody.' In challenges to present physical confinement, we reaffirm that the immediate
custodian, not a supervisory official who exercises legal control, is the proper respondent. If the
'legal control' test applied to physical-custody challenges, a convicted prisoner would be able to
name the State or the Attorney General as a respondent to a § 2241 petition. As the statutory
language, established practice, and our precedent demonstrate, that is not the case.").
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merits question. 197
Justice Stevens' dissent'9" questioned whether the immediate custodian
rule was really so inflexible a rule as the majority alleged, finding that "we
have declined to adopt a strict reading of Wales v. Whitney... and instead
have favored a more functional approach that focuses on the person with the
power to produce the body . ,,199 Justice Stevens argued, "surely we
should acknowledge that the writ reaches the Secretary as the relevant
custodian in this case."200  Therefore, finding "the Secretary is a proper
custodian, the question whether the petition was appropriately filed in the
Southern District is easily answered."' 0 ' Justice Stevens' emphasis on
serving the detainees' custodian (the Secretary of Defense) as a central
consideration in the jurisdictional analysis of habeas rights20 2 is notable
because similar concerns underscored his majority opinion in the next case,
Rasul v. Bush . 3 This decision effectively enabled the Guantanamo habeas
litigation, and is therefore discussed in detail below.
3. Rasul v. Bush-Detainees and Statutory Access to Habeas
Two Australian citizens 2°4 and twelve Kuwaiti citizens were captured
while fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and were subsequently
detained at Guantanamo Bay.20 5 Both groups of detainees petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, but the district court and the court of appeals in
197. Id. at 430.
198. In which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 461.
200. Id. at 462.
201. Id. at 462. The dissent also focused on forum considerations as central to the question of
federal court jurisdiction, finding that when it comes to determining the proper forum, "the question
is one of venue, i.e., in which federal court the habeas inquiry may proceed." Id. at 463 ("As a result
of the Government's initial forum selection, the District Judge and counsel in the Southern District
were familiar with the legal and factual issues surrounding respondent's detention both before and
after he was transferred to the Defense Department's custody. Accordingly, fairness and efficiency
counsel in favor of preserving venue in the Southern District.").
202. Id. at 464 n.6 ("Although the Court makes no reference to venue principles, it is clear that
those principles, not rigid jurisdictional rules, govern the forum determination.").
203. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
204. The five year detainment of one of the Australian citizens, David Hicks, became something
of an international incident. See Raymond Bonner, David Hicks, Australian Convicted of Supporting
Terrorism, to be Released, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 28, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2007/12/28/asia/hicks.php. Following conversations between former Australian Prime
Minister John Howard and Vice President Dick Cheney, Hicks was formally sentenced by a United
States military commission. Id. He subsequently entered a plea deal, and was returned to Australia
where he faced further charges. Id.
205. SeeRasul, 542 U.S. at470-471.
Washington, D.C., rejected the petitions based on the Court's decision in
Johnson v. Eisentrager.0 6 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, reversed and held that the federal habeas statute conferred
jurisdiction on federal courts to hear habeas claims brought by Guantanamo
detainees.
207
Several aspects of Justice Stevens' opinion are worth noting. First, he
sought to distinguish the petitioners in Rasul from those in Eisentrager.°8
In Eisentrager, the Court had rejected the habeas petitions of German
citizens captured in China and imprisoned in Germany following World War
II, finding it inappropriate to extend habeas to a prisoner who:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by
a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for
offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States;
(f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.
209
Justice Stevens found the Rasul petitioners to be distinguishable from
the Eisentrager petitioners because they:
are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they
deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against
the United States; they have never been afforded access to any
tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and
for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over
which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control.21°
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that these factors were "relevant
only to the question of the prisoners' constitutional entitlement to habeas
corpus. Eisentrager, in Justice Stevens' view, did not rule out the
possibility that the federal habeas statute might extend federal court
jurisdiction over the detainees' claims. 22 This was possible because the
Eisentrager majority, in Justice Stevens' opinion, gave little attention to
206. Id. at 472-73.
207. Id. at 473.
208. Id. at 476.
209. Id. at 475-76.
210. Id. at 476.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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statutory habeas considerations and instead focused on the court of appeals's
constitutional habeas analysis.
2 13
Second, Justice Stevens asserted that Eisentrager had rejected the
petitioners' reliance on statutory habeas relief because of the Court's holding
in Ahrens.2 14 Yet because the Court had subsequently overruled Ahrens in
the Braden case, discussed supra,21 5 "Braden overruled the statutory
predicate to Eisentrager's holding," and therefore "Eisentrager plainly does
not preclude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over petitioners' claims. 21 6
213. Id. at 477-78 ("The Court of Appeals instead held that petitioners had a constitutional right
to habeas corpus secured by the Suspension Clause, reasoning that 'if a person has a right to a writ of
habeas corpus, he cannot be deprived of the privilege by an omission in a federal jurisdictional
statute.' Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d, at 965. In essence, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the habeas statute, as construed in Ahrens, had created an unconstitutional gap that had to be filled
by reference to 'fundamentals.' 174 F.2d, at 963. In its review of that decision, this Court, like the
Court of Appeals, proceeded from the premise that 'nothing in our statutes' conferred federal-court
jurisdiction, and accordingly evaluated the Court of Appeals' resort to 'fundamentals' on its own
terms. 339 U.S., at 768, 70 S. Ct. 936.").
214. Id. at477-78.
215. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
216. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479. Justice Stevens' reasoning here is important for the way it
applies the logic of the Braden decision, which focused on the habeas rights of United States
citizens, to find that the habeas statute extends federal court jurisdiction to hear habeas claims from
aliens detained at Guantanamo. Because the federal statute conferred the habeas right, petitioners
need not rely on any constitutional right to habeas. Stevens argues that:
Because subsequent decisions of this Court have filled the statutory gap that had
occasioned Eisentrager's resort to "fundamentals," persons detained outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on the Constitution
as the source of their right to federal habeas review. In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court ofKv., 410 U.S. 484, 495, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 35 L. Ed.2d 443 (1973), this Court held,
contrary to Ahrens, that the prisoner's presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the
district court is not "an invariable prerequisite" to the exercise of district court
jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute. Rather, because "the writ of habeas corpus
does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in
what is alleged to be unlawful custody," a district court acts "within [its] respective
jurisdiction" within the meaning of § 2241 as long as "the custodian can be reached by
service of process." 410 U.S., at 494-495, 93 S. Ct. 1123. Braden reasoned that its
departure from the rule of Ahrens was warranted in light of developments that "had a
profound impact on the continuing vitality of that decision." 410 U.S., at 497, 93 S. Ct.
1123. These developments included, notably, decisions of this Court in cases involving
habeas petitioners "confined overseas (and thus outside the territory of any district
court)," in which the Court "held, if only implicitly, that the petitioners' absence from the
district does not present a jurisdictional obstacle to the consideration of the claim." Id., at
498, 93 S. Ct. 1123 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S. Ct. 1045, 97 L. Ed. 1508
(1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844, 851-852, 74 S. Ct. 3, 98 L. Ed. 363 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S. Ct. 1,100 L. Ed.
8 (1955); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 199, 69 S. Ct. 197, 93 L. Ed. 1902 (1948)
(Douglas, J., concurring (1949))). Braden thus established that Ahrens can no longer be
viewed as establishing "an inflexible jurisdictional rule," and is strictly relevant only to
Third, the federal habeas statute provides that federal courts may hear
habeas petitions brought by those persons located "within their respective
jurisdictions" alleging "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." '2 17 Justice Stevens determined that Braden
allowed a physically absent habeas petitioner to assert the writ in distant
federal courts if the petitioner's custodian could be reached by service of
process."' He then reasoned that the lease agreement between the United
States and Cuba rendered Guantanamo Bay United States territory for
purposes of federal court jurisdiction under § 2241 .219 This fact, combined
with the principal that "the [habeas] statute draws no distinction between
Americans and aliens held in federal custody. . . . " meant that "[a]liens
held at the base, no less than American citizens, are entitled to invoke the
federal courts' authority under § 2241 .,220
Justice Scalia's lengthy dissent is emblematic of the intense reactions
provoked by the Rasul decision.22  Finding the majority position to be "an
irresponsible overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme importance to
our forces currently in the field," Justice Scalia noted several concerns with
the Court's holding.222 First, Justice Scalia asserted that the majority
"largely ignores" the plain meaning of the federal habeas statute, which
requires the petitioner to be located within the jurisdiction of a federal court
the question of the appropriate forum, not to whether the claim can be heard at all. 410
U.S., at 499-500, 93 S. Ct. 1123.
Id. at 478-79.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (2005).
218. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479.
219. Id. Despite the 1903 Lease Agreement's stipulation that "the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the (leased areas]," Justice
Stevens concluded that the United States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control over and
within said areas." Id. at 471.
220. Id. at 481 ("Putting Eisentrager and Ahrens to one side, respondents contend that we can
discern a limit on § 2241 through application of the 'longstanding principle of American law' that
congressional legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless such intent is
clearly manifested. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 113 L.
Ed.2d 274 (1991). Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other
contexts, it certainly has no application to the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons
detained within 'the territorial jurisdiction' of the United States. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285, 69 S. Ct. 575, 93 L. Ed. 680 (1949). By the express terms of its agreements with
Cuba, the United States exercises 'complete jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses. 1903 Lease
Agreement, Art. 111; 1934 Treaty, Art. 111. Respondents themselves concede that the habeas statute
would create federal-court jurisdiction over the claims of an American citizen held at the base. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 27. Considering that the statute draws no distinction between Americans and aliens
held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical
coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee's citizenship.").
221. Id. at 488-506 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also infra note 243 regarding Congress's effort to
overrule Rasul when it passed the DTA.
222. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160
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before he can assert the writ.22 3 Second, Justice Scalia rejects the Court's
characterization of Braden as overruling Ahrens,224 and notes that the
question left unanswered in Ahrens but partially addressed in Eisentrager is
again revisited but answered differently in Rasul.25  Therefore, it is Rasul
that overrules Eisentrager, not Braden.226 Third, Justice Scalia disputes the
Court's contention that the lease agreement establishes federal court
jurisdiction at Guantanamo by noting the absence of any explanation how
"'complete jurisdiction and control' without sovereignty causes an enclave
to be part of the United States for purposes of its domestic laws. ' 227 Next,
Justice Scalia argues that the majority's approach to habeas jurisdiction is
not "consistent with the historical reach of the writ., 228  In conclusion,
223. Id. at 490 ("No matter to whom the writ is directed, custodian or detainee, the statute could
not be clearer that a necessary requirement for issuing the writ is that some federal district court have
territorial jurisdiction over the detainee. Here, as the Court allows, ...the Guantanamo Bay
detainees are not located within the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court. One would
think that is the end of these cases.") (internal citations omitted).
224. Id. at 494 ("But in fact Braden did not overrule Ahrens; it distinguished Ahrens. Braden
dealt with a habeas petitioner incarcerated in Alabama. The petitioner filed an application for a writ
of habeas corpus in Kentucky, challenging an indictment that had been filed against him in that
Commonwealth and naming as respondent the Kentucky court in which the proceedings were
pending. This Court held that Braden was in custody because a detainer had been issued against him
by Kentucky, and was being executed by Alabama, serving as an agent for Kentucky. We found thatjurisdiction existed in Kentucky for Braden's petition challenging the Kentucky detainer,
notwithstanding his physical confinement in Alabama. Braden was careful to distinguish that
situation from the general rule established in Ahrens.") (emphasis in original).
225. Id. at 490-91 ("Ahrens explicitly reserved 'the question of what process, if any, a person
confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert federal
rights.' Id., at 192, n.4, 68 S. Ct. 1443. That question, the same question presented to this Court
today, was shortly thereafter resolved in Eisentrager insofar as noncitizens are concerned.").
226. Id. at 497-98 ("The reality is this: Today's opinion, and today's opinion alone, overrules
Eisentrager; today's opinion, and today's opinion alone, extends the habeas statute, for the first time,
to aliens held beyond the sovereign territory of the United States and beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of its courts. No reasons are given for this result; no acknowledgment of its
consequences made. By spurious reliance on Braden the Court evades explaining why stare decisis
can be disregarded, and why Eisentrager was wrong. Normally, we consider the interests of those
who have relied on our decisions. Today, the Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting
Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the federal courts even though it has never before been thought
to be within their jurisdiction-and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime
detainees.") (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 501 ("Since 'jurisdiction and control' obtained through a lease is no different in effect
from 'jurisdiction and control' acquired by lawful force of arms, parts of Afghanistan and Iraq
should logically be regarded as subject to our domestic laws. Indeed, if 'jurisdiction and control'
rather than sovereignty were the test, so should the Landsberg Prison in Germany, where the United
States held the Eisentrager detainees.").
228. Id. at 502 ("None of the authorities it cites comes close to supporting that claim. Its first set
of authorities involves claims by aliens detained in what is indisputably domestic territory. Those
cases are irrelevant because they do not purport to address the territorial reach of the writ. The
Justice Scalia proclaims that the Court abandons "the venerable statutory
line drawn in Eisentrager," "boldly extends the scope of the habeas statute
to the four comers of the earth, 22 9 and engages in "judicial adventurism of
the worst sort., 230 Justice Scalia's vigorous dissent demonstrates the extent
to which the Rasul decision transformed the legal landscape for the
detainees. Now that Guantanamo detainees were given the right to assert
habeas petitions to contest their detentions, Congress and the President took
quick action to forestall the torrent of appeals that would quickly come.23'
The political branches responded with alacrity and unanimity. 2
4. Combatant Status Review Tribunals-Implementing Hamdi
The Bush Administration's response to these decisions was two-fold and
swift. First, on July 7, 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
issued a memorandum establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) 23 3 to determine whether, under a preponderance standard,
23 4
detainees would be classified as enemy combatants. 235  After Hamdi held
remaining cases involve issuance of the writ to 'exempt jurisdictions' and 'other dominions under
the sovereign's control.' These cases are inapposite for two reasons: Guantanamo Bay is not a
sovereign dominion, and even if it were, jurisdiction would be limited to subjects.") (internal
citations omitted).
229. Id. at 498.
230. Id. at 506.
231. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
233. See Defense Department Background Briefing on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
July 7, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid
=2751
("The procedures that are being-that have been adopted today, in an order signed by the deputy
secretary, are intended to reflect the guidance that the Supreme Court provide (sic) in its decisions
last week. The court held that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges to the legality of
the detention of enemy combatants held at GTMO. In a separate decision-that's the Rasul case. In
a separate decision involving an American citizen held in the United States, Hamdi, the court held
that due process would be satisfied by notice and an opportunity to be heard, and indicated that such
process could be provided in the context of a hearing before a military tribunal .... The Combatant
Status Review Tribunals, which are established today, are a variant on that order and are established
to review the case-review each detainee at Guantanamo, and to provide an opportunity for the
detainee to contest the determination that's been made that he is an enemy combatant. It's a
streamlined process. The court recognized-the Supreme Court recognized the military's need for
flexibility, and indicated that that streamlined process might provide all the procedures that were
sufficient even for a U.S. citizen. The procedures that are being implemented today are only being
applied to alien enemy combatants in control of DOD at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.").
234. Id. ("The tribunal will decide whether there is-will decide whether a preponderance of the
evidence supports the detention of the individual as an enemy combatant. And as provided for-as
suggested in Justice O'Connor's opinion in the Hamdi case, there will be a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the government's evidence, but the detainee will be able to have an opportunity to rebut that
presumption.").
235. Id. ("In response to last week's decisions by the Supreme Court, the deputy secretary of
Defense today issued an order creating procedures establishing a Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
which will provide detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base with notice of the basis for their
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that detainees had the right to contest their detentions before a neutral
decisionmaker, the United States military implemented the CSRTs to fulfill
this requirement.236
detention and an opportunity for them to contest their detention as enemy combatants."); see also
Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 181-82 (2007) ("In a July 2004 Memorandum for the Secretary of
the Navy, the Secretary of Defense established skeletal procedures for the conduct of CSRT
proceedings with respect to foreign nationals held at Guantdnamo to 'review the detainee's status as
an enemy combatant.' The Secretary of the Navy, who was 'appointed to operate and oversee [the
CSRT] process,' promptly issued a memorandum specifying detailed procedures (Navy
Memorandum), which are still in effect. Pursuant to those procedures, a CSRT reviews the
determination, made after 'multiple levels of review by military officers and officials of the
Department of Defense,' (E-I § B) that a detainee is an 'enemy combatant,' defined as 'an individual
who was part of or supporting Taliban or Al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.' (E-1 § B) A Tribunal is composed of
'three neutral commissioned officers' who were not involved in the 'apprehension, detention,
interrogation, or previous determination of status of the detainee[ ].' (E-1 § C(l)) The Tribunal is to
'determine whether the preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that each detainee
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant.' (E-1 § B) There is a rebuttable
presumption that the Government Evidence, defined as 'such evidence in the Government
Information as may be sufficient to support the detainee's classification as an enemy combatant' (E-
I § H(4)) is 'genuine and accurate' (E-1 § G( I1)). The Tribunal is authorized to request the
production of 'reasonably available information in the possession of the U.S. Government bearing
on the issue of whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant,' (E- I
§ E(3)) and the Recorder, a military officer, is charged with obtaining from government agencies and
reviewing all such Government Information (E-2 § C(l)). The Recorder must present, orally or in
documentary form (E-2 § C(6)), both the Government Evidence and, if any there be in the
Government Information, all 'evidence to suggest that the detainee should not be designated as an
enemy combatant.' (E- I § H(4), E-2 § B(I)) In advance of the Tribunal hearing, the Recorder must
prepare an unclassified summary of the relevant Government Information and provide the summary
to the detainee's Personal Representative, also a military officer. (E-2 § C(2), (4)). Each detainee's
Personal Representative reviews the Government Evidence the Recorder plans to present to the
Tribunal (E-3 § C(3)), has access to the Government Information (E-3 § C(2)), and meets with the
detainee to explain the CSRT process. The Personal Representative may not, however, share
classified information with the detainee. (E-3 § C(4)) The Personal Representative 'shall present
information to the Tribunal if the detainee so requests' and 'may, outside the presence of the
detainee, comment upon classified information submitted by the Recorder.' (E-3 § C(5)) The
detainee may testify or introduce relevant documentary evidence at the hearing, but may not be
compelled to answer questions. (E- I § F(6)-(7)) He also may present the testimony of any witness
who is 'reasonably available and whose testimony is considered by the Tribunal to be relevant.' (E-
I § F(6)).... Each Tribunal has a 'Legal Advisor' with whom the members may consult regarding
legal, evidentiary, procedural, and like matters. (E-I § C(4)) The Legal Advisor reviews for legal
sufficiency both the CSRT's rulings on whether witnesses and evidence are reasonably available and
its ultimate determination of the detainee's status. (E-1 § 1(7)) The Legal Advisor forwards the
Record of Proceedings to the 'Director, CSRT,' (E-I § 1(5)) who reviews the decision as well. (E-1
§ 1(8), E-2 § C(10)) If approved by the Director, CSRT, then the decision becomes final. (E-I §
I(8)).").
236. See Kathleen T. Rhem, DoD to Review Status of All Guantanamo Detainees, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERVICE, July 8, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx
?id=25741; see also Defense Department Background Briefing, supra note 233 ("SR. JUSTICE
DEPT. OFFICIAL: Well, I think that covers all of the basics of the process. I think one thing to
As previously noted, the Court's decision in Eisentrager was controlling
law for more than fifty years prior to Rasul.237 That precedent meant that
when the United States military began detaining captured Taliban and Al
Qaeda fighters at Guantanamo in 2002, there was no concern that those
prisoners would be able to file habeas petitions in federal courts or need to
be afforded any procedures resembling due process. 8  Furthermore,
because those detainees were deemed unlawful combatants, the notion that
they were entitled to anything resembling due process under United States or
international law was never contemplated before Hamdi and Rasul.2 39 Those
decisions demonstrated the Court's willingness to give detainees the
opportunity to vindicate constitutional rights in federal court.240  To ensure
that federal courts would not further expand the scope of the detainees' legal
entitlements, the political branches sought to deny federal courts the legal
authority to do so.
emphasize is that the government here is reacting very quickly to the Supreme Court's decisions.
The Supreme Court made important decisions affecting the war on terrorism. And over the past
week we've tried to put together-the Department of Defense has tried to put together a process that
will respond to the court's concerns, take into account the fact that the detainees at Guantanamo are
able to file petitions for habeas corpus in U.S. courts, and to establish a process similar to the process
Justice O'Connor referred to in the Hamdi decision as a military process that likely would satisfy
even the due process rights of an American citizen, to take that existing Army regulation for a form
of tribunal and provide actually a little additional process in the form of a personal representative,
something that is not a traditional part of the Army regulation, to add on something more to put
together a process that will provide the detainees at Guantanamo with any form of process that they
have a right to so that when and if there are habeas petitions filed challenging their detention, the
government will be in a position to say that we fully satisfied our legal obligations.").
237. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
238. Yet Padilla and Rasul instantly changed the dynamic. Hamdi laid out the general due
process procedures to which citizens detained as enemy combatants were entitled. See supra notes
170-73 and accompanying text. Rasul then held that under the habeas statute, federal court
jurisdiction extended to alien enemies detained at Guantanamo. See supra notes 204-07 and
accompanying text. Together, these decisions meant that the military was forced to construct
procedures in compliance with Hamdi and then apply those procedures to the Guantanamo
detainees; see also Defense Department Background Briefing, supra note 233 ("And I guess it's
important to emphasize, Justice O'Connor was talking about those basics of due process in the
context of an American citizen held in the United States and due process rights under the
Constitution. Here we're using that decision as guidance to try to construct this process, but it is
admittedly somewhat uncharted territory to figure out what sort of process would be sufficient or is
required at all for alien enemy combatant detainees held outside the United States. We're using the
Hamdi decision as guidance to try to provide a process that we think is fair and sufficient to provide
notice and opportunity to be heard, so that upon any challenge to the detention it will be clear that
sufficient process has been provided. But nothing like this has been provided in any previous armed
conflict, you know. Even the regulation that we are modeling this on is not a regulation that requires
a hearing like this for all persons detained as POWs or enemy combatants in a traditional war. You
know, in World War 11, subsequent wars, we have hundreds of thousands of enemy prisoners of
war. Not every one of them gets any process like this. So this is entirely new to provide a complete
process like this to every single detainee.").
239. Id.; see Bialke, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 160-71, 204-20 and accompanying text.
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5. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005-Jurisdiction-Stripping After
Rasul
A little more than a year after the Pentagon established the CSRTs to
determine whether detainees were enemy combatants, Congress passed and
President Bush signed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). 241 At the
time of its passage, more than 150 habeas petitions had been filed on behalf
of over 300 detainees, 2 42 and the DTA was Congress's effort to legislatively
overrule the Rasul decision that made such appeals possible. 243  The
principal jurisdictional effect of the DTA was to amend the habeas statute
and strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of Guantanamo
detainees.2" In lieu of habeas corpus,245 the DTA established a review
241. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (to
be codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)). The full text of the revised portion of the statute
reads:
(e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court,
justice, orjudge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider-
(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the
detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who-
(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant.
242. See 151 Cong. Rec. S14256-01, S14264 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
243. See id. In the Senate debate prior to the bill's passage, Arizona Republican Senator Jon Kyl,
a sponsor of the legislation, argued that:
Cuba is not the United States. Eisentrager should be restored to its rightful place as the
precedent that governs litigation attempted by enemy combatants outside of our
territory--even for the special case of Guantanamo Bay. Eisentrager was the law of the
land for over 50 years, until Rasul carved a hole into it. Through this act, Congress
patches that hole and restores Eisentrager's role as the governing standard. We do this
not because, or not just because, Rasul doesn't make sense and is wrong. We do it
because Eisentrager's reasoning is compelling, and the rule that is established wards off
much mischief.
Id.
244. See supra note 241. Section 1005(e)(l) provides:
Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider-(l) an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Id.
245. See 151 CONG. REC. S14, 256-01, S14264 (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("Mr. KYL. Mr.
President, I see that we are nearing the end of our allotted time. If I could quickly address a few
other minor issues and summarize briefly. It is important to note that the limited judicial review
process that gave detainees the opportunity to challenge their CSRT
determination in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, with possible petition to
the Supreme Court.2 4 6 With this legislation, Congress and President Bush
thought they had put to rest the torrent of habeas litigation flowing from
Guantanamo and established procedures consistent with the Court's
demands in Hamdi.247 It was not long, however, before those assumptions
were defeated in the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court had already
granted certiorari to another detainee habeas case before the DTA was even
passed.248
B. Round 2: Hamdan and the Military Commissions Act of 2006
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld-The Legality of Military Commissions
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President Bush
issued Military Order No. 1.249 This order provided for the establishment of
military commissions to try those prisoners determined to be enemy
combatants.250 In November 2001, Yemeni national Salim Ahmed Hamdan
was captured while aiding the Taliban in Afghanistan and was sent to
Guantanamo the following year.2  On July 3, 2003, President Bush
authorized by paragraphs 2 and 3 of subsection (e) are not habeas-corpus review. It is a limited
judicial review of its own nature. All habeas actions are terminated by this bill. I hope that this
change will also put to rest any arguments that extending habeas to prisoners also extends to them
some type of substantive rights. I do not believe that supposition is correct because habeas is a
vehicle for asserting rights, not a source of rights. The fact that an individual has access to habeas
does not mean that he has any of the rights that he asserts. But in any event, because this bill leaves
no habeas in place, that debate need not be rejoined.").
246. Id. ("Also, some have suggested that by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the DC circuit for
the paragraph 2 and 3 appeals, this bill bars even Supreme Court appellate review. That was not the
drafters' intention, nor do I believe that it is a correct reading of the legislative language. Supreme
Court review is implicit, or rather, authorized elsewhere in statute, for all judicial decisions. It is
rarely mentioned expressly. In fact, when it is mentioned, it is sometimes to preempt Supreme Court
review. For example, the limit on successive federal habeas petitions for state prisoners in section
2244 bars petitions for certiorari following a three-judge panel's decision on a successive-petition
application. The clear implication of these provisions is that Supreme Court review is implicitly
allowed except where expressly barred, and thus since it is not barred here, it is allowed."); see also
supra note 241. Section (e)(2)(B) of the DTA provides that
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ...any other
action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the
Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who ...has been
determined by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant.
Id.
247. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
248. See Pushaw, supra note 140, at 1059.
249. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
251. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006); see infra note 449 and accompanying
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announced that Hamdan would be tried by the military commissions
pursuant to the November 13, 2001 order.2 52 On July 13, 2004, Hamdan was
formally charged with conspiring with Al Qaeda to commit acts of
terrorism. 21' A simultaneous ruling by a CSRT determined "that Hamdan's
continued detention at Guantanamo Bay was warranted because he was an
'enemy combatant.' ' 254 Hamdan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that President Bush did not have the authority to convene the
military commissions to which Hamdan was subject, and that such
commissions violated military and international law. 5 The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Stevens,256 held that "the military commission
convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and
procedures violate both the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and
the Geneva Conventions.2 57
The Court articulated several propositions that are significant for the
detainee litigation. First, the Court held that the language of the DTA
supported the inference that its provisions barring courts from hearing
detainee habeas claims were not meant to apply to appeals pending on the
date of the DTA's enactment.25 8  Second, the Court rejected the
govemment's request to abstain from ruling on the commissions until an
outcome could be reached in those commissions.25 9 Third, the Court found
that neither the AUMF nor DTA authorized the military commissions at
issue.260 Fourth, the Court held that the government failed to carry its
text regarding Hamdan's August 2008 conviction by a Guantanamo Bay military commission.
252. Id. at 569.
253. Id. The specific charges against Hamdan included serving as Osama bin Laden's driver and
bodyguard; facilitating transportation of weapons for bin Laden; escorting and accompanying bin
Laden to various Al Qaeda activities; and receiving weapons training with Al Qaeda. Id. at 570.
254. Id. (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 567.
256. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg
joined in full and Justice Kennedy joined in part. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. See
id. at 557.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 583-84 ("Congress here expressly provided that subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) applied to
pending cases. It chose not to so provide-after having been presented with the option-for
subsection (e)(1). The omission is an integral part of the statutory scheme that muddies whatever
'plain meaning' may be discerned from blinkered study of subsection (e)(1) alone.").
259. Id. at 584-90. The Court rejects the government's reliance on Counselman by distinguishing
the petitioners in that case and the instant case, and then analogizes to the Quirin decision, arguing
that it "provides a compelling historical precedent for the power of civilian courts to entertain
challenges that seek to interrupt the processes of military commissions." Id. at 588-89 (citation
omitted). Therefore, the Court's abstention was not warranted in this case. Id. at 589.
260. Id. at 593-94 ("The government would have us dispense with the inquiry that the Quirin
burden of demonstrating that "the crime for which it seeks to try a defendant
by military commission is acknowledged to be an offense against the law of
war." '261 Next, the Court rejected the government's contention that the
military commissions were authorized under the UCMJ. 2 62  Finally, the
Court held that the military commissions violated Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.
2 63
Justice Scalia dissented on the basis that the language of the DTA
clearly communicated Congress's intent to preclude all future and pending
habeas claims.2 6 Justice Thomas' dissent focused on the separation of
powers between the branches and what he perceived as the Court's failure to
show an appropriate level of deference to executive wartime decision-
making. 265 Finally, Justice Alito's dissent argued that the military
commission which tried Hamdan was a "regularly constituted court" for
purposes of the Geneva Convention. 66
Court undertook and find in either the AUMF or the DTA specific, overriding authorization for the
very commission that has been convened to try Hamdan. Neither of these congressional Acts,
however, expands the President's authority to convene military commissions.").
261. Id. at 603. The Court looks to history, precedent and international sources in arguing that
"the crime charged here"-conspiracy to commit terrorist acts--"is not a recognized violation of the
law of war." Id. at 610.
262. Id. at 613 ("Whether or not the Government has charged Hamdan with an offense against the
law of war cognizable by military commission, the commission lacks power to proceed. The UCMJ
conditions the President's use of military commissions on compliance not only with the American
common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the
'rules and precepts of the law of nations'-including, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed
in 1949. The procedures that the Government has decreed will govern Hamdan's trial by
commission violate these laws.") (internal citations omitted).
263. Id. at 625-35. The Court argued that the government failed to demonstrate "some practical
need" to explain "deviations from court-martial practice." Id. at 633. Because the government was
unable to justify its use of military commissions, as opposed to the traditional courts martial
proceedings established by statute, the Court held that "Common Article 3 ... is applicable here and
• ..requires that Hamdan be tried by a 'regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."' Id. at 631-32.
264. Id. at 655-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This repeal of jurisdiction is simply not ambiguous as
between pending and future cases. It prohibits any exercise of jurisdiction, and it became effective
as to all cases last December 30. It is also perfectly clear that the phrase 'no court, justice, or judge'
includes this Court and its Members, and that by exercising our appellate jurisdiction in this case we
are 'hear[ing] or consider[ing] . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus."') (emphasis in
original).
265. Id. at 684-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The plurality's willingness to second-guess the
Executive's judgments in this context, based upon little more than its unsupported assertions,
constitutes an unprecedented departure from the traditionally limited role of the courts with respect
to war and an unwarranted intrusion on executive authority. And even if such second-guessing were
appropriate, the plurality's attempt to do so is unpersuasive.").
266. Id. at 727-28 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("I see no basis for the Court's holding that a military
commission cannot be regarded as 'a regularly constituted court' unless it is similar in structure and
composition to a regular military court or unless there is an 'evident practical need' for the
divergence. There is no reason why a court that differs in structure or composition from an ordinary
military court must be viewed as having been improperly constituted. Tribunals that vary
significantly in structure, composition, and procedures may all be 'regularly' or 'properly'
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The Hamdan decision was significant in two respects. First, the Court
read into the DTA an interpretive gap that many of its proponents were
startled to discover existed.267 Second, the Court analyzed the military
procedures in light of Geneva Convention requirements. 268  The decision
expressed the Court's willingness to invalidate a wartime jurisdiction-
stripping habeas statute unless that statute communicated, with unmistakable
clarity, Congress's intent in such a way as to preclude any alternative
interpretation.269 Also, the insertion of international law as a relevant factor
in deciding detainee habeas appeals introduced a new hurdle the government
would have to clear in its prosecution of enemy combatants.270 As discussed
below, Congress again responded, and statutory interpretation and
international law would again figure prominently in the detainee litigation
challenging this new statute.27'
constituted. Consider, for example, a municipal court, a state trial court of general jurisdiction, an
Article I federal trial court, a federal district court, and an international court, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Although these courts are 'differently
constituted' and differ substantially in many other respects, they are all 'regularly constituted.').
267. See 152 CONG. REC. S10357, S 10404 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Sessions)
("It certainly was not my intent, when I voted for the DTA, to exempt all of the pending
Guantanamo lawsuits from the provisions of that act.").
268. Haidan, 548 U.S. at 629-35. This was a novel proposition since, as noted above, prisoners
captured during the war on terror did not fit into traditional understandings of lawful combatants.
Furthermore, the fact that terrorists like Hamdan waged war on civilians while dressing as civilians,
and fighting on behalf of a stateless terrorist organization rather than a signatory to an international
accord, would normally disqualify such terrorists from the protections of international accords like
the Geneva Conventions. See Bialke, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
269. See Pushaw, supra note 140, at 1059-61 ("The government contended that the DTA made
plain that 'no court' (including the Supreme Court) had jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions by
Guantanamo Bay detainees, effective December 30, 2005. This argument, accepted by the
dissenters, rested on long and unbroken precedent, which established two principles. First, Article
III grants Congress plenary power to make 'exceptions' to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. Second, a federal law ousting jurisdiction applies to pending cases, except when the
statute explicitly reserves such jurisdiction. The majority characterized this precedent as setting
forth not an ironclad rule, but merely a 'presumption against jurisdiction.' This presumption could
be rebutted by ordinary principles of statutory construction-here, that 'a negative inference may be
drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is included in other
provisions of the same statute.' Applying this interpretive canon to the DTA, Justice Stevens
observed that section 1105(h)(2) expressly made sections 1005(e)(2) and (e)(3)--which grant the
D.C. Circuit 'exclusive jurisdiction' to review the 'final decisions' of Combat Status Review
Tribunals and military commissions-applicable to pending cases, whereas section 1005(h)(1)
contained no such explicit termination of pending claims as to section 1005(e)(1). Hence, the
majority held that Congress had not intended to eliminate the Court's jurisdiction over Hamdan's
case.") (internal citations omitted).
270. See infra notes 357-64 and accompanying text (discussing the relevancy of the Geneva
Conventions, specifically Article 5, to determine the sufficiency of the DTA/MCA review).
271. See infra Parts VI.C-D.2.
169
2. Military Commissions Act of 2006-Precluding All Habeas Claims
On October 17, 2006, President Bush signed the Military Commissions
Act of 2006.272 Section 7, entitled Habeas Corpus Matters, amended the
DTA with respect to the relevant portion of the habeas statute, §
2241(e)(1). 273  Similar to Congress's efforts to overrule Rasul in the DTA,
Congress used this legislation to overrule Hamdan 74 The jurisdiction-
272. Military Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see
President Bush Signs Military Commissions Act of 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/10/20061017-1.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2008) ("The bill I'm about to sign also provides a
way to deliver justice to the terrorists we have captured. In the months after 9/11, I authorized a
system of military commissions to try foreign terrorists accused of war crimes. These commissions
were similar to those used for trying enemy combatants in the Revolutionary War and the Civil War
and World War II. Yet the legality of the system I established was challenged in the court, and the
Supreme Court ruled that the military commissions needed to be explicitly authorized by the United
States Congress.").
273. Section 7(a) of the MCA provides:
(a) IN GENERAL-Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking
both the subsection (e) added by section 1005(e)(1) of Public Law 109-148 (119 Stat.
2742) and the subsection (e) added by added by section 1405(e)(1) of Public Law 109-
163 (119 Stat. 3477) and inserting the following new subsection (e):
"(e)(l) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
"(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is awaiting such determination."
Military Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2635-36.
274. The language of subsection (b) communicates this effect when it provides:
The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of
this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment,
trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September
11, 2001.
Id. at 2636. Furthermore, the legislative history behind the MCA clearly indicates that both
proponents and opponents of the bill understood that the MCA was a direct response to the Hamdan
ruling. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986-87 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (compiling various
congressional statements regarding the MCA); 152 Cong. Rec. S10357 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The habeas stripping provisions in the bill go far beyond what Congress
did in the Detainee Treatment Act .... This new bill strips habeas jurisdiction retroactively, even for
pending cases."); id. at S 10367 (statement of Sen. Graham) ("The only reason we are here is because
of the Hamdan decision. The Hamdan decision did not apply ... the [DTA] retroactively, so we
have about 200 and some habeas cases left unattended and we are going to attend to them now."); id.
at S10403 (statement of Sen. Comyn) ("[O]nce . . . section 7 is effective, Congress will finally
accomplish what it sought to do through the [DTA] last year. It will finally get the lawyers out of
Guantanamo Bay. It will substitute the blizzard of litigation instigated by Rasul v. Bush with a
narrow DC Circuit-only review of the [CSRT] hearings."); id. at S10404 (statement of Sen.
Sessions) ("It certainly was not my intent, when I voted for the DTA, to exempt all of the pending
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stripping provisions of the MCA clearly intended to preclude federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction over detainee habeas claims. 275 This is
important given that the Court demands a very high level of clarity when
precluding federal court jurisdiction over habeas claims.2 76 Furthermore,
while Congress was very explicit about stripping federal courts of habeas
jurisdiction, the MCA retained the DTA's appellate review process for
detainees desiring to appeal the commission's judgment. 277  That review is
Guantanamo lawsuits from the provisions of that act. Section 7 of the [MCA] fixes this feature of
the DTA and ensures that there is no possibility of confusion in the future .... I don't see how there
could be any confusion as to the effect of this act on the pending Guantanamo litigation. The
MCA's jurisdictional bar applies to that litigation 'without exception."'); 152 Cong. Rec. H7938
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Hunter) ("The practical effect of [section 7] will be to
eliminate the hundreds of detainee lawsuits that are pending in courts throughout the country and to
consolidate all detainee treatment cases in the D.C. Circuit."); id. at H7942 (Rep. Jackson-Lee)
("The habeas provisions in the legislation are contrary to congressional intent in the [DTA]. In that
act, Congress did not intend to strip the courts ofjurisdiction over the pending habeas [cases].").
275. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 986-97 n.2.
276. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-99 (2001) ("For the INS to prevail it must overcome
both the strong presumption in favor ofjudicial review of administrative action and the longstanding
rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. See Ex parte
Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 8 Wall. 85, 102, 19 L. Ed. 332 (1869) ('We are not at liberty to except from
[habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law'); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
660-61, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827, 116 S. Ct. 2333, (1996) (noting that '[n]o provision of Title I mentions
our authority to entertain original habeas petitions,' and the statute 'makes no mention of our
authority to hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this Court'). Implications from
statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress
must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal. Ex parte Yerger, 8
Wall. at 105 ('Repeals by implication are not favored. They are seldom admitted except on the
ground of repugnancy; and never, we think, when the former act can stand together with the new
act').").
277. Section 950(g) of the MCA describes the procedures for review in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeal:
Sec. 950g. Review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit and the Supreme Court
(a) EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION.-(1)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a final judgment rendered by a military
commission (as approved by the convening authority) under this chapter.
(B) The Court of Appeals may not review the final judgment until all other appeals under
this chapter have been waived or exhausted.
(2) A petition for review must be filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals not later
than 20 days after the date on which-
(A) written notice of the final decision of the Court of Military Commission Review is
served on the accused or on defense counsel; or
(B) the accused submits, in the form prescribed by section 950c of this title, a written
notice waiving the right of the accused to review by the Court of Military Commission
Review under section 950f of this title.
(b) STANDARD FOR REVIEW.-In a case reviewed by it under this section, the Court of
lodged in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and requires a federal court to
consider the legal sufficiency of the commission's determination.278
As federal courts have sought to interpret the DTA and MCA, important
questions have arisen regarding the constitutionality of the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions of the DTA/MCA and the proper scope of the appellate
review process. These questions are addressed in the most recent detainee
challenges to the DTA/MCA discussed below.27 9
V. CURRENT AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
The Supreme Court's willingness to open the federal courts to habeas
challenges brought by Guantanamo detainees has led to litigation that, in
many instances, has forced the Court to resolve questions of first
impression.280  The following two cases highlight the difficulties of
reconciling the Court's willingness to afford habeas rights to detainees with
Congress's repeated desire to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
detainee habeas claims.
Appeals may act only with respect to matters of law.
(c) SCOPE OF REVIEW.-The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals on an appeal under
subsection (a) shall be limited to the consideration of-
(1) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and procedures specified
in this chapter; and
(2) to the extent applicable, the Constitution and the laws of the United States.
(d) SUPREME COURT.-The Supreme Court may review by writ of certiorari the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant to section 1257 of title 28.
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3, 10 U.S.C. § 950 (g) (2006).
278. Id.
279. See infra Part V.
280. Litigation in the wake of Rasul is a good example of this. As noted earlier, prior to Rasul it
was assumed that aliens detained outside the United States during wartime had no right to bring
habeas claims in federal court. See infra Part 1I. Federal court jurisdiction did not reach aliens
detained abroad who had no physical connection to the United States. Id. This was the holding in
Eisentrager, which stood undisturbed for over fifty years. Once Rasul determined that federal court
jurisdiction extended to Guantanamo for purposes of the habeas statute, courts had to decide how
habeas rights would be vindicated in federal courts. This was especially difficult in light of
Congress's passage of the DTA and MCA, which in effect stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear detainee habeas claims. See generally Military Commission Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-336,
120 Stat. 2600 (2006). Whether the MCA applies to detainee claims, and whether the MCA is a
violation of the Suspension Clause are two issues that came before the Court in Boumediene.
Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 984, 988. But even if the Court decides the MCA did not apply to detainee
habeas claims, which is a difficult proposition given the explicit language of the Act, and even if the
Court also decides that the MCA is an unconstitutional violation of the Suspension Clause, it still
needs to answer the question of what the habeas process for detainees must look like. The DTA and
MCA offer an answer to that question in the form of limited review in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, and one of the open questions is whether that process functions as an adequate substitute
for the habeas rights of detainees. That question was addressed by the Court in Boumediene. See
infra Part IX.
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A. Boumediene/Al Odah v. Bush
In 2005, federal district judges in Washington, D.C., issued conflicting
rulings in two detainee cases. 2 81 Judge Green held in the "Al Odah" cases
that the detainees had a triable due process claim, while Judge Leon granted
the government's motion to dismiss the "Boumediene" detainee cases. 282
Two years later, these combined appeals reached the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Boumediene v. Bush.283  The petitioners in Boumediene
challenged the MCA on two grounds. First, they argued that the MCA
provisions purporting to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear all
detainee claims did not include habeas appeals.218 4 Second, they argued that
the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA were a violation of the
Suspension Clause.285 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found the first
argument to be "nonsense.2 86 The second argument, the court said, failed
because federal jurisdiction does not extend to Guantanamo, 287 and that as
aliens lacking property or presence in the United States, the detainees had no
right to invoke the Suspension Clause.288 The detainees appealed to the
281. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2008).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 986.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 988; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cf. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
286. Bounediene, 476 F.3d at 987 ("The detainees of course do not see it that way. They say
Congress should have expressly stated in section 7(b) that habeas cases were included among 'all
cases, without exception, pending on or after' the MCA became law. Otherwise, the MCA does not
represent an 'unambiguous statutory directive[ ]' to repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction. INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 299, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001). This is nonsense. Section 7(b)
specifies the effective date of section 7(a). The detainees' argument means that Congress, in
amending the habeas statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241), specified an effective date only for non-habeas
cases. Of course Congress did nothing of the sort. Habeas cases are simply a subset of cases dealing
with detention. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439
(1973). Congress did not have to say that 'the amendment made by subsection (a)'-which already
expressly includes habeas cases-shall take effect on the date of enactment and shall apply to 'all
cases, without exception, including habeas cases.' The St. Cyr rule of interpretation the detainees
invoke demands clarity, not redundancy.") (emphasis in original).
287. ld. at 990-91 ("Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950),
ends any doubt about the scope of common law habeas. 'We are cited to no instance where a court,
in this or any other country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who,
at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.' Id. at
768, 70 S. Ct. 936; see also Note, Habeas Corpus Protection Against Illegal Extraterritorial
Detention, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 368, 368 (1951).").
288. Id. at 991 ("The detainees encounter another difficulty with their Suspension Clause claim.
Precedent in this court and the Supreme Court holds that the Constitution does not confer rights on
Supreme Court, and the Court initially rejected their petition for certiorari.28 9
Interestingly, though, the Court subsequently granted certiorari,29° and oral
arguments were heard on December 5, 2007.291
The questions raised at oral argument in Boumediene indicate the
Court's concerns that the DTA/MCA review process provides a meaningful
opportunity for detainees to contest the merits of their CSRT determinations
and the constitutionality of the DTA/MCA definition of enemy combatant. 92
aliens without property or presence within the United States. As we explained in Al Odah, 321 F.3d
at 1140-41, the controlling case is Johnson v. Eisentrager. There twenty-one German nationals
confined in custody of the U.S. Army in Germany filed habeas corpus petitions. Although the
German prisoners alleged they were civilian agents of the German government, a military
commission convicted them of war crimes arising from military activity against the United States in
China after Germany's surrender. They claimed their convictions and imprisonment violated
various constitutional provisions and the Geneva Conventions. The Supreme Court rejected the
proposition 'that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality,
wherever they are located and whatever their offenses,' 339 U.S. at 783, 70 S. Ct. 936. The Court
continued: 'If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world ...[it] would mean that
during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and "werewolves"
could require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in
the First Amendment, right to bear arms as in the Second, security against "unreasonable" searches
and seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.'
Id. at 784, 70 S. Ct. 936. (Shortly before Germany's surrender, the Nazis began training covert
forces called "werewolves" to conduct terrorist activities during the Allied occupation. See http://
www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/ossrecords_263_wilhelmhoettl.html.)").
289. See William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees' Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/30/washington/30scotus.html ("The
United States Supreme Court reversed course yesterday and agreed to hear claims of GuantAnamo
detainees that they had a right to challenge their detention in American courts. The decision,
announced in a brief order released yesterday morning, set the stage for a legal battle that could
shape debates in the Bush administration about how to close the detention center, which has become
a lightning rod for international criticism. The order, which required votes from five of the nine
justices, rescinded an April order in which the justices declined to review a federal appeals court
decision that ruled against the detainees. The court offered no explanation. But the order meant that
the justices will hear the full appeal in their next term, perhaps by December."). Some have
speculated that the decision to hear the case was influenced by an affidavit filed by Stephen
Abraham, an Army reservist and attorney assigned to work on the CSRTs. Id.
290. Id.; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
291. See David Savage, High Court Hears Gitmo Detainee Rights Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-scotus6dec06,0, 3 3 8 8 72 9 .
story?coll=la-home-center; see also infra Part IX.
292. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 55-57, Boumiediene, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (No. 06-1195, 06-
1196), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts/06-1195.
pdf. The exchange between Solicitor General Paul Clement and Justices Kennedy and Stevens
demonstrates the substance of the Court's concerns:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just one more question on that point: Would the Court of Appeals
in-under the MCA have the authority to question the constitutionality of the definition
of noncombatant--of unlawful combatant?
GENERAL CLEMENT: Absolutely, Justice Kennedy. That would be available to them
in the D.C. Circuit. ...
JUSTICE STEVENS: You have a hypothetical claim that a particular prisoner says: I was
kidnapped by people who were not in the United States Army and sold for a bounty. And
I arn- just happened to be there when I got kidnapped. And then there is a genuine
question of fact as to whether the fact that they may have been sold in that manner
[Vol. 36: 129, 2008] Given an Inch, the Detainee Effort to Take a Mile
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Yet the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has not had the opportunity to address
such challenges.293 This prompted some members of the Court to appear
inclined to let the review process work its way through the appellate court
before ruling on the adequacy of that process. 294  Furthermore, other
members of the Court were concerned that the DTA and MCA withdrew
jurisdiction from federal courts to hear the kind of challenges they thought
necessary in habeas claims. 295  The government responded that jurisdiction
justifies detention, which is a different question entirely from whether they committed a
violation under the law of war.
GENERAL CLEMENT: Absolutely, Justice Stevens. But that question, of course, can be
considered by the D.C. Circuit on review, because they're specifically entitled to a
preponderance review in the D.C. Circuit. So that's a claim that they clearly could bring.
They can also bring the statutory and constitutional claims to the standards and
procedures, and they can make claims that the procedures that are set forth in the CSRTs
are not provided.
Id.
293. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
294. Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 292 at 57-58 ("CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I
suppose any challenges to the adequacy of the standards, or whatever, are the sort of things that
would be raised in the D.C. Circuit. And we don't know what that's going to look like yet, because
the D.C. Circuit hasn't had an opportunity to rule on those. GENERAL CLEMENT: That's exactly
right, Mr. Chief Justice. And that's why, as we say in the brief-I mean there's a sense in which this
is really a facial challenge.").
295. Id. at 64-65. The following colloquy illustrates the issue:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that because the withdrawal of jurisdiction does not
apply to review of the proceedings in the D.C. Circuit that's provided under the statute?
In other words, your argument that the habeas jurisdiction doesn't extend[,] doesn't reach
the review of the adequacy of the DTA proceedings?
GENERAL CLEMENT: That's exactly right. That's exactly right.
JUSTICE SOUTER: Why would they litigate that adequacy if they have determined in
advance that substantively the individuals who are petitioning have absolutely no rights?
GENERAL CLEMENT: They hadn't decided that, Justice Souter. That might have been
a problem back in Rasul. But now whatever the answer to the question of whether the
Constitution provides rights in Guantanamo, they have rights. They have the statutory
right to preponderance review. They have a statutory right to have the military follow its
own procedures. And they have lots of arguments in the lower courts trying to take
advantage of those rights that they have. So there will be a meaningful procedure in the
D.C. Circuit.
Id. This dialogue is interesting because it seems to indicate that at least four members of the
Court-Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg-do not acknowledge the DTA as a direct
overruling of Rasul. Congress was very clear in its intent to overrule what it perceived as an errant
interpretation of the habeas statute with regard to aliens detained abroad. The text of the DTA itself,
and its subsequent amendment by the MCA, indicates that Rasul was fully rejected and thus has no
force with regard to extraterritorial habeas claims. For these members of the Court to act as though
Rasul was still controlling is puzzling at best and a direct denial of clear congressional will at worst.
Justice Ginsburg's questioning during oral argument in Boumediene indicates this idea:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought this was decided in Rasul. That's why I am so puzzled
by the Government's position. I think Justice Kennedy said it most clearly when he said
that, well, in every practical respect, Guantanamo Bay is U.S. territory; and whatever
was not withdrawn from the appellate court tasked to hear habeas appeals, 296
and that the legal challenges proceeding in the appellate court were
addressing the contours of the DTA/MCA review process. 297  Thus,
regardless how the Court rules on the MCA's application to detainee habeas
claims and its relation to the Suspension Clause, it is clear that whether the
statutory review process affords detainees habeas-like rights depends in
large part on the review proceeding in the appellate court. The litigation
concerning the scope and nature of that review illustrates how the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted its mandate under the DTA/MCA
review process. The Bismullah litigation is the first instance where the court
has had the opportunity to explain its role in the detainee review process.
298
B. Bismullah v. Gates
In Bismullah v. Gates, eight Guantanamo detainees sought review of
their CSRT determinations that they were enemy combatants. 299  They
argued that the evidentiary record before the appellate court should include
all the information that was used by the CSRT to make the determination
that they were enemy combatants.0 0 The government argued that "the
record before the court is properly limited to the Record of Proceedings, as
compiled by the Recorder."' ' The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the government's request for a more limited record.30 2 In its rejection, the
Court held that "the record on review consists of the Government
Information, that is, all 'reasonably available information in the possession
of the U.S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets
the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant."' 30 3 The court later
denied the government's request for rehearing, and also denied the
government's petition for rehearing en banc.
304
Congress recently passed, they can't, as you pointed out, change the terms of the lease.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 292, at 31.
296. Id. at 64-65.
297. Id.
298. As noted above, in Boumediene the Court of Appeals was concerned with interpreting the
MCA and determining whether its provisions violated the Suspension Clause. See supra notes 285-
88. The Bismullah litigation, by contrast, was the first case where the court gave meaning to the
statutory mandates of the review process itself. See infra notes 299-303.
299. See Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
300. Id. at 180.
301. Id. at 185.
302. Id. at 192.
303. Id.
304. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This order is important for the way it
clarifies the government's obligations under the DTA review process. The court rejected the
government's requests in two key areas regarding the type and amount of information it would be
required to furnish on review. First, the government alleged that the initial Bismullah ruling
imposed an onerous discovery burden that would "divert limited resources and sidetrack the
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These cases are significant because they go to the heart of the debate
regarding the habeas rights of Guantanamo detainees. With respect to the
fundamental habeas right to contest the merits of one's detention, the
intelligence community from performing other critical national security duties during a time of war."
Id. at 140. The court rejected this assertion and held that:
If the Government cannot, within its resource constraints, produce the Government
Information collected by the Recorder with respect to a particular detainee, then this court
will be unable to confirm that the CSRTs determination was reached in compliance with
the DoD Regulations and applicable law. The Government does have an alternative: It
can abandon its present course of trying to reconstruct the Government Information by
surveying all relevant information in its possession without regard to whether that
information is reasonably available, and instead convene a new CSRT. If the
Government elects to convene a new CSRT, it will have to collect only the Government
Information specified by DoD regulations-that is, the relevant information in its
possession that is then reasonably available.
In summary, the record on review must include all the Government Information, as
defined by the DoD regulations. If the Government did not preserve that entire body of
information with respect to a particular petitioner, then it will have either to reassemble
the Government Information it did collect or to convene a new CSRT, taking care this
time to retain all the Government Information.
Id. at 141-42 (citations and footnotes omitted). Second, the court addressed the government's
concern that the production requirement outlined in the first Bismullah decision would affect its
efforts to filter classified information from that provided to detainees' counsel. The court noted that:
[T]he Government now indicates that a substantial amount of the Government
Information comes within one or another of the three exceptions, thereby "exponentially
increase[ing] the magnitude of' its review of Government Information to determine what
to withhold .... In any event, the proportion of the Government Information that may be
withheld from the petitioners' counsel should not affect to an appreciable degree the
burden upon the Government of producing the Government Information to the
petitioners' counsel. Regardless of how much ultimately may be withheld, the
Government will have to conduct the same review of the Government Information in
order to make that determination; so much was inherent in the Government's proposed
standard for withholding information, which we adopted. Thus, the real import of the
Government's argument seems to be that having to review the Government Information
to determine whether it must be disclosed creates a substantial burden for the
Government and therefore, because the Government obviously cannot indiscriminately
turn over all the Government Information to the petitioners' counsel, the only solution is
to turn over none of it. As we explained in Bismullah I, however, entirely ex parte
review of a CSRT determination is inconsistent with effective judicial review as required
by the DTA and should be avoided to the extent consistent with safeguarding classified
information.
Id. at 143 (citation omitted). The court's Order denying the government's request for rehearing en
banc was filed February 1, 2008. See Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (order
denying petition for rehearing en banc). The government requested an expedited review by the
Supreme Court. See U.S. Plans Swift New Appeal on Detainees, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/
uncategorized/us-plans-swift-new-appeal-on-detainees/#more-6563 (Feb. 5, 2008, 4:03 am EST).
On June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the D.C. Circuit Court's Bismullah
ruling and ordered the court to reconsider the case in light of the Supreme Court's Boumediene
decision. See Order List, Monday, June 23, 2008, Certiorari-Summary Dispositions, case number
07-1054, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/062308pzor.pdf.
Bismullah ruling demonstrates how the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has
interpreted its mandate under the DTA/MCA to conduct an effective judicial
review of the military's CSRT determination. Its interpretation-that all of
the government information relevant to the enemy combatant determination
must be made available on review-makes it more likely that detainees will
be able to mount a more vigorous challenge to the merits of their CSRT
determinations.0 5 Boumediene and other recent Supreme Court cases signal
that at least four (and possibly five if Justice Kennedy is included) members
of the Court strongly feel that detainees should be able to mount factual and
constitutional challenges to their detentions.3 °6 Thus, a robust challenge at
the appellate level, especially if that challenge could result in a detainee's
release from Guantanamo,3 °7 would arguably satisfy that requirement. 30 8
Whether the statutory review process conforms to the habeas requirements
expressed in the Court's detainee decisions is a question that will persist
beyond the resolution of the above cases. 309  A possible answer to that
question is presented in the section that follows.
VI. THE DTA/MCA AND HABEAS IN THE DETAINEE CONTEXT
As noted above, the Court's recent detainee decisions have discussed
whether Guantanamo detainees have habeas rights and have answered that
question in the affirmative, at least with regard to habeas under § 2241.31 °
Yet the DTA overruled Rasul, and therefore it is necessary to consider
305. See infra notes 374-80 and accompanying text.
306. The Court's decisions in Haimdi, Rasul, and Hamdan indicate the Court's desire for detainees
to have access to federal courts and exemplify the Court's willingness to reject the Executive's
attempt to completely cut off detainees from American courts. The appellate review process
provided for by the DTA/MCA gives detainees that have been determined to be enemy combatants,
and those awaiting such a determination, access to federal courts for a limited review of that
determination. Whether that review is sufficient as a DTA/MCA review was not directly at issue in
Boumediene, but that question underlies the Court's concerns with prolonged detentions and the
detainees' rights to challenge those detentions. See supra Part IV.A-B; see also infra Part IX.
307. Solicitor General Paul Clement appeared to concede that such a release was possible
following review by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, though he did not indicate that to a certainty.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 292, at 37-38. This uncertainty is indicative of the
effect the appellate litigation is having on the Court's review of the DTA/MCA. See supra note 295
and accompanying text.
308. See infra Parts VI.D.1-4.
309. None of the detainee cases that came before the Court before Boumediene directly asked the
Court to consider whether the DTA/MCA review process is a sufficient substitute for habeas. The
majority opinion in Boumediene addressed that question in the negative, but as Chief Justice Roberts
noted in dissent, there are still several unresolved issues that the Court will likely be forced to
confront again in the near future. See infra Part IX.
310. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) ("We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the
District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of the
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base"); see also infra Part IX, regarding the Court's
determination that detainees have a constitutional right to habeas.
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whether detainees have any basis for claiming habeas rights.31' The Court
has noted that habeas restrictions in the DTA and MCA implicate not only
the federal habeas statute but also the Constitution and the Geneva
Conventions.1 2  Therefore, the DTA/MCA review process must be
considered in light of those factors. Also important is how the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals has construed the language of the DTA/MCA with respect
to its judicial review of the CSRT determinations.3 13 The discussion below
argues that Congress acted within its authority when it subjected detainees to
the DTA/MCA process because detainees have neither a constitutional nor
statutory right to habeas. Therefore, the remaining consideration is whether
the DTAIMCA review process satisfies the Geneva Conventions
requirements. 1 4
The DTA/MCA process easily satisfies these requirements.315 If,
however, the Court still recognizes the Rasul holding that detainees have a
statutory right to habeas, then the DTA/MCA review process represents a
sufficient substitute for the right of habeas corpus.3 16
A. § 2241-Habeas Within the Territory of the United States
1. Differentiation Between Enemy and Non-Enemy Alien Detainees
The prima facie inquiry in detainee habeas cases is whether the detainee
is detained pursuant to military-related offenses.317 Proper differentiation
311. There are only two bases for habeas corpus rights: the federal habeas statute or the
Constitution. The DTA says detainees have no statutory access to habeas, and thus detainees must
attempt to claim a constitutional right to habeas. See supra note 241. This claim is unavailing, for
many reasons. See infra Parts VI.B. 1-2.
312. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that military commissions violate
the Geneva Conventions); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n.15 ("Petitioners' allegations-that,
although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they
have been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term,
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being
charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.' 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Cf. United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-278, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990) (KENNEDY, J.,
concurring), and cases cited therein.").
313. Seeinfra Parts VI.D.I-2.
314. See infra notes 357-64 and accompanying text.
315. See infra Part VI.C.
316. Rasul was clearly overruled so this question should be of no great moment, but even if there
is some doubt about the question, the answer is clear. If the Court feels detainees need a habeas
substitute, they have it in the DTA/MCA review. See infra notes 387-99 and accompanying text;
see also infra Part IX, discussing the status of the DTA/MCA review process in light of the
Boumediene decision.
317. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
under the MCA is important for habeas purposes because it ensures that only
those detained for war-related offenses are subject to the DTAIMCA review
process. In Rasul, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of the habeas
statute, Guantanamo Bay was a United States territory subject to federal
court jurisdiction."' Therefore, the MCA provisions dealing with the
detention of enemy aliens could theoretically apply to aliens anywhere in the
United States, regardless of whether or not they were involved in war-related
activities. 319 Indeed, one of the chief concerns expressed by opponents of
the legislation was that the MCA did not sufficiently differentiate a wartime
detainee from one with no military connection.320 A hypothetical scenario
given to reflect this concern was that of the law-abiding resident alien
318. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) ("By the express terms of the agreement with Cuba,
the United States exercise 'complete jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base .... ) (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S.
No. 418).
319. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-
36 (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong__bills
&docid=f:s3930enr.txt.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2008). The relevant portion of the MCA is Section
7, entitled Habeas Corpus Matters.
SEC. 7. HABEAS CORPUS MATTERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking
both the subsection (e) added by section 1005(e)(l) of Public Law 109-148 (119 Stat.
2742) and the subsection (e) added by added by [sic] section 1405(e)(1) of Public Law
109-163 (119 Stat. 3477) and inserting the following new subsection (e):
"(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is awaiting such determination."
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on
the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception,
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the
detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the
United States since September 11, 2001.
Id.
320. See 152 CONG. REC. S10356057 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy),
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/SCOR-2006-09-28.pdf ("Section 7 of the
bill before us represents a choice about how to treat them. This bill could have been restricted to
traditional notions of enemy combatants-foreign fighters captured on the battlefield-but the
drafters of this bill chose not to do so .... This new legislation goes far beyond Guantanamo and
strips the right to habeas of any alien living in the United States if the alien has been determined an
enemy combatant, or even if he is awaiting a determination-and that wait can take years and years
and years. Then, 20 years later, you can say: We made a mistake. Tough. It allows holding an
alien, any alien, forever, without the right of habeas corpus, while the Government makes up its
mind as to whether he is an enemy combatant.").
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detained for contributing money to an Islamic charity that, unbeknownst to
the donor, had ties to a terrorist organization.3 21 Opponents of the MCA
feared such innocents would be subject to prolonged detention at
Guantanamo with no access to habeas to contest their detentions.322 The
language of the statute refers only to an alien "detained by the United States
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.,
323
Were the Supreme Court to construe the MCA as applying to both wartime
detainees and those with no connection to the war on terror, then it is likely
that the apparent lack of differentiation, accompanied by the limited
appellate review of CSRT determinations, would run afoul of Court
precedent granting fundamental constitutional rights to non-enemy aliens
physically present in the United States.
324
Yet it is clear from the legislative history of the MCA that it is meant to
apply only to those aliens detained at Guantanamo for connection to war-
related activities.3 25  Furthermore, the MCA was a direct response to and
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636
(2006).
324. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950).
325. See 152 CONG. REC. S 10361 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Comyn) ("Now,
the question may be: Are we going to provide what the law requires? Are we going to provide
additional rights and privileges that some would like to confer upon these high-value detainees
located at Guantanamo Bay? But the fact is, to do what the proponents of this amendment propose
would be to divert our soldiers from the battlefield and to tie their hands in ways with frivolous
litigation and appeals. And the last thing that I would think any of us would want to do would be to
provide an easy means for terrorists to sue U.S. troops in U.S. courts, particularly when it is not
required by the Constitution, laws of the United States, not mandated by the Supreme Court, and we
have provided an adequate substitute remedy, which I believe is entirely consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in this area. We have provided an avenue or a process by which these
detainees can have their rights protected, such rights as they have being unlawful combatants
attacking innocent civilians. America is conferring rights upon them that we do not have to confer,
but we are conferring them because we believe there ought to be a fair process and we ought to be
consistent with our Constitution and with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court."); id. at 10367
(statement of Sen. Graham) ("Why not habeas for noncitizen, enemy combatant terrorists housed at
Gitmo? No. 1, the whole Congress has agreed prospectively habeas is not available; the Detainee
Treatment Act will be available. The only reason we are here is because of the Hamdan decision.
The Hamdan decision did not apply to the Detainee Treatment Act retroactively, so we have about
200 and some habeas cases left unattended and we are going to attend to them now. Why do we-1
and others-want to take habeas off the table and replace it with something else? I don't believe
judges should be making military decisions in a time of war. There is a reason the Germans and the
Japanese and every other prisoner held by America have never gone to Federal court and asked the
judge to determine their status. That is not a role the judiciary should be playing. They are not
trained to make those decisions. Under the Geneva Conventions article 5, the combatant tribunal
requirement is a military decision. So I believe very vehemently that the military of our country is
rejection of the Court's holding in Hamdan that struck down the military
commissions instituted to try those detainees held at Guantanamo.326
Therefore, Congress intended only to restrict the habeas rights of those
aliens held as detainees in connection with war-related activities. Thus,
there is no reason to construe the MCA to apply to those aliens outside the
wartime context.
Separate and apart from legislative intent, the DTA/MCA review
process allows the military to differentiate between war-related detainees
and non-war-related detainees.327  These procedures subject the military's
evidence against a detainee to multiple levels of review, and ensure that
detention for war-related crimes is warranted.328 This differentiation is
better qualified to determine who an enemy combatant is over a Federal judge. That is the way it has
been, that is the way it should be and, with my vote, that is the way it is going to be.").
326. See id. at 10367 (statement of Sen. Graham) ("The only reason we are here is because of the
Hamdan decision.").
327. As noted above, the CSRT regulations require all reasonably available exculpatory and
inculpatory evidence to be presented to the tribunal members so they can determine whether a
detainee should be classified and detained as an enemy combatant. See supra notes 233-35 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals subjects the CSRT
determination to a thorough judicial review. See infra Parts VI.D.l-2. As demonstrated in the
Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene litigation, it is possible for detainees to contest
their detentions in the Supreme Court.
328. Some commentators have noted the potential "gap" in the DTA/MCA review process that
exists for a detainee that has not been subject to a CSRT determination. See Janet Cooper
Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in the War on Terrorism, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 259 (2006).
They question whether that process is a sufficient replacement for habeas because before Rasul such
detainees were held at Guantanamo without any means of contesting their detentions. See id. at 288
("The DTA provides jurisdiction to review appeals only by detainees who have had a CSRT status
determination or who have completed a trial before a military commission. However, without
habeas, there is no way to enforce the DTA requirement (and that of Rasul) that detainees be given
CSRT determinations. For almost four years, up until the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul,
detainees were held without any opportunity to contest the factual basis for their detention. Even
after Rasul, the government has not provided hearings to all detainees. In fact, it has turned to a
policy of holding 'high-value' detainees outside of Guantanamo and keeping their names, where
they are being held, what they are alleged to have done, and what is happening to them secret. Some
Guantanamo detainees have been rendered to foreign countries where they have no procedural rights
and where the federal courts where they had already filed habeas petitions would lose their
jurisdiction. Others have obtained orders preventing the government from transporting them without
prior notice to the court; if the DTA's withdrawal of jurisdiction applies to these pending cases,
those injunctions would presumably be of no further effect. Even if the provision for review of final
decisions by CSRTs and military commissions is an adequate substitute for habeas, there are
categories of detainees who may have viable constitutional or statutory claims but who will not be
eligible for judicial review under the statute. For them, habeas--or some other form of judicial
review, by extraordinary writ or otherwise-may be constitutionally required."). While this
criticism is not fully without merit, several facts counsel patience before rejecting the DTA/MCA
process. First, that process has only been law for slightly longer than two years, meaning detainees
awaiting their chance to challenge their detentions-a right only granted to them in 2005-have not
been subject to the kind of indefinite detention as many of their supporters assert. See supra notes
241, 272. Second, as noted above, the military has been actively conducting CSRT determinations,
and that system, along with the regular annual review board process, has resulted in hundreds of
detainees being released from Guantanamo. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. Third,
the viability of the MCA is still being debated in federal court litigation, which could result in those
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important for habeas purposes not only because it preserves the longstanding
distinction between enemy aliens and non-enemy aliens, but also because it
triggers the DTA/MCA review-a review process far more robust than any
procedural rights traditionally afforded to enemy aliens detained outside the
United States. 329 Furthermore, the process is even more substantial in light
of the Court's recent decision regarding the due process owed citizens
detained as enemy combatants.33 °
2. Padilla v. Rasul-Due Process Rights of Citizen v. Noncitizen
Detainees
The Court's June 28, 2004 decisions in Padilla and Rasul are seemingly
inconsistent.331 It is difficult to imagine the Court meant to give presumptive
noncitizen terrorists detained at Guantanamo greater procedural rights than a
United States citizen detained in the United States.332 Along the same lines,
it is equally hard to conclude that the Hamdi plurality's directive to provide
a detained United States citizen the "minimum requirements of due process"
is not fulfilled by the DTA/MCA review with respect to noncitizens alleged
to be enemy combatants.333 Thus, even though the Court has not spoken
petitioners being released from Guantanamo if the Court alters the contours of the present review
process. See supra Part V. Thus, the DTA/MCA review process is already functioning in many
respects as a habeas review even while its implementation and legality are being litigated in federal
courts.
329. See infra notes 344-47 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Part IV.A.
331. Justice Scalia, in his Rasul dissent, notes the tension between the Court's simultaneous
decisions in Rasul and Padilla. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Congress is in session. If it wished to change federal judges' habeas jurisdiction from what this
Court had previously held that to be, it could have done so. And it could have done so by intelligent
revision of the statute, instead of by today's clumsy, countertextual reinterpretation that confers upon
wartime prisoners greater habeas rights than domestic detainees. The latter must challenge their
present physical confinement in the district of their confinement, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, post, 542
U.S. 426 (2004), whereas under today's strange holding Guantanamo Bay Detainees can petition in
any of the 94 federal judicial districts. The fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the
district of detention that the statute requires has been converted from a factor that precludes their
ability to bring a petition at all into a factor that frees them to petition wherever they wish-and, as a
result, to forum-shop.") (internal citation and footnotes omitted). In Padilla, the Court held that a
United States citizen detained at a military brig in South Carolina could not pursue a habeas petition
under the statute in New York because his immediate custodian was not located in New York. See
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Rasul held that noncitizens detained at Guantanamo were
not prevented from filing habeas petitions in Washington, D.C., even though they were held outside
the United States and until that date federal courts had never exercised jurisdiction over Guantanamo
during the 101 year period of the lease agreement with Cuba. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 501-04.
332. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
333. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion). Due process required
that "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
clearly or thoroughly regarding the due process rights of noncitizens
detained at Guantanamo, 334 it is likely the DTA/MCA review fulfills what
limited due process entitlements they would possess should the Court find
they could claim such rights.335
B. Habeas Under the Constitution
1. Aliens at Guantanamo v. Aliens in the United States
The statutory scheme upon which the DTA/MCA review is predicated
fits well within the historical understanding of the reach of federal court
jurisdiction under the habeas statute, at least with respect to aliens outside
the United States. 336  How that statutory scheme comports with the
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." Id. at 533. The DTA/MCA review fulfills this
requirement by providing the detainee and his lawyer access to the unclassified evidence used in the
CSRT determination, a chance to appeal the CSRT determination before the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the opportunity to appeal to the Supreme Court. See supra notes 241, 246 and
accompanying text. In each instance the detainee has the opportunity to present arguments in his
defense and contest the CSRT determination before a neutral authority. Id.
334. The debate over what rights detainees have in light of the Rasul decision has been vibrant in
the federal district court in Washington, D.C. See Kmiec, supra note 16, at 886-88 ("By contrast,
how the courts will assess the merits of the cases brought by Guantinamo detainees under their
newfound statutory habeas right is wholly open-ended. The Supreme Court in Rasul, it will be
remembered, left this up to the lower courts to fill out, but with an unexplained footnote-thumb on
the scale, noting that the detainees' 'allegations ... unquestionably describe "custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."' The district courts have taken up the
grand debate. It is a debate that is largely occurring in Washington, D.C. between Judges Leon and
Green over what rights, if any, accompany the extension of a statutory right of habeas corpus to
noncitizen detainees outside U.S. sovereign territory. In a nutshell, Judge Leon reasons that the writ
means that these alien detainees are empowered to ask: were we properly captured as part of a
properly authorized military conflict? Judge Leon finds this question largely answered for him by
Congress's sweeping AUMF and the President's own inherent Constitutional authority, provided, of
course, the detainees were captured within the scope of those parameters. The last proviso is not
unimportant as it gives lie to the rhetorical claim that anyone could be snatched up at any time for
indefinite detention. To the contrary, it is only upon the proper showing of a wartime capture that
Judge Leon finds other causes of action, that are really only multiply-expressed challenges to the
authority to detain during war, to be either not judicially enforceable or inapplicable. Judge Green
skips over the issue of whether or not someone was properly captured and proceeds directly to the
issue of whether or not noncitizens have Fifth Amendment due process rights. Relying upon the
Rasul footnote, Judge Green concludes that noncitizen detainees may challenge not just the detention
itself, but also its nature and manner in terms of the conditions of custody, access to counsel, and
perhaps a full panoply of matters arising under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Judge Green
thereby produces an anomaly: citizens within the United States (pursuant to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdi) may challenge the lawfulness of the detention, but noncitizens beyond our
borders have federal judicial supervision well in excess of that, over a host of subsidiary matters that
were previously thought to be the subject of diplomacy or the province of military judgment limited
by international accord.") (footnotes omitted).
335. See supra note 333 and accompanying text; see also infra note 435 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Kennedy's needful due process analysis in the Boumediene majority).
336. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2064 ("The statutory scheme appears to make no
provision for habeas corpus jurisdiction, or any substitute therefor, over challenges of any kind to the
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traditional understanding of the constitutional rights of aliens detained
within the United States is the current question." 7 Rasul did not elaborate
upon what fundamental constitutional rights, if any, accompanied federal
court jurisdiction as it stretched the ninety miles from Florida to Cuba via
the federal habeas statute.338 This raises the question whether rights of
Guantanamo aliens are as constitutionally broad as aliens within the United
States. Some have argued they are.3 39 But two factors counsel the opposite
conclusion.
First, Guantanamo detainees have not met-and never will meet,
provided they remain at Guantanamo-the crucial requirement of having
any physical connection with the United States. 340  The "privilege of
litigation," as noted in Eisentrager, was only available to those aliens having
a physical presence in the United States. 341  Notwithstanding Rasul's
questionable statutory analysis, the fact remains that as habeas petitioners
Guantanamo detainees cannot establish the simple predicate for alien access
to federal courts. 342
detention of aliens abroad. Harsh though this state of affairs might be in some cases, habeas
jurisdiction has never generally extended to aliens detained abroad under Eisentrager (which Rasul
did not clearly displace). The preclusions of review contained in the DTA and the MCA thus
introduce no constitutional difficulty, at least in ordinary cases, for they essentially only ratify the
constitutionally acceptable status quo ante for aliens detained abroad.").
337. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. As previously mentioned, this question assumes
Rasul is still valid, even though the DTA clearly overruled it. Id.
338. See Rasul v. Bush, 544 U.S. 466 (2004); see also supra note 245 and accompanying text.
339. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2064 ("As our argument relies in part on the
reasoning in St. Cyr and in part on a broader principle concerning the right of access to a court in
order to assert a constitutional right to judicial redress, the obvious question is whether the rights of
aliens at Guantanamo Bay are as broad in relevant respects as those of aliens in the United States.
We would answer this question in the affirmative, based in part on the distinctive features of
Guantanamo Bay noted above and in part on the closely related view . . . that aliens detained at
Guantanamo Bay possess at least 'fundamental' constitutional rights and thus a right to claim
judicial redress for violations of those rights.") (footnote omitted).
340. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The fundamental criterion for alien access to
federal courts is alien residence within sovereign United States territory. That the United States
exercises "complete control" over Guantanamo and federal law governs United States citizens at
Guantanamo-facts the Rasul court found sufficient to satisfy the sovereignty requirement-clearly
does not mean the same thing as sovereignty, and thus casts grave doubt on the Rasul analysis. As
Justice Scalia and many other commentators have noted, this rationale would mean that federal
courts could exercise their jurisdiction under the habeas statute at Bagram Air Force Base in
Afghanistan, or any United States military facility in Iraq. The Boumediene oral argument featured
an exchange discussing the difficulty of using a jurisdictional analysis that relied on a standard less
than "sovereignty." Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, 17, Boumediene, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (No.
06-1195, 06-1196), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-
transcripts/ 06-1195.pdf:
Second, assuming Rasul is correct and Guantanamo detainees are
physically present in the United States, their presumptive enemy status
affords them limited judicial review of their detentions. 343  Eisentrager
discussed this issue and held that the judicial inquiry resulting from the
habeas petition of a resident enemy alien was a limited one.3 " Rasul held
that § 2241 did not bar detainees from accessing federal courts, but it did not
elaborate on what substantive rights, if any, such access would entail.34 In
light of the historically limited nature of the judicial inquiry noted above, it
seems likely that the detainees' newfound habeas rights would entitle them
to similarly limited judicial inquiry.346 The requirement of a limited judicial
MR. WAXMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, let me answer that question directly and then if I
may finish my answer to Justice Scalia. We don't contend that the United States
exercises sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. Our contention is that at common law,
sovereignty (a) wasn't the test, as Lord Mansfield explained, and (b) wasn't a clear-cut
determine-there weren't clear-cut sovereignty lines in those days. Our case doesn't
depend on sovereignty. It depends on the fact that, among other things, the United States
exercises-quote-"complete jurisdiction and control over this base." No other law
applies. If our law doesn't apply, it is a law-free zone.
JUSTICE ALITO: So the answer to Justice Ginsburg's question, it wouldn't matter
where these detainees were held so long as they are under U.S. control. If they were held
on a U.S. military base pursuant to a standard treaty with another country, if they were in
Afghanistan or in Iraq, the result would be the same?
MR. WAXMAN: No, I think, Justice Alito, I want to be as clear about this as I can be.
This is a particularly easy straightforward case, but in another place, jurisdiction would
depend on the facts and circumstances, including the nature of an agreement with the
resident sovereign over who exercises control ....
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So to determine whether there's jurisdiction, in every case
we have to go through a multi factor analysis to determine if the United States exercises
not sovereignty, which you've rejected as the touchstone, but sufficient control over a
particular military base? Over the Philippines during World War II, in Vietnam, and it is
going to decide in some cases whether the control is sufficient and others whether it
isn't?
MR. WAXMAN: Well, I don't-
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And that is a judgment we the Court would make, not the
political branches who have to deal with the competing sovereignties in those situations?
Id.
343. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
344. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775-76 (1950) ("The resident enemy alien is
constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a 'declared war'
exists. Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to ascertain the
existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and so subject to the Alien Enemy Act.
Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, courts will not inquire into any other issue
as to his internment .... A unanimous Court recently clarified both the privilege of access to our
courts and the limitations upon it. We said: 'The ancient rule against suits by resident alien enemies
has survived only so far as necessary to prevent use of the courts to accomplish a purpose which
might hamper our own war efforts or give aid to the enemy. This may be taken as the sound
principle of the common law today."') (citations omitted).
345. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
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inquiry is more than met in the DTA/MCA review, which provides for
review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.347
2. The Constitutional Right to Habeas
Eisentrager is important not only for its statutory holding but also for its
related holding that the Constitution does not confer upon enemy aliens
detained abroad a right to bring habeas actions in federal courts.3 48 The
Court discussed the panoply of rights to which aliens within the United
States are entitled under the Constitution,349 but noted that, as mentioned
earlier, these protections inhere by virtue of the alien's presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 350  Furthermore, the Court
presciently commented on the relationship between aliens and the Executive
during wartime, noting that security concerns require the free exercise of
Executive authority unfettered by alien-related litigation.35 ' Finally, as noted
above, the Court declared its unwillingness to conduct a searching judicial
inquiry into the detainment of resident enemy aliens. 352 Each of these points
is made to communicate the crucial idea that because the constitutional
rights of aliens within the United States are necessarily limited, there is no
347. See supra notes 241, 246 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IX. Chief Justice
Roberts rightly notes that the majority's failure to clearly show the inadequacy of the DTA/MCA
review process calls into question the majority's view that the process fails to provide sufficient
habeas protections. Id.
348. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768 ("We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any
other country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant
time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of
the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.").
349. Id. at 770-71 ("The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has
been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.
Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him
certain rights; they become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of
intention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization.
During his probationary residence, this Court has steadily enlarged his right against Executive
Deportation except upon full and fair hearing. And, at least since 1886, we have extended to the
person and property of resident aliens important constitutional guaranties-such as the due process
of law of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
350. Id. at 771.
351. Id. at 774-75 ("Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation,
has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security. This is in keeping with the
practices of the most enlightened of nations and has resulted in treatment of alien enemies more
considerate than that which has prevailed among any of our enemies and some of our allies. This
statute was enacted or suffered to continue by men who helped found the Republic and formulate the
Bill of Rights, and although it obviously denies enemy aliens the constitutional immunities of
citizens, it seems not then to have been supposed that a nation's obligations to its foes could ever be
put on a parity with those to its defenders.").
352. See supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text.
conceivable basis for the claim that the Constitution provides a right for
alien enemies detained outside the United States to file a writ of habeas
corpus in federal courts.353
Notably, the Court in Rasul does not directly refute this longstanding
constitutional interpretation. Instead, it sidesteps the issue by attempting to
distinguish between the Eisentrager and Rasul petitioners on the basis of six
factors laid out in the Eisentrager opinion.354 Yet Rasul's distinguishing the
petitioners by no means overrules the firmly rooted doctrine that enemy
aliens detained abroad have no constitutional access to habeas, and nothing
in the opinion indicates that the constitutional bar is overruled by the Court's
new statutory interpretation.355 Thus, despite the statutory interpretation in
Rasul, there is no reason to believe aliens detained at Guantanamo have a
constitutional right to habeas relief. The Supreme Court's June 12, 2008
decision in Boumediene v. Bush, which reached the opposite conclusion, is
discussed in the Postscript.
C. Habeas Under the Geneva Conventions
The incorporation of international law into constitutional jurisprudence
has always been a contentious issue, and the Hamdan decision was
noteworthy for the way it struck down the military commissions as violative
of the Geneva Conventions.35 6 If this decision is indicative of the emerging
importance of international treaties to the Court's jurisprudence, then the
Court is likely to subject future detainee decisions to the scrutiny of the
Geneva Conventions. Therefore it is necessary to evaluate the DTA/MCA
review process in light of the Geneva requirements.
Briefly stated, the applicable Geneva regulation is Article 5, which
requires that in cases where questions "arise as to whether persons...
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,357 such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until ... their status has been
353. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778.
354. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004). The Rasul Court found those factors "relevant
only to the question of the prisoners' constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus." Id. at 477.
Therefore, because the Court found that the petitioners were easily distinguished on the basis of
those factors, the constitutional impediment to habeas jurisdiction was easily disposed of and
"persons detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely
on the Constitution as the source of their right to federal habeas review." Id. at 478.
355. Id.
356. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
357. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II], available at http://www.yale.
edu/lawweb/avalonlawofwar/geneva03.htm#art5 (last visited Sept. 16, 2008). Article 4 lays out the
criteria for being categorized as a prisoner of war. See id. It is notable that those persons detained at
Guantanamo Bay do not fit into any of these categories, which explains the Bush Administration's
2002 policy to classify the detainees as enemy combatants instead of prisoners of war. See Bialke,
supra note 17, at 1-2, 15.
[Vol. 36: 129, 2008] Given an Inch, the Detainee Effort to Take a Mile
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
determined by a competent tribunal." '358 The obvious question is whether the
CSRTs fulfill this "competent tribunal" requirement.359 Many reasons
358. See id.; see also Bialke, supra note 17, at 49-51 ("A capturing party convenes a 'competent
tribunal' under Geneva Convention III art. 5 when it is necessary to resolve a material factual issue
of doubt as to the legal status of captured combatants. Geneva Convention III art. 5 does not purport
to dictate the nature of a POW status tribunal, deferring to the detaining power as to tribunal
procedures and composition. Art. 5 does not specify how tribunals are to be structured or organized.
Neither does art. 5 instruct whether the tribunals are executive or judicial in nature. Art. 5 does not
instruct that the detaining power establish a separate tribunal for each detainee who has 'fallen into
the hands of the enemy.' Art. 5 merely directs that doubt as to a captured combatant's status should
be considered and settled by a 'competent tribunal.' Such individual art. 5 tribunals were designed
to provide ad hoc on-the-scene minimal due process to rectify expediently the battleground front-
line factual errors of combatant status. For example, individual art. 5 tribunals are meant to ensure
that a few displaced civilians or other individual noncombatant captives rounded up by mistake and
who are in the proximity of belligerent activity taking place in a combat zone, are then released
promptly. Art. 5 tribunals are also meant to provide POW status to a deserter of an opposing armed
force who has discarded his or her uniform, to confer timely POW status to a captured lawful
combatant who lost an identification card or to a lawful combatant captured off-duty (or otherwise
legitimately out-of-uniform). As stated earlier, art. 5 defers to the detaining power and does not
indicate how individual competent tribunals should be organized or structured. Generally, however,
an individual art. 5 tribunal would be non-adversarial and limited in scope.") (footnotes omitted).
359. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 550-51 (2004) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
"competent tribunal" requirement as enacted in military regulations) ("Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8, ch. 1, §§ 1-5, 1-6
(1997), adopted to implement the Geneva Convention, and setting out a detailed procedure for a
military tribunal to determine an individual's status. See, e.g., id., § 1-6 ('A competent tribunal shall
be composed of three commissioned officers'; a 'written record shall be made of proceedings';
'[p]roceedings shall be open' with certain exceptions; '[p]ersons whose status is to be determined
shall be advised of their rights at the beginning of their hearings,' 'allowed to attend all open
sessions,' 'allowed to call witnesses if reasonably available, and to question those witnesses called
by the Tribunal,' and to 'have a right to testify;' and a tribunal shall determine status by a
'[p]reponderance of evidence'). One of the types of doubt these tribunals are meant to settle is
whether a given individual may be, as Hamdi says he is, an '[i]nnocent civilian who should be
immediately returned to his home or released.' Id., § l-6e(10)(c). The regulation, jointly
promulgated by the Headquarters of the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
Corps, provides that '[p]ersons who have been determined by a competent tribunal not to be entitled
to prisoner of war status may not be executed, imprisoned, or otherwise penalized without further
proceedings to determine what acts they have committed and what penalty should be imposed.' Id.,
§ 1-6g. The regulation also incorporates the Geneva Convention's presumption that in cases of
doubt, 'persons shall enjoy the protection of the ... Convention until such time as their status has
been determined by a competent tribunal.' Id., § l-6a."). As noted earlier, it is not a settled
proposition that detainees as unlawful combatants are entitled to the protections of international law,
and a good case can be made that the manner in which they fight deprives of them of the protections
accorded to traditional soldiers. See Bialke, supra note 17, at 51 ("In regards to captured al-Qaeda
and Taliban irregular combatants captured out-of-uniform in armed conflict, there is no question,
doubt, or ambiguity that they failed en masse to meet any of the four criteria of lawful belligerency
and, subsequently then, equally no doubt as to their status as unlawful combatants. Generally, both
the al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees now in Cuba were captured without responsible chains of
command, without uniforms, with concealed weapons, and without any commitment to or history of
compliance with international humanitarian law and LOAC. As a result of the lack of doubt as to
both al-Qaeda and the Taliban's unlawful combatant status, art. 5 tribunals, in regards to individual
189
suggest they do. First, the CSRTs are composed of three neutral
commissioned officers.36 ° Second, "[t]he detainee shall be allowed to attend
all proceedings . . . .""' Third, the detainee can call and question
witnesses. 362 Fourth, the detainee has the right to testify.363  In short, the
CSRTs were modeled after the Geneva requirements as they were
incorporated into Army Regulation 1 9 0 -8. 3 64  Therefore, there is little
question that the CSRTs satisfy the Geneva Convention "competent
tribunal" requirement.
D. Statutory Interpretation-The Scope of Appellate Review
How the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has understood its obligation
under the DTA/MCA review is crucial to habeas considerations for several
reasons. First, a broad evidentiary record on appellate review of a CSRT
determination affirms Congress's intent to enable detainees to challenge the
merits of their detentions by contesting the evidence used in their CSRT
determinations.365 Second, forcing the government to either produce all of
the information used in the CSRT or convene a new CSRT expands the
scope of the government's documentary obligation, strengthens the factual
record on review, and gives teeth to the appellate review process.366 Third, a
broad interpretation of the appellate review that encompasses constitutional
challenges to the DTAIMCA review process would ensure that the appellate
review is not limited to purely fact-based challenges. 367  Finally, the
appellate court's ability to order release for unwarranted detentions would
demonstrate that the DTA/MCA review functions as an effective habeas
remedy. 368 The discussion that follows demonstrates how a robust judicial
review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ensures that detainees are
captured al-Qaeda and Taliban combatants, would not be applicable.").
360. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. Letter (e) of the implementing order provides
that "A Tribunal shall be composed of three neutral commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed
Forces, each of whom possesses the appropriate security clearance and none of whom was involved
in the apprehension, detention, or previous determination of status of the detainee."
361. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum of Paul Wolfowitz,
Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal, at (g)(4) (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004
/d2004O7O7review.pdf [hereinafter Wolfowitz Memorandum].
362. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note
361 at (g)(8).
363. See supra note 235 and accompanying text; see also Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note
361 at (g)(10).
364. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
365. See infra Part VI.D.I.
366. See infra Part VI.D.2.
367. See infra Part VI.D.3. An example of such a constitutional claim would be a detainee
challenging the government's definition of "enemy combatant" as an unconstitutionally broad or
vague definition. Id.
368. See infra Part VL.D.4.
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afforded the essential habeas protection and properly respects the President's
wartime authority.
369
1. The Scope of the Record on Appellate Review
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has issued one decision and two
orders denying the rehearing of its July 2007 decision clarifying the scope of
the record on review when a detainee challenges his CSRT determination.37 °
These rulings are important because they demonstrate how that court has
construed the language of the DTA 3 71 with regard to the breadth of the
factual record the government must divulge.37 Thus far, the Court has
rejected the government's request for a more limited evidentiary review,
both in terms of the volume of information and the type of information that
must be delivered to petitioners' counsel.373 This is crucial for two reasons.
First, the requirement that the government must divulge all the
information collected by the Recorder, and not just that used in the CSRT
determination,374 ensures that the appellate review addresses the facts of the
369. See infra Part VI.5; see also infra Part IX (discussing the sufficiency and validity of the
appellate review process in light of Boumediene).
370. See supra note 304.
371. It should be noted that the court of appeals has yet to rule on the scope of the record on
review of a military commission's final decision, which is governed by the MCA, but there is no
reason to believe the court would construe its language in a way inconsistent with its interpretation
of the DTA. That is to say, the court construed the DTA's provisions to require the government to
make available the fullest amount of information it could with respect to the CSRTs, and it is likely
the court would exert a similarly robust legal review under the MCA, as it does not make provision
for factual review. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
372. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(c)(2) 110 Stat.
2680, 2742-44 (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr359&
dbname=109& (last visited Oct. 25, 2008). The relevant DTA language governing the review in the
appellate court reads:
(C) SCOPE OF REVIEW-The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit on any claims with respect to an alien under this paragraph
shall be limited to the consideration of-
(i) whether the status determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with regard
to such alien was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary
of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the
conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence); and
(ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether
the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Id.; see also supra note 277 for the relevant MCA language governing appellate review.
373. See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
374. See Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (order denying petition for
rehearing en banc) ("The DoD Regulations, which establish the 'standards and procedures' to be
record in terms of the classified and non-classified information against the
detainee. 375  It also ensures appellate review of whether the CSRT met its
legal burden-whether the evidence is sufficient to affirm the CSRT's
determination by a preponderance of the evidence standard. 76 Second, the
Court's refusal to reduce the government's burden of culling highly sensitive
information from that required to be handed over to petitioners' counsel
suggests the court is dedicated to ensuring petitioners' counsel are not
followed by the Recorder, the detainee's Personal Representative, and the CSRTs themselves,
require the Recorder to obtain all the Government Information, E-1 § C(2); E-2 § C(l), to cull from
the Government Information and forward to the Tribunal such information 'as may be sufficient to
support the detainee's classification as an enemy combatant' together with all exculpatory
information, E-1 § H(4); E-2 §§ B(1), C(6), and to share all the Government Information with the
detainee's Personal Representative, E-I § F(8); E-2 § C(4). In order to review whether the Recorder
performed these tasks, the court obviously must see all the Government Information. See Bismullah
1, 501 F.3d at 185-86; Bismullah II, 503 F.3d at 139-40. Further, the court will be able to assess
whether any failure by the Recorder to perform these tasks affected the weight of the evidence
before the CSRT only if the court can consider that failure in light of all the information the
Recorder was supposed to collect and forward. See Bismullah 1, 501 F.3d at 185-86; Bismullah II,
503 F.3d at 139-40. Irrespective, therefore, of what § 2112 might say in general about the scope of
a record on review, the DTA requires that the record on review of a CSRT's status determination
include all of the Government Information, regardless of whether it was all put before the
Tribunal.").
375. Both the DTA and MCA provide for deletion of classified material for security purposes, but
the court of appeals in its October 3, 2007 order stated that while deletion of sensitive material was
allowed, "entirely ex parte review of a CSRT determination is inconsistent with effective judicial
review as required by the DTA and should be avoided to the extent consistent with safeguarding
classified information." See Bismullah, 503 F.3d at 143.
376. Id. See supra notes 234-35; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2107 ("Although
the rules governing proceedings before CSRTs also sharply limit detainees' access to information on
which the lawfulness of their detentions may depend, the DTA appears to authorize judicial review
by the D.C. Circuit of the question whether the CSRT properly found enemy combatant status to
have been established by a preponderance of the evidence. That provision of the DTA strikes us as
important, for the preclusion of all review of the factual determinations made by CSRTs would be
constitutionally troublesome, given that those tribunals lack the procedural guarantees afforded by
the MCA in trials for war crimes."). A recent independent review of hundreds of CSRT
determinations indicates the overwhelming accuracy of the CSRT process. See generally Joseph
Felter & Jarrett Brachman, AN ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS
(CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARIES, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, July 25, 2007,
available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/csrt/CTC-CSRT-Report-072407.pdf. The authors note that
only six out of 516 detainees posed no security threat to the United States:
In 2007, the Office of Detainee Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked
faculty at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point to review information
recorded in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries (hereinafter referred to as "CSRT
records") and provide an objective assessment of this information.
After querying the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, the CTC found that 73% of the
unclassified summaries meet the CTC's highest threshold of a 'demonstrated threat' as an
enemy combatant. The CTC established two other categories with four discrete proxy
characteristics in each ('potential threat' and 'associated threat') in order to help assess
whether the information in these records indicated these individuals posed or potentially
posed a threat as an enemy combatant. The CTC found that six of the publicly available
CSRT unclassified summaries contained no evidence that fit any of the CTC's twelve
threat variables.
Id. at4.
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denied the information necessary to successfully contest the CSRT
determination.377 The court has made clear it will not be a rubber stamp for
the CSRTs, and its rulings demonstrate that it intends to conduct a thoroughjudicial review of the factual and legal conclusions of CSRT determinations,
and the same is likely true for the judgments of military commissions.378 To
the extent that habeas rights traditionally involve the ability to contest the
evidence justifying one's executive detention, a review providing noncitizen
enemies near total evidentiary disclosure3 79 before a federal civil appellate
court clearly satisfies the requirements of habeas corpus.38°
377. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
378. The MCA provides for only legal review of military commission judgments, and while this
restriction on factual review would seem to suggest shortcomings in the habeas analysis, the greater
structural protections within the military commission system itself belie that criticism. See Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 36, at 2106-07 ("In the end, all we can say with confidence is that with respect
to aliens detained in the United States or at Guant~namo Bay who have been convicted of crimes by
military commissions, the best reading of the Suspension Clause would make the permissibility of
precluding judicial review of factual determinations depend on such context-specific factors as the
nature and reliability of the administrative process and perhaps the credibility of the government's
claim of exigency. In light of that general standard, the MCA's preclusion of factual review finds
some support in the Yamashita decision and might be defended on the ground that the statutorily
prescribed procedures for war crimes trials provide relatively robust, albeit far from perfect,
guarantees of fact-finding accuracy. These guarantees include reasonably strong protections of
adjudicatory independence from command influence, the right to challenge a commission member
for cause, limits on the closure of hearings, the right to counsel, the right to compulsory process
similar to that in civilian courts, exclusion of hearsay evidence deemed to be unreliable, the right to
obtain exculpatory evidence, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
379. That disclosure is necessarily limited to accommodate the government's concerns regarding
classified or highly sensitive information. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has sought to balance
between accommodating the government's security concerns and fulfilling its DTA mandate to
conduct a thorough judicial review. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007),("In Bismullah I, we dealt with the Government's concern about disclosure by providing, just as the
Government urged, that it may withhold from the petitioners' counsel any Government Information
that is either 'highly sensitive information, or ... pertain[s] to a highly sensitive source or to anyone
other than the detainee.' The Government's need to review the Government Information in order to
determine whether it fits within any of these three exceptions gives rise to the Government's present
concern about the burden of complying with Bismullah L") (citation and footnote omitted). The
court then rejected the government's request for a reduced burden regarding its obligations to sift
classified information from that being made available to petitioners' counsel. Id.
380. As noted above, the essence of habeas is the ability to come before a civil court to contest the
evidence supporting an allegedly unlawful executive detention. See generally supra Part II. In a
situation where Congress has been very explicit that the Guantanamo detainees have absolutely no
right to file habeas appeals in federal courts, a system of review that affords those same detainees
access to evidence used to justify their detentions, and the chance to contest that evidence before
multiple civil appellate courts undoubtedly qualifies as a substitution for habeas. See supra Part IV.
2. The Government Obligation to Produce Evidence or Convene a
New CSRT
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has not been reticent about enforcing the
government's production requirements such that the government's inability
to meet its burden will necessitate convening a new CSRT. 81 This is
important because it displays the court's seriousness about its role in
providing an independent civil check on the military's CSRT determination.
Habeas came into its own as a means of requiring the Admiralty to
justify its detention of British subjects.382 The Crown's failure to establish
cause required it either to assert new charges warranting detention or release
the prisoner.383 Similarly here, the government's failure to retain the
necessary evidence with respect to the detainee challenging his CSRT
determination requires it to validate that determination again before military
authorities and civilian courts.3 8 4 The court's language here is instructive
regarding the government's burden to fulfill its evidentiary duty under the
DTA/MCA process or face the consequences of having to reconvene a
second CSRT. The court states that, "[i]f the Government did not preserve
that entire body of information with respect to a particular petitioner, then it
will have either to reassemble the Government Information it did collect or
to convene a new CSRT, taking care this time to retain all the Government
Information.,385 The court's willingness to reject the CSRT determination
and force the military to reconvene a new tribunal to determine detainee
status fits well within the habeas tradition of subjecting executive detention
to independent civil court review.
3 86
3. Constitutional Challenges to the DTA and MCA
Whether detainees can mount constitutional challenges to their
confinement strikes at the heart of the habeas debate because such
challenges allow the detainee the opportunity to contest not only his
individual confinement, but the very constitutional authority underlying his
detention.387 Both the DTA and MCA appear to make provisions for such
challenges by allowing the appellate court to consider whether the DTA and
381. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
384. Whether the D.C. Circuit can order a detainee's release if the CSRT evidence is found
wanting is discussed in Part VI.D.4, infra.
385. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
386. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
387. Such was the situation in Hamdan where the petitioner detainee, bin Laden's former driver,
was able to contest his detention up to the Supreme Court, where the Court struck down the military
commissions established to try detainees like Hamdan. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006).
194
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MCA decisions were consistent with "the Constitution and the laws of the
United States. 3 88
One of the persistent questions accompanying detainee litigation has
been the soundness of the government's definition of the term "enemy
combatant. ' 389 Detainees see the perceived lack of a formal definition as a
potential avenue of successful litigation, and recent Supreme Court litigation
has touched on whether detainees would have the right under the DTAIMCA
process to challenge the constitutionality of the government's definition of
"enemy combatant. '390 The government has indicated that detainees would
have that right in the appellate court or the Supreme Court.391  Like the
Hamdan decision, this strategy would involve second-guessing an Executive
decision made during wartime. Certain members of the Court would likely
be reticent to read this right into the review process and be unreceptive to the
merits of such challenges.392
388. See supra notes 277, 372 and accompanying text.
389. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) ("The threshold question before us is
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as 'enemy combatants.' There
is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never provided any court
with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such. It has made clear, however, that,
for purposes of this case, the 'enemy combatant' that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it
alleges, was 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' in
Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States' there. Brief for
Respondents 3. We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of
citizens falling within that definition is authorized.").
390. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 265. Justice Thomas dissented in Hamdan on the grounds that the Court
should not be second-guessing decisions properly left to the Executive during a time of war. See
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 682-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at
2101 ("Against this background of precedent and policy, we would interpret § 2241-which
continues to govem habeas review for citizens-as permitting de novo review of issues of
constitutional and statutory law. The DTA and the MCA-which, in challenges to the detention of
aliens as enemy combatants, substitute appellate review in the D.C. Circuit for habeas corpus
jurisdiction-both invite similar interpretations, for neither purports to limit review of legal issues,
save for a proviso in the MCA that a commission's finding or sentence 'may not be held incorrect on
the ground of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the
accused.' De novo judicial determinations of legal questions should occasion relatively little
ongoing disruption of military or related operations. In addition, a small number of rulings should
suffice to clarify the law that executive officials can thereafter apply. Opposing de novo review of
questions of law, Justice Thomas argued in Hanidan that the deference due to administrative
decisionmakers under ordinary administrative law doctrines and due to executive officials in the
foreign affairs arena should carry over into habeas corpus. On this view, a habeas court (and
presumably the D.C. Circuit in affording the substitute judicial process under the MCA and DTA for
alien detainees) should hesitate to second-guess executive determinations that federal statutes
authorize executive detention and military trial. Although there is weight to this argument, the core
concern of habeas corpus-to protect the right to freedom from bodily restraint-differs not only
from the concerns applicable to routine administrative law cases, but also from those relevant to the
Nevertheless, the fact that the DTA/MCA process grants detainees the
right to bring this particular constitutional challenge is significant because it
arguably means detainees can use the Constitution to challenge other
components of their detention. Also, striking down fundamental articles of
executive detention like the definition of "enemy combatant" serves the
essential purpose of habeas relief-the possibility of release.393
4. Merits Relief under the DTA and MCA
The provision for detainee release under the DTA/MCA was discussed
at great length in the Boumediene oral argument.394 Justice Souter in
particular was concerned that the language and practice of the DTA
demonstrated that it was unavailing for detainees to seek their release under
that system.3 95 The government responded that nothing in the text of the
DTA precluded the Court from interpreting it to require the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals to release detainees if the evidence did not support their
CSRT determination.396 Thus, while the DTA does not expressly provide for
great bulk of foreign affairs matters in which courts often defer. To put the point bluntly, the values
that underlie habeas corpus jurisdiction are both more venerable and more vulnerable than those that
operate in routine administrative law cases, and courts should not subordinate the former to the latter
in the absence of a plain legislative mandate.") (footnotes omitted).
393. There is no guarantee that constitutional challenges to the DTA/MCA review process will
result in a detainee's release or transfer from Guantanamo. Congress's reaction to Hamdan was a
good illustration of what happens when the Court rejects executive detentions and Congress
responds by specifically authorizing the system of detention struck down. See supra Part 11. Yet
there is good reason to believe similar Court response to future constitutional challenge of the
DTA/MCA would not produce the same result. First, Congress is controlled by Democrats, who
have been ardent in their criticism of Guantanamo and have made efforts to "restore" habeas rights
to Guantanamo detainees. See Jonathan Weisman, GOP Blocks Bid on Rights of Detainees, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 2007, at A05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/09/19/AR2007091900873.html. Second, the makeup of the Court could likely change. Come
January 2009, six of the nine Justices will be seventy or older, and the Obama administration could
witness new changes on the Court. See Steven G. Calabresi & John 0. McGinnis, McCain and the
Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2008, at A14.
394. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (No. 06-
1195, 06-1196), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/06-1195.pdf
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. It was a practical problem. But the fact is that the
effectiveness of habeas jurisdiction, for example, in requiring new trials, and so on,
depends upon the ultimate sanction, which is the authority of the court to let somebody
go if the Government does not comply with a condition. And the-the Government
practice so far under the DTA seems quite contrary to that.
GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, again, Justice Souter, what I would say is simply this: that
if what the Constitution requires to make the DTA to be an adequate substitute is the
power to order release, there is no obstacle in the text of the DTA to that. And the All
Writs Act is available to allow them to order release to protect their jurisdiction under the
DTA.
Id.
395. See id. at 36.
396. See id. at 37.
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a detainee's release in the event he successfully challenges his CSRT
determination, it does not specifically foreclose the opportunity. 397 This
interpretive gap leaves room for the Court to construe the DTA review
process to comply with constitutional requirements, and the same option is
available with respect to the MCA as well.3 98 Thus, it can be said that the
DTA and MCA fully express the essential protections of the Great Writ
because they provide no obstacle for the ultimate vindication of the habeas
right. Furthermore, the statutes provide these protections while respecting
the Executive's authority to "wage war successfully. '"3 99
5. Robust Appellate Review and Respect for Presidential Wartime
Authority
The DTA and MCA were enacted to refute the Court's determination
that President Bush had overstepped his wartime authority.400  The
legislative history demonstrates that congressional sponsors sought to restore
the status quo ante with respect to President Bush's decisions to detain and
prosecute detainees. 4° 1  These sponsors argued that Eisentrager correctly
rejected the habeas claims of alien enemies detained overseas and deferred
to Executive wartime decision-making.4 2 The DTA and MCA incorporated
this understanding into the appellate review process, ensuring it would not
handcuff the President's prosecution of the war.403 The comity between the
statutory review process and the President's wartime authority demonstrates
that Congress properly exercised its authority when it enacted the DTA and
MCA.
397. Id.; see supra note 394 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
399. The Supreme Court has held that the power to wage war is "the power to wage war
successfully." See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (quoting Charles Evans
Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 42 A.B.A. Rep. 232, 238 (1917)).
400. See supra notes 243-47, 272-74 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
402. Id.
403. The appellate review is focused in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and as noted above,
requires the government to provide all reasonably available information, not all information that
might pertain to a detainee without regard to whether it is reasonably available. See supra note 304
and accompanying text. Furthermore, the appellate review encompasses both factual and legal
review of CSRT determinations, but with respect to military commission judgments, the MCA
mandates only legal review. See supra note 378 and accompanying text. These limitations
demonstrate Congress' desire to strike an appropriate balance between granting detainees a viable
process to challenge their detentions and respecting the President's authority to determine detention
and prosecution procedures.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BROADER WAR
The legal debate over detainee rights has profoundly affected the
prosecution of the war by forcing the Executive to wage battle against
radical Islamic jihadists on multiple fronts. The campaigns in Iraq and
Afghanistan have resulted in the killing or capturing of thousands of Al
Qaeda and Taliban members 4°4 committed to the destruction of the
government whose legal system has, since 2004, been accommodating their
efforts to hamstring the Executive's prosecution of the war.4 °5 It is too soon
to tell whether the military accomplishments realized abroad will withstand
the legal assaults waged within the United States, especially if enemies who
are vanquished on foreign battlefields are able to assert legal claims against
their victors in American courts.4 06 Such an absurd scenario was rightly
unthinkable before 2004.
404. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2008), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-13.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) ("When
we met last year, al Qaeda had sanctuaries in many areas of Iraq, and their leaders had just offered
American forces safe passage out of the country. Today, it is al Qaeda that is searching for safe
passage. They have been driven from many of the strongholds they once held, and over the past
year, we've captured or killed thousands of extremists in Iraq, including hundreds of key al Qaeda
leaders and operatives.").
405. See supra notes 207-20 and accompanying text. See also Gitmo and al Qaeda, WALL ST. J.,
July 26, 2007, at A12, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=
110010383 ("While Guantanamo is clearly disliked around the world, those who want to close it
have yet to offer a suitable alternative. Transferring its detainees to some place further offshore
would mean spending billions of more dollars on a new facility, while facing the same criticism
from antiwar activists. Gitmo is also territory under U.S. control, which means it avoids the
complication of embarrassing allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, or somewhere else (as in the 'secret CIA
prisons' in Europe where KSM and other 9/11 plotters were allegedly kept before their transfer to
Gitmo in 2006). The legality of Guantanamo has also been upheld by the Supreme Court, which
isn't true of any other foreign outpost. The High Court has agreed to hear another Gitmo-related
case in October, and it's not a bad idea to remind the Justices that Guantanamo harbors terrorists
captured on the current battlefield while trying to kill Americans. That fact might give them pause
before they supplant their own war judgment for the Commander in Chief's and make it easier for
these killers to return to the war. The real goal of Guantanamo's critics is to have these killers
treated like common criminals in American courts. That would make it impossible to deny them the
full array of U.S. legal protections. In many cases, prosecutors would lack enough evidence to
convict them under normal trial rules, especially if much of the evidence were classified. Soldiers
don't build a criminal case like 'C.S.l.' sleuths when they're snagging an enemy on the battlefield
while also trying to avoid getting killed. The result of bringing Gitmo detainees into U.S. criminal
courts would inevitably be their widespread release-which means leaving them free to kill
Americans again. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point recently examined the non-
classified evidence about Gitmo detainees, and in a new report concludes that 73% were a
'demonstrated threat' to U.S. forces. No less than 95% were a 'potential threat.' According to the
Pentagon, at least 30 former Gitmo detainees have returned to fight Americans after deceiving U.S.
interrogators and being released. One of those detainees, Abdullah Mahsud, was captured in
northern Afghanistan in late 2001, held until March 2004, and upon release immediately became a
Taliban leader in southern Waziristan near the Afghan-Pakistan border. In October 2004, he
directed the kidnapping of two Chinese engineers, one of whom was killed during a rescue attempt.
This week he blew himself up with a grenade rather than surrender to Pakistani troops who had him
surrounded.").
406. This was the practical import of the Rasul decision. Emblematic of this problem specifically,
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It is beyond dispute that there are important constitutional questions at
stake in the detainee litigation, at least if one believes the Constitution
invests America's enemies with rights traditionally afforded to citizens, 407 or
law abiding resident aliens. 408  Longstanding precedent held, for good
reason, 40 9 that enemy aliens detained abroad had neither constitutional nor
and more generally the American legal profession's willingness to use captured terrorists as a
vehicle for contesting the prosecution of the war and punishing those who assisted in its prosecution
was the January 2008 lawsuit brought by convicted terrorist Jose Padilla against John Yoo, a Boalt
Hall professor and former Justice Department official for President Bush. See John Yoo, Terrorist
Tort Travesty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB12007033358030191 .html. The lawsuit was made possible by lawyers and students from Yale
Law School, who are attempting to use such suits to protest the war. Id. ("Last week, I (a former
Bush administration official) was sued by Jos6 Padilla-a 37-year-old al Qaeda operative convicted
last summer of setting up a terrorist cell in Miami. Padilla wants a declaration that his detention by
the U.S. government was unconstitutional, $1 in damages, and all of the fees charged by his own
attorneys. The lawsuit by Padilla and his Yale Law School lawyers is an effort to open another front
against U.S. anti-terrorism policies. If he succeeds, it won't be long before opponents of the war on
terror use the courtroom to reverse the wartime measures needed to defeat those responsible for
killing 3,000 Americans on 9/11. On Thursday, a federal judge moved closer to sentencing Padilla
to life in prison. After being recruited by al Qaeda agents in the late 1990s, Padilla left for Egypt in
1998 and reached terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in 2000. American officials stopped him at
Chicago O'Hare airport in 2002, based on intelligence gained from captured al Qaeda leaders that he
was plotting a dirty bomb attack. President Bush declared Padilla an enemy combatant and ordered
him sent to a naval brig in South Carolina. After a federal appeals court rejected Padilla's plea for
release, the government transferred him to Miami for trial for al Qaeda conspiracies unrelated to the
dirty bomb plot. Federal prosecutors described Padilla as 'a trained al-Qaeda killer,' and a jury
convicted him of conspiring to commit murder, kidnapping and maiming, and of providing material
support to terrorists. Now Padilla and his lawyers are trying to use our own courts to attack the
government officials who stopped him. They claim that the government cannot detain Padilla as an
enemy combatant, but instead can only hold and try him as a criminal. Padilla alleges that he was
abused in military custody-based primarily on his claim that he was held in isolation and not
allowed to meet with lawyers. But enemy prisoners in wartime never before received the right to
counsel or a civilian trial because, as the Supreme Court observed in 2004, the purpose of detention
is not to punish, but to prevent the enemy from returning to the fight. Under Padilla's theory, the
U.S. is not at war, so any citizen killed or captured by the CIA or the military can sue.").
407. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("Because the Government's
obligation of protection is correlative with the duty of loyal support inherent in the citizen's
allegiance, Congress has directed the President to exert the full diplomatic and political power of the
United States on behalf of any citizen, but of no other, in jeopardy abroad. When any citizen is
deprived of his liberty by any foreign government, it is made the duty of the President to demand the
reasons and, if the detention appears wrongful, to use means not amounting to acts of war to
effectuate his release. It is neither sentimentality nor chauvinism to repeat that 'Citizenship is a high
privilege.' United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467.")
408. Id. at 778.
409. It is hard to consider the magnitude of the Rasul decision and how it will affect further
wartime litigation because there is nothing in the text of the opinion to suggest its rationale extends
beyond Guantanamo. One hopes that will be the extent of its reach, for there is no principled way to
distinguish, for purposes of the habeas statute, between those military areas where the United States
military exercises "exclusive control" and those where it does not. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
498-99 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The consequence of this holding, as applied to aliens outside
statutory access to habeas.410  The long-term effects of Rasul's quasi-
overturning of this pragmatic rule are hard to discern. 4 11 The even more
difficult, and potentially unsettling question is, whether the Court will
continue its recent discovery of the apparently long-dormant rights due
aliens detained abroad as unlawful enemy belligerents.4 12
Furthermore, the Court's willingness to actively intrude on the
Executive's prosecution of the war is also reason for concern.413 But history
the country, is breathtaking. It permits an alien captured in a foreign theater of active combat to
bring a § 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense. Over the course of the last century, the
United States has held millions of alien prisoners abroad. See, e.g., Department of Army, G. Lewis
& J. Mewha, HISTORY OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776-
1945, Pamphlet No. 20-213, p. 244 (1955) (noting that, '[b]y the end of hostilities [in World War I1],
U.S. forces had in custody approximately two million enemy soldiers'). A great many of these
prisoners would no doubt have complained about the circumstances of their capture and the terms of
their confinement. The military is currently detaining over 600 prisoners at Guantanamo Bay alone;
each detainee undoubtedly has complaints-real or contrived-about those terms and circumstances.
The Court's unheralded expansion of federal-court jurisdiction is not even mitigated by a comforting
assurance that the legion of ensuing claims will be easily resolved on the merits. To the contrary, the
Court says that the '[p]etitioners' allegations ... unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' From this point forward, federal courts will
entertain petitions from these prisoners, and others like them around the world, challenging actions
and events far away, and forcing the courts to oversee one aspect of the Executive's conduct of a
foreign war.") (citations omitted).
410. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768.
411. See Kmiec, supra note 16, at 880 ("Can the damage to the successful conduct of the war be
contained? Yes and no. Yes, because just as the Court's statutory construction was more the
product of assertion than reasoning, so too, its scope was by like declaration limited to the unique
confines of Guantanamo Bay. Justice Stevens and the Rasul majority do not explicitly limit the
holding to Cuba, but it can be inferred from the Court's casual dismissal of the customary rule
against the extraterritorial application of statutes.").
412. See Bialke, supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A.
Casey, Gitmo Goes to Court: The Judiciary Has No Business Managing How We Fight Wars
Abroad, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://www.opinionjoumal.com/editorial/
feature.html?id=l 10010949 ("Because the Constitution does not apply to foreigners overseas, the
procedural rights accorded to the Guantanamo detainees are a matter exclusively for the political
branches. Subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny would overstep the judiciary's legitimate
power, making it the ultimate arbiter of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, if the court were to grant
constitutionally based habeas rights to aliens overseas, there is no principled means of avoiding
extension of the entire Constitution anywhere in the world where U.S. forces (or officials) may go.
For the first time in American history, an entire panoply of the federal government's overseas
actions directed at foreigners, including surveillance and even use of deadly force, would become
subject to constitutional strictures. This would transform the U.S. into a Gulliver, bound by its own
judicial strings, on the international stage.").
413. Numerous constitutional authorities, from Alexander Hamilton to Justice Robert Jackson,
have held that the Executive reigns supreme in matters of foreign affairs. The energy and dispatch
with which the Executive can respond to crises has traditionally warranted it great deference by the
Court in its exercise of its Article 11 authority. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948)
("Accordingly, we hold that full responsibility for the just exercise of this great power may validly
be left where the Congress has constitutionally placed it-on the President of the United States. The
Founders in their wisdom made him not only the Commander-in-Chief but also the guiding organ in
the conduct of our foreign affairs. He who was entrusted with such vast powers in relation to the
outside world was also entrusted by Congress, almost throughout the whole life of the nation, with
the disposition of alien enemies during a state of war. Such a page of history is worth more than a
volume of rhetoric.").
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suggests this fact might have more to do with the perceived political
weakness of the Executive rather than any fundamental shift in the
separation of powers.4 14 This rationale, however, does not alter the reality
that the Court has asserted itself into affairs more properly managed by the
political branches, and there is no reason to expect the Court's forays into
foreign affairs to necessarily have the intended result, either at home or
abroad.4 5  The wisdom of the Eisentrager Court is still prescient today as
414. See Pushaw, supra note 140, at 1077-78 ("As with the 2004 detention decisions, then,
Hamdan is a setback for the President, but hardly the devastating blow imagined by many
commentators. The Court has not plunged into a brave new world of bold judicial review. Rather,
four Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) embraced strong executive power; two others
(Kennedy and Breyer) concurred to emphasize the limited nature of the Court's holding; and even
Justice Stevens and his allies did not question the President's authority to detain alien enemy
combatants like Hamdan or to try them outside of the ordinary federal court system. Rather, the
majority seized an opportunity to check a politically vulnerable President by requiring him to obtain
unmistakable authorization from Congress before using military commissions in a nonemergency
situation where regular procedures could be followed. The Court conspicuously avoided grand
constitutional pronouncements and focused on the particular circumstances. The situation, and
hence the Court's approach, could change in an instant. For example, if the terrorists had succeeded
in their July 2006 plot to blow up ten planes bound from England to the United States, Americans
would have clamored for much tighter security measures and harsh treatment of the perpetrators. In
such a climate, the Justices would become more reluctant to guarantee procedural niceties to accused
terrorists. Overall, the four "enemy combatant" decisions follow a historical pattern in which the
Court has curbed the President and vindicated individual rights when politically feasible to do so.
Such cases represent a statistical minority, however, as the Justices usually defer to the military
judgments of the majoritarian branches, often because they have no other realistic choice. If the
terrorists escalate their attacks and the President responds aggressively, history suggests that the
Court will back down.") (footnotes omitted).
415. Serious questions have been raised regarding how the granting of constitutional rights to
those at Guantanamo will affect future presidents' decisions of where to detain enemies captured
abroad. See Robert Haddick, Judicial Imperialism: The U.S. Supreme Court May Expand its Power
at the Expense of Other Countries' Sovereignty, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.opinionjoumal.com/federation/feature/?id=l 10011038 ("If the Supreme Court grants all
of these habeas corpus claims, it will do so with the belief that it is extending its supposedly
civilizing influence to parts of the globe it feels would benefit from that authority. Yet, its actions
would have the opposite effect. In the future, no U.S. president would ever contemplate bringing
war prisoners to the United States, to Guantanamo Bay or any other place that the U.S. court system
might see fit to get its hands on. In fact, the U.S. military could find it preferable, at least less legally
bothersome, to 'subcontract' such things as prisoner-holding and interrogations to allied countries,
or, where none are available, friendly tribes and militias. And if this doesn't reduce the legal
nightmare caused by capturing detainees, the U.S. and its tribal allies might just be inclined not to
take any prisoners. Why use rifles and pistols to raid a suspected terror safe-house when a laser-
guided bomb will do? Such a practice would reduce the amount of intelligence U.S. military units
might have otherwise received from live detainees. Or maybe not, if some judges feel especially
inclined to micromanage the war effort. During the past six years of conflict, nothing has caused
more embarrassment and grief to the U.S. military than the detainees it has acquired. Knowing what
it knows now, the Bush administration would never have established the detainee camp at
Guantanamo Bay. Future presidents will also learn from this experience. They could be forced into
a course that will result in much less visibility for future prisoners, and as a consequence, much less
humane treatment.").
201
the Court considers whether America's most determined and dangerous
enemies are proper recipients of America's most treasured rights.4 16
A Supreme Court holding that the DTA/MCA review process is a proper
exercise of congressional authority in the detainee context would affirm
Congress's ability to determine the habeas rights of those traditionally
falling outside of constitutional protections. 417 In the absence of Supreme
Court jurisprudence providing for a constitutional right to habeas, a decision
416. One of the frequent refrains of war critics is that having lost the "moral high ground" because
of the alleged scandals at Abu Ghraib and the so-called torture of detainees held at Guantanamo,
America needs to "restore" the constitutional rights of the detainees so that America will once again
be seen as an honest defender of individual rights. Further, despite the barbaric murders of Nicholas
Berg and Daniel Pearl to the contrary, these critics disingenuously assert that if America grants
constitutional rights to terrorists, those terrorists will somehow treat captured Americans more
humanely. The Eisentrager Court wisely noted how granting constitutional rights to America's
enemies does little more than frustrate the war effort while affording no reciprocal benefit to those
soldiers thus frustrated. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950) ("To grant the
writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the seas for hearing.
This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might
also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as
transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a
matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in the present
twilight between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort
to the enemy. They would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with
wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than
to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own
civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict
between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States. Moreover,
we could expect no reciprocity for placing the litigation weapon in unrestrained enemy hands. The
right of judicial refuge from military action, which it is proposed to bestow on the enemy, can
purchase no equivalent for benefit of our citizen soldiers. Except in England, whose law appears to
be in harmony with the views we have expressed, and other English-speaking peoples in whose
practice nothing has been cited to the contrary, the writ of habeas corpus is generally unknown.")
417. As noted above, Eisentrager specifically held that detainees had no constitutional access to
habeas, and that still seems to be the prevailing interpretation, even after the Rasul holding. See
Andrew C. McCarthy, The New Detainee Law Does Not Deny Habeas Corpus: Fear Not, New York
Times, Al Qaeda's Lawfare Rights Are Still Intact, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2006, available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YWNMjg3YWRNmNjMTkONDc1NzEOZW12YzBIOGRINz
U= ("The right against suspension of habeas corpus is found in the Constitution (art. 1, 9).
Constitutional rights belong only to Americans-that is, according to the Supreme Court, U.S.
citizens and those aliens who, by lawfully weaving themselves into the fabric of our society, have
become part of our national community (which is to say, lawful permanent resident aliens). To the
contrary, aliens with no immigration status who are captured and held outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, and whose only connection to our country is to wage a barbaric war
against it, do not have any rights, much less 'basic rights,' under our Constitution. Indeed, even
when the Supreme Court, in its radical 2004 Rasul case, opened the courthouse doors to enemy
fighters in wartime for the first time in American history, it relied not on the Constitution but on the
federal habeas corpus statute. So put aside that Rasul was an exercise in judicial legerdemain
whose holding depended on a distortion of both that statute and the long-established limitations on
the Court's own jurisdiction (which does not extend outside sovereign U.S. territory to places like
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Even in its willful determination to reach a result that rewarded al Qaeda's
lawfare, the Court declined to rule that alien combatants have fundamental habeas rights. Instead,
they have only what Congress chooses to give them-which Congress can change at any time.").
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recognizing that Congress properly resolved the habeas issue in the
DTA/MCA would confirm the principal that certain federal rights are
conferred and therefore expanded or limited by federal statutes. 41s Thus, a
new Congress would be able to amend or repeal the DTA/MCA as it sees
fit.4 19  Furthermore, recognition that the DTA/MCA establishes the
functional equivalent of habeas would support the Bush Administration's
claim that the rights afforded detainees in these statutes go far beyond those
ever provided to alien enemies.420 With respect to separation of powers, it
would support the related argument that the DTA/MCA represents an
appropriate wartime balancing by the political branches between the needs
of the Executive and the due process considerations of detainees.42 1
Conversely, a Supreme Court decision finding that the DTA/MCA are
not a proper exercise of congressional authority would likely require the
Court to delineate, as it did in Hamdi, the procedural rights of detainees in
light of their habeas rights.422 Such a decision would represent an unwise
judicial intervention in a wartime matter best left to the discretion of the
418. See Andrew C. McCarthy, Lawfare Strikes Again: The Fourth Circuit's combatant case
heralds the return of September 1 0 1h, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, June 12, 2007, available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YWVIMGZIMzJhN2EwMWUOYjlzZjkwOGRIOTBIY2UxYT
Q= ("Indeed, even in its awful 2004 Rasul v. Bush decision, which granted Qaeda detainees statutory
habeas rights, the Supreme Court declined to hold that aliens had constitutional rights-
notwithstanding that the Court majority had (erroneously) found them to be inside de facto U.S.
territory (i.e., Guantanamo Bay). And in its 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, which strained to
give excludable aliens constitutional due process rights, the Court was careful to qualify that it was
not addressing aliens involved in 'terrorism or other special circumstances where special arguments
might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of
the political branches with respect to matters of national security.' (Tellingly, Monday's panel
majority cites Zadvydas but elides mention of this crucial caveat.) Why is this distinction between
statutory and constitutional rights so vitally important? For two reasons. First, if rights are
conferred only by statute, Congress can eliminate or narrow them. In connection with enemy
combatants, it has done the latter-balancing due process and military necessity-by two major
pieces of legislation since 2005. These statutes (the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military
Commissions Act) permit military tribunals (to determine combatant status and try war crimes) and
limit review in the civilian courts to only the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and, ultimately, the
Supreme Court. If, however, the combatants' rights were deemed to be inherently constitutional,
that would mean unaccountable federal courts, not political officials answerable to Americans,
would take charge of determining how military detainees in wartime must be treated. This would be
a radical departure. The Supreme Court has acknowledged, repeatedly, that the detention and trial of
enemy combatants is a military determination committed to the political branches.").
419. Id.
420. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, 40, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (No. 06-
1195, 06-1196), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcipts/
06-1195.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
421. Id.
422. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IX, discussing the habeas
rights of detainees in light of Boumediene.
political branches, the Executive in particular.423 More significantly, since
the DTA/MCA clearly amended the federal habeas statute in order to restrict
the detainees' habeas rights, such a decision would likely require the Court
to either invalidate these statutes or attempt to distinguish them under a
dubious statutory interpretation like that demonstrated in Rasul.42 4 Most
troubling, this could lead the Court to possibly determine that detainees have
a constitutional right to habeas and other constitutional protections.4 5 Such
an unprecedented and unwarranted judicial extension of fundamental rights
would be a dangerous deviation from traditional constitutional practice.426
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will continue to wrestle with detainee cases as long
as America is engaged in the war on terror. As it does so, it would do well
to remember Justice Robert Jackson's warning that "the result of ... enemy
litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion
highly comforting to enemies of the United States., 427 Future litigation will
explore the full contours of detainees' rights, and the Obama Administration,
Congress, and the Supreme Court will surely be called upon to further
clarify which protections detainees are entitled to under federal law. They
must do so with great care. War always raises important and difficult
questions, and it will be sufficient if the ideas expressed here help shed light
on these historic and complex issues.
IX. POSTSCRIPT
42 8
On June 12, 2008, a bare majority of the Supreme Court decided
Boumediene v. Bush.42 9 The Court, speaking through Justice Kennedy, held
that detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus to challenge their
detentions; 430 that the review procedures in the DTA were not a sufficient
423. See supra notes 265, 418 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 214-16.
425. See McCarthy, supra note 417; see also infra Part IX. The Court did find a constitutional
right to habeas in Boumediene, and it remains to be seen what further substantive rights the Court
will now discover alien enemy combatants are entitled to under the Constitution.
426. Id.
427. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
428. This article was written prior to the Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008).
429. See id.
430. Id. at 2240. Justice Kennedy wrote that "practical concerns" and "objective factors," such as
the United States' exercise of de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay under the terms of the
lease with Cuba, warranted the extraterritorial extension of the fundamental constitutional habeas
right to the detainees held there. Id. at 2258. Allowing the political branches to determine what
constitutes sovereign United States territory, Justice Kennedy maintained, did not imply a
coterminous ability for the political branches to decide when the Constitution would or would not
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substitute for habeas corpus; 43 ' and therefore that the MCA provision that
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear detainee habeas claims was an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 32 The Court left
the district court to determine whether the President has the authority to
apply in such territories. Id. Those questions, Justice Kennedy held, remain the province of the
Court. Id. at 2259. Allowing the political branches to decide such issues would violate fundamental
separation of powers principles, under which the Supreme Court decides "what the law is." Id.
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)).
431. The Court compared the protections that had been afforded to the Eisentrager petitioners and
found that those provided to the detainees fell short of the habeas standard. Id. at 2260. Justice
Kennedy wrote that "the procedural protections afforded to the detainees in the CSRT hearings are
far more limited . . . and fall well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would
eliminate the need for habeas corpus review." Id. In particular, Justice Kennedy referred to the fact
that
[a]lthough the detainee is assigned a "Personal Representative" ... that person is not the
detainee's lawyer . . . . The Government's evidence is accorded a presumption of
validity .... [The detainee's] ability to rebut the Government's evidence against him is
limited by the circumstances of his confinement and his lack of counsel at this stage.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Additionally, Justice Kennedy was concerned that "although the
detainee can seek review of his status determination in the Court of Appeals, that review process
cannot cure all defects in the earlier proceedings." Id. Concerning the evidentiary provisions of the
DTA, Justice Kennedy found the statute lacking because there is "no way to construe the statute to
allow what is also constitutionally required in this context: an opportunity for the detainee to present
relevant exculpatory evidence that was not made part of the record in the earlier proceedings." Id. at
2272. Along the same lines, Justice Kennedy expressed the majority's concern with the appellate
review provision under the DTA when he pointed out that
[t]here is no language in the DTA that can be construed to allow the Court of Appeals to
admit and consider newly discovered evidence that could not have been made part of the
CSRT record because it was unavailable to either the Government or the detainee when
the CSRT made its findings.
Id. at 2273. In essence,
[bly foreclosing consideration of evidence not presented or reasonably available to the
detainee at the CSRT proceedings, the DTA disadvantages the detainee by limiting the
scope of collateral review to a record that may not be accurate or complete. In other
contexts, e.g., in post-trial habeas cases where the prisoner already has had a full and fair
opportunity to develop the factual predicate of his claims, similar limitations on the scope
of habeas review may be appropriate.
Id. Additionally, the Court found it "troubling" that "[t]he DTA does not explicitly empower the
Court of Appeals to order the applicant in a DTA review proceeding released should the court find
that the standards and procedures used at his CSRT hearing were insufficient to justify detention."
Id. at 2271.
432. Id. at 2274. The extension of the writ and rejection of the DTA review process means that
detainees are now entitled to forgo that process. Instead, they may seek immediate habeas hearings
in federal district court. Id. at 2275. The Court held:
To require these detainees to complete DTA review before proceeding with their habeas
corpus actions would be to require additional months, if not years, of delay .... While
some delay in fashioning new procedures is unavoidable, the costs of delay can no longer
be borne by those who are held in custody. The detainees in these cases are entitled to a
prompt habeas corpus hearing.
Id.
detain individual detainees, whether the writ must issue for each individual
detainee, and the scope of evidentiary procedures for dealing with classified
information.4 33
Chief Justice Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito.434 Chief Justice Roberts rightly critiqued the majority
for its failure to address what he considers the "critical threshold
question"-whether the DTA review system sufficiently protects the
detainees' rights, whatever they may be. 435  He also questioned the
majority's claim that directing detainees to file habeas claims in federal
district courts will resolve their legal uncertainties more expeditiously or
consistently than if they had simply proceeded through the two-tiered DTA
review system.436 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts accused the majority
433. Id. at 2241, 2276.
434. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
435. Id. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the most important consideration "in these cases, prior
to any inquiry about the writ's scope, is whether the system the political branches designed protects
whatever rights the detainees may possess. If so, there is no need for any additional process,
whether called 'habeas' or something else." Id. The majority's error, he noted, is that "its opinion
fails to determine what rights the detainees possess and whether the DTA system satisfies them. The
majority instead compares the undefined DTA process to an equally undefined habeas right--one
that is to be given shape only in the future by district courts on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 2280.
"This whole approach," he argued, "is misguided." Id. Furthermore, the out-of-hand rejection of the
DTA process without any critical analysis of what might replace it belies the majority's true
purpose: asserting control over federal detainee policy. Id. at 2279. Given the lack of clear habeas
standards provided by the majority to replace the allegedly inadequate DTA system, "[a]ll that
today's opinion has done is shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign policy and national
security decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary." Id. at 2280. At bottom, Chief
Justice Roberts was clearly uneasy with the ease with which the majority disregards a painstakingly
created two-part legal system fashioned by the political branches to address the complex legal issues
surrounding the detainees. As he noted,
this Court does not require petitioners to exhaust their remedies under the statute; it does
not wait to see whether those remedies will prove sufficient to protect petitioners' rights.
Instead, it not only denies the D.C. Circuit the opportunity to assess the statute's
remedies, it refuses to do so itself: the majority expressly declines to decide whether the
CSRT procedures, coupled with Article III review, satisfy due process.
Id. at 2280. He found it "grossly premature" for the Court "to pronounce on the detainees' right to
habeas without first assessing whether the remedies the DTA system provides vindicate whatever
rights petitioners may claim." Id. at 2280-81. He did not foreclose the possibility that at some
future date it might be necessary to resort to the writ if the alternative measures Congress provided
in the CSRTs and DTA review prove inadequate substitutes; the crucial point is that that day has not
yet arrived. Id. at 2281. In the meantime, analyzing the potential sufficiency of the CSRTs and
DTA is little more than futile speculation that violates the canons of constitutional avoidance and
judicial restraint. Id. at 2282.
436. Id. at 2282. Indeed, under the new system mandated by the Court, detainees will be forced to
complete their CSRT hearing, and then file a habeas appeal in a federal district court. Id. This in
effect adds another step in the review process; where detainees could appeal directly to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals from their CSRT determination under the DTA review process, now they
must first appeal to a federal district court in Washington. Id. And, in light of the fact that the
Court's majority opinion provides no clear guidelines on how the district courts are supposed to
implement the Court's ruling, there is a good chance conflicting rulings will only result in greater
litigation. As the Chief Justice wrote,
[tihe effect of the Court's decision is to add additional layers of quite possibly redundant
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of failing to comprehend the DTA itself.437 He noted that its two-tiered
review system, which was created in response to the Court's Hamdi decision
concerning the due process rights of American citizens detained as
combatants, was surely protective enough of the due process rights of non-
citizen combatants.438 Finally, Chief Justice Roberts surveyed the alleged
deficiencies of the DTA review process noted by the majority and concluded
that "the DTA satisfies the majority's own criteria for assessing
adequacy., 439 In conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts asserted again what he
noted at the introduction to his dissent-in short, that "[t]his statutory
scheme provides the combatants held at Guantanamo greater procedural
protections than have ever been afforded alleged enemy detainees-whether
citizens or aliens-in our national history.
4 40
Justice Scalia's lengthy dissent was joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. 44 1 After discussing the atrocities wrought
by the radical Islamists the United States is currently fighting, Justice Scalia
concentrated his dissent on several key principles. First, the writ has never
extended to aliens detained abroad.442 Second, the Court's decision damages
the Executive branch's ability to rely on the Court's precedent and harms the
review. And because nobody knows how these new layers of "habeas" review will
operate, or what new procedures they will require, their contours will undoubtedly be
subject to fresh bouts of litigation. If the majority were truly concerned about delay, it
would have required petitioners to use the DTA process that has been available to them
for 2 1/2 years, with its Article HII review in the D.C. Circuit.
Id.
437. Id. at 2283-84.
438. Id. at 2285. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the DTA needs to be understood in light of the
Court's Hamdi decision, and that the majority's disregard of Hamdi indicated that the Court is not
respecting Congress's good faith effort to comply with that ruling.
The use of a military tribunal such as the CSRTs to review the aliens' detention should be
familiar to this Court in light of the Hamdi plurality, which said that the due process
rights enjoyed by American citizens detained as enemy combatants could be vindicated
"by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal." 542 U.S., at
538, 124 S. Ct. 2633. The DTA represents Congress' considered attempt to provide the
accused alien combatants detained at Guantanamo a constitutionally adequate
opportunity to contest their detentions before just such a tribunal.
Id. at 2284. "In short, the Hamdi plurality concluded that this type of review would be enough to
satisfy due process, even for citizens. See 542 U.S., at 538, 124 S. Ct. 2633. Congress followed the
Court's lead, only to find itself the victim of a constitutional bait and switch." Id. at 2284-85.
439. Id. at 2293.
440. Id.
441. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
442. Id. at 2294 ("My problem with today's opinion is more fundamental still: The writ of habeas
corpus does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad; the Suspension Clause thus has no
application, and the Court's intervention in this military matter is entirely ultra vires.").
war effort.443 Third, the decision represents an unwise judiciary intervention
in foreign affairs when it is the least qualified branch to do so. 444 Fourth,
there is no possible Suspension Clause violation because "[t]he writ as
preserved in the Constitution could not possibly extend farther than the
common law provided when that Clause was written." 445 Fifth, the Court's
Eisentrager decision decisively forecloses the possibility of the writ
extending to aliens detained beyond the territorial sovereignty of the United
States. 446  Sixth, Eisentrager in no way provides the elements of the
"functional" test underlying the majority decision.447 Finally, Justice Scalia
argued that what truly animated the majority's opinion was an effort to
assure judicial branch supremacy in detainee decisionmaking at the expense
of the political branches.448
Several brief observations are appropriate. First, it is important to
reiterate that the only provision struck down by the Supreme Court in
443. Id. at 2294 ("The game of bait-and-switch that today's opinion plays upon the Nation's
Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans
to be killed. That consequence would be tolerable if necessary to preserve a time-honored legal
principle vital to our constitutional Republic. But it is this Court's blatant abandonment of such a
principle that produces the decision today. The President relied on our settled precedent in Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950), when he established the prison at
Guantanamo Bay for enemy aliens."). Justice Scalia also highlighted recent examples of detainees
rejoining the fight after being released from Guantanamo. Id. at 2295 ("Another former detainee
promptly resumed his post as a senior Taliban commander and murdered a United Nations engineer
and three Afghan soldiers. Still another murdered an Afghan judge. It was reported only last month
[May 2008] that a released detainee carried out a suicide bombing against Iraqi soldiers in Mosul,
Iraq.") (citations omitted).
444. Id. at 2296 ("What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of
Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever. But the Court blunders in nonetheless.
Henceforth, as today's opinion makes unnervingly clear, how to handle enemy prisoners in this war
will ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the national security concerns that the
subject entails.").
445. Id. at 2297.
446. Id. at 2298-99 ("Eisentrager thus held-held beyond any doubt-that the Constitution does
not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United States in areas over which our Government is not
sovereign.").
447. Id. at 2302 ("The rule that aliens abroad are not constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus has
not proved unworkable in practice; if anything, it is the Court's 'functional' test that does not (and
never will) provide clear guidance for the future. Eisentrager forms a coherent whole with the
accepted proposition that aliens abroad have no substantive rights under our Constitution. Since it
was announced, no relevant factual premises have changed.").
448. Id. at 2302 ("What drives today's decision is neither the meaning of the Suspension Clause,
nor the principles of our precedents, but rather an inflated notion ofjudicial supremacy."). Putting it
another way, Justice Scalia said that
[t]he gap between rationale and rule leads me to conclude that the Court's ultimate,
unexpressed goal is to preserve the power to review the confinement of enemy prisoners
held by the Executive anywhere in the world. The 'functional' test usefully evades the
precedential landmine of Eisentrager but is so inherently subjective that it clears a wide
path for the Court to traverse in the years to come.
ld.
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Boumediene is the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the MCA. 449 Second,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia are rightfully concerned about the
lack of procedural guidelines and substantive standards provided by the
Boumediene majority to guide the district court judges tasked to implement
the Court's decision.45 0  Detainee trials in federal district court in
Washington, D.C., began in November 2008 before Judge Richard Leon.451
There is little reason to be optimistic that the procedures and rulings
emerging from those trials will be consistent with similar trials occurring in
other federal district courts.452 The only predictable result is years of more
449. Id. at 2275 ("The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA § 7, 28 U.S.C.A. §
2241(e) (Supp.2007). Accordingly, both the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact."). The
recent trial and conviction of Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's driver, by a Guantanamo Bay
military commission demonstrates the continuing vitality of that process. See Carol J. Williams, Bin
Laden Driver Convicted at Guantanamo of Aiding Terror, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/ aug/07/nation/na-hamdan7.
450. See Andrew C. McCarthy, A Quick Way Forward After Boumediene, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,
June 16, 2008, available at http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZGEwMTY5YTU3NGRiOWU
yMzkxZTU3MDE1ZWUwMDYxOTM=&w=MA= ("The most reprehensible aspect of the
Boumediene ruling is thus Justice Kennedy's diktat that all 'questions regarding the legality of the
detention [of combatants] are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court'-as if
Congress, the law writing branch of our government, had nothing to say about them. Congress must
ignore that brazen overstatement. Boumediene is a terrible decision, but all it means for the moment
is that the jihadists held at Guantanamo Bay have been given the opportunity to press their cases-
i.e., to seek their release from custody-in the federal district courts. The combatants have not been
ordered released, and the narrow majority did not presume to prescribe a procedure for how the
district courts should handle those cases.").
451. See William Glaberson, Judge Opens First Habeas Corpus Hearing on Guantanamo
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l 1/07/washington/
07/washington/07gitmo.html?_r- &scp= 12&sq=Guantanamo%20Bay&st=cse&oref slogin ("After
years of legal clashes over whether detainees have the right to contest their detention in court, a
federal judge on Thursday opened the first hearing into the government's justification for holding
suspects at the naval base at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba. But after opening statements that did not
detail the evidence, the judge, Richard J. Leon of Federal District Court here, closed the courtroom,
saying the evidence was classified.").
452. As Justice Kennedy noted in the majority opinion, the Court's decision only struck down
jurisdiction-stripping provision of section 2241(e). See supra note 449 and accompanying text. But
the second portion of the statute aimed to preclude federal courts from hearing detainee appeals
concerning any other aspect of their confinement. Federal district court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina
was recently forced to consider whether the Boumediene decision invalidated the second section of
section 2241(e). See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Analysis: What Did Boumediene
Strike Down?, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-what-did-boumediene-strike-down/ (Aug. 7,
2008, 8:11 pm EST). Judge Urbina faced an appeal from six detainees seeking a transfer from one
Guantanamo camp to another. Id. They claimed the desired camp was more human than their
current conditions. Id. While not fully accepting the Justice Department's claim that Boumediene
did not affect the section part section 2241, Judge Urbina found that given the security concerns
presented by the military and the uncertainty of Boumediene regarding the second part of section
2241, the military did not have to order the transfer of the prisoners. Id. ("Judge Urbina is one of 15
District judges in Washington who, sooner rather than later, will be deciding detainee habeas cases,
including the kinds of claims that implicate Section 7(e)'s second part. In addition, the D.C. Circuit
litigation, and there is no guarantee that litigation will be any more helpful
than the two-tiered DTA review system in articulating the procedural and
substantive protections to which the detainees are entitled. What does seem
abundantly clear is that the Court's most recent foray into foreign affairs has
produced far more chaos when certainty is needed.453 Chief Justice Roberts
was sadly accurate when he called the decision a "constitutional bait and
switch., 45 4 If the political branches cannot rely on a fifty-year precedent like
Eisentrager when fashioning war policy, there is little reason for them to
place any reliance on a deeply flawed, constitutionally suspect decision like
Boumediene.455
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already has before it some of the same issues-particularly issues about conditions of confinement,
and about transfers out of Guantanamo. It is by no means clear that this array of judges will reach
the same conclusions, thus raising the distinct possibility that the Supreme Court may have to say
what it actually meant on June 12.").
453. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("So who has won?
Not the detainees. The Court's analysis leaves them with only the prospect of further litigation to
determine the content of their new habeas right, followed by further litigation to resolve their
particular cases, followed by further litigation before the D.C. Circuit-where they could have
started had they invoked the DTA procedure. Not Congress, whose attempt to 'determine-through
democratic means-how best' to balance the security of the American people with the detainees'
liberty interests, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557, 636, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 165 L. Ed.2d 723
(2006) (BREYER, J., concurring), has been unceremoniously brushed aside. Not the Great Writ,
whose majesty is hardly enhanced by its extension to a jurisdictionally quirky outpost, with no
tangible benefit to anyone. Not the rule of law, unless by that is meant the rule of lawyers, who will
now arguably have a greater role than military and intelligence officials in shaping policy for alien
enemy combatants. And certainly not the American people, who today lose a bit more control over
the conduct of this Nation's foreign policy to unelected, politically unaccountable judges.").
454. Id. at 2285.
455. See supra note 435 and accompanying text. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out at length,
not one detainee has yet to exercise his full rights under the DTA review system. Id. Thus, it is
impossible for the Court to conclude that the DTA system is not sufficiently protective of the
detainees' constitutional rights. Id. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the decision is anything but a
politically driven facial challenge to a statutory scheme that has yet to fully run its course. The
political angle appears even clearer when one considers the substantial international and domestic
pressure to close Guantanamo and the fact that the Court majority was comprised of the same five
Justices that have routinely opposed the Administration's war policies since the detainee decisions
began in 2004; see also McCarthy, supra note 450 ("If you can follow this, the bloc of liberal
justices reasons that the framers designed our fundamental law to empower enemies of the American
people to use the American people's courts as a weapon to compel the American people's
commander-in-chief to justify his actions during a war overwhelmingly authorized by the American
people's elected representatives ... even as those enemies continue killing Americans.").
* J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, May 2009. 1 wish to thank Professor
Douglas Kmiec for his insights; my former White House colleagues for their inspiring and untiring
devotion to our nation; and, most importantly, my family for their support and encouragement. This
article is dedicated to the men and women of the United States military, whose heroic service
safeguards the freedoms we enjoy under the law. Many brave soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines
have given their lives in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Men like Paul
Smith, Ross McGinnis, Michael P. Murphy, Matthew Axelson, and Danny Dietz gave what
President Lincoln called "the last full measure of devotion." Our country owes them and their
families a debt we can never repay. I would also like to pay special tribute to the Greene family of
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Thousand Oaks, California. All of the Greene children - Byron, Spencer, and Laura - are serving in
the United States Army and have completed tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. As America grapples
with the legalities of twenty-first century warfare, it must do so in a way that honors the "cherished
memory of the loved and lost," of those who daily offer "so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of
freedom." Truly, "greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."
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